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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the positioning of white, English-speaking, immigrant 
women from Africa to Australia. I explore the effects that minimal differences 
have on issues of identity. Notions of identity, memory, and belonging are 
contrasted with white settlement in Rhodesia in the last century. My personal 
history and the desire to write a thesis relevant to the Australian experience led 
me to ask, “How do women from a privileged background, from Rhodesia and 
Zimbabwe, understand their experiences as immigrants to Australia?” The 
relevance lies in the perception that Australia is populated by immigrants and this 
research interrogates at a deeper level some specific issues presented by this 
sample group and my interpretation of their experiences augments the literature in 
this area. I questioned (individually) a small group of immigrants using 
unstructured interviews; the use of my own experiences and ‘long/desk drawer’ 
makes the study significantly autobiographical. Notions of migration into 
Australia from Southern Africa are explored using theories and themes of rites de 
passage. I interrogate the meanings attributed to assimilation and integration in 
immigration and connect these to the theory. Identity, memory, and reflection are 
discussed in the context of separation from Africa and integration into Australia. 
The similarities and differences and embodied history (habitus) that shape us, 
interweave the trope of rites de passage, uncovering a multiplicity of identity—
attributed, assumed, and self-determined. I examine the ways in which 
Australians of Anglo-Saxon and British origin tend to position English-speaking 
immigrants from non-British backgrounds as outsiders and suggest that this 
attribution has more to do with similarities than differences. Reflection and   vi
discussion of other times and places reveals how memories intersect with ‘new’ 
lives in Australia and the complexities of time in migration as rites de passage 
make possible an exploration of present experience shadowing earlier experience. 
Finally, I discover that identity and belonging as continually negotiated spaces are 
illuminated by the contrast I drew between assimilation and integration as 
conceptual tools in understanding the migrant experience. 
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Background 
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Chapter One 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction, method, and preparation.
i 
 
 
So one of the hidden grounds of ethnography’s possibility is that ethnographers 
can ‘be there’ (Probyn, 1993, 71). 
 
I write because I want to find something out. I write in order to learn something 
that I didn’t know before I wrote it (Richardson, 1994, 517). 
 
The genesis for this work is situated in personal experience. The desire to explore 
a thesis relevant to the African/Australian experience led me to ask the question, 
“How do women from a privileged background, from Southern Africa understand 
their experiences as immigrants to Australia?” Historically, the last thirty to 
thirty-five years has seen an exodus of white Rhodesians (and later 
Zimbabweans) from Africa; the emigrants have spread throughout the Western 
world. I have elected to examine a small segment of this diaspora in my thesis. 
The fragment I have chosen to study comprises six white women who have 
immigrated to Western Australia from Southern Africa (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and 
Zambia) in the past forty years. I counterpoint my core sample by drawing on    
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correspondence and conversations with friends, relatives, Australians, 
Zimbabweans, and expatriate Rhodesians. Therefore, while the six women are 
fundamental to the thesis, there are numerous other individuals who have added 
to the development of the hypothesis. In the historical context I heed the voices of 
those long dead; in the present I consider the opinions of colleagues whose ideas 
and input have encouraged me and inspired the research. There are others too who 
are anonymous, their words and conversations overheard here and there. The 
effect of these myriad voices initiate motif and leitmotif as the past impacts on the 
present and the present on the past. As a seventh member of the core sample my 
own voice, my own experience, are evident throughout the work and I signal this 
autobiographical element here, at the beginning, and as palimpsest, throughout 
the writing.  
 
So, I take the opportunity to look at some white women who have come into 
Australia and who are, or have been, mistaken for Australian women (until they 
speak), for the racial markers which symbolise difference, are absent. I link the 
questions of belonging and not belonging that are, in my hypothesis, closely 
linked to assimilation (as I define it) and integration. As author, and by declaring 
the autobiographical content of the work, I am situated in the society and, 
inferentially, in the authenticity of the text. It is within the concept of authority 
and of speaking for others that I contemplate my own role in the narrative because 
I too have a history in colonial Rhodesia and I am entangled in the weaving 
together of history, memory and identity; of separation, transformation, and 
integration. The issue of authority extends to, and extrapolates from, my authority 
as writer of this thesis and it is the underlying motif of the methodology and the    
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subsequent writing of this work. I believe it is critical for me to acknowledge the 
imbrication of authority (of the author) wherever it manifests and this 
acknowledgment becomes integral to the work.  
 
In exploring the identities of immigrant women I reflect on the transition from 
immigrant to integrant as a rite of passage; I consider how our experiences (and 
memories) shape us and bring us to the understanding we have of ourselves now. 
In this context stories of migration into colonial Africa, and from Southern Africa 
into Australia, are explored. It is within the issues of transitory identity and 
memory and my reflection on them that I am able to tease out my theories of 
assimilation and integration into Australian society. Therefore, the validity of our 
experiences and memories extending from our cultural differences shadows and 
shapes our identities—national, personal, and attributed; and, in a sense, attention 
to this bricolage, these minutiae, frames the work.  
 
When I set out to do the research for the thesis in January 1998, there was no 
question in my mind but to follow feminist interpretive social research 
methodology. Clear guidelines for feminist ethnography are described as being 
consistent with three goals, “(1) to document the lives and activities of women, 
(2) to understand the experience of women from their own point of view, and (3) 
to conceptualize women’s behaviour as an expression of social context” 
(Reinharz and Davidman, 1992, 51). In addition to these guidelines is my 
profound belief that the transparency demanded by feminist research, the 
authenticity of “making visible why we do what we do—and how we do this” 
(Klein in Reinharz 1992, 74), helps me avoid what Donna Haraway describes as a    
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claim of “… power to see and not be seen, to represent while escaping 
representation … the god trick of seeing everything from nowhere …” (Haraway, 
1988, 581). And Elspeth Probyn, commenting on ethnographic writing says, 
“”Through an analysis of self-reflexivity we find a prime example of how certain 
disembodied masculine selves emerge as central at the expense of the materiality 
of others” (1993, 60). In other words, I am fully involved and clearly visible in 
the research—which becomes as much about me as about the women with whom 
I am working. I reiterate, this persistent/consistent situating of myself within the 
study signals the inherent subjectivity of my writing.  
 
The methods I use in the research begin well before the idea of studying for a 
doctorate entered my mind. In fact, I discover during the lengthy process of being 
a doctoral candidate, that I have been a researcher since childhood and I signal 
here the Bakhtinian notion of the “long drawer”. As a research student I discover 
that my researcher persona seldom takes a holiday. Conversations I have—and 
have had (or overheard), the books I read, the events I participate in or observe 
become intrinsic to my life, to my thesis, and the garnered information is stored, 
often in a journal, sometimes in memory, sometimes on tape or in pictures, 
sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, but is there to be “drawn” on 
when I need it! Does not a feminist ethnographer have to work like this? In this 
way my ‘situatedness’ travels with me, as a feminist ethnographer, connecting my 
familiar to what is, at first, strange and moves/comes with me in my writing. 
 
Apart from the timely and serendipitious “long drawer” (which I will elaborate 
upon in the course of the narrative) and my ever-present journal, the methods I    
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use for this research entail interviewing several women who, in the event, turn out 
to be six women. The process of selection for the study is informal and I am 
motivated by the interest and enthusiasm of the women to join and participate in 
the research. Some of the women (in the study) have been living in Australia for 
many years and some have arrived more recently. All of the women are of 
European or British descent and their home language is English. All of the 
women are educated and come from privileged backgrounds. For the purposes of 
this dissertation I have not used the participants’ real names although I gave them 
the choice of using their own names. Three of the women, Betty, Sarah, and Amy, 
I knew when we all lived in Rhodesia. Another, Vivian, I meet in Perth when, at a 
social gathering, she expresses interest in my work; and Marlene befriends me at 
a book club we belong to. Clare, a postgraduate student, hears about my research 
and contacts me. As research students working on similar hypotheses, we are able 
to explore and discuss ideas and she raises questions I may otherwise have 
avoided. Besides their participation in this research there are few other 
connections between the women although some of us attended the same schools 
in Rhodesia, and have social interaction in Australia. The ages of the women vary 
from around forty to over seventy years old. I have mentioned that none of the 
immigrant women chose to use their real names for the study and the pseudonyms 
were, for the most part, my choice. Only one of the women, Vivian, rejected my 
selection of a name for her and she told me she preferred ‘Vivian’ to the name I 
had chosen.  
 
Other participants include my friend and colleague, Robin, who is an Australian 
woman. Robin’s input inadvertently leads me down some surprising avenues that    
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enrich the story. Then there is Barbara, my long-time friend from Rhodesia and 
an author of children’s books. Barbara lives in Melbourne and her voice, her 
views on the research and my methodology form an integral theme in the work. 
Barbara’s polyphonic voice appears again and again in the work; in the metaphor 
of motif and leitmotif Barbara’s voice is counterpoint that combines and 
harmonises. My mentor, friend, and supervisor, Dr Jennifer de Reuck and my 
mentor, therapist, and friend, Theresia Johnston, both of whom inspired, 
encouraged indeed, on occasion, provoked me to transcend self-doubt. As part of 
the process, all of these women are central to the premises of the work. 
Throughout the work I draw deeply from my personal journal and this record is 
evidence of my visibility as participant and author.  
 
In this work I use several names for the country from which I, and my 
protagonists, emigrated and these are: ‘Southern Rhodesia’, ‘Rhodesia’ and 
‘Zimbabwe’. From 1895, and until the break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, in 1963, the country was called ‘Southern Rhodesia’. The name 
‘Rhodesia’ was used from the time of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) proclaimed by the white minority government in 1964 until 1979, after 
which (during a period of transition) it became for a very short time, ‘Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia’; and only after majority Independence in 1980 did the name change to 
Zimbabwe. Therefore, when I write about Rhodesia I am referring to the period 
prior to majority Independence. The dates are connected in my memory with 
births and deaths and I address these issues further in Chapter Three: The 
beginning is not at Perth Airport.  
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In writing this thesis I sometimes use a combination of words, separated by a 
slash (/). This strategy occurs where I find myself caught between two words, 
neither of which carries completely, the intended meaning, but both of which are 
significant/representative of that meaning. Therefore, this is not a random laziness 
of choice on my part but a provocative tool to carry the semantic weight of the 
idea and, textually, the slash represents the passage between the words, or, on a 
re-layered re-reading of this passage, of me – as if I were situated as an 
intermediary between the words. The motif of ‘passage’ is apparent, recurring 
throughout the work, and in a microcosm the slash is its representative.  
 
The referencing system I have used in this work is the Harvard style. This is 
similar to the American Psychological Association (APA) system of referencing. 
The APA is considered to be a complex style, and for that reason I have chosen 
this, the less complicated affiliated style, as being suitable for this thesis. In 
addition I have modified the style to suit my own purposes and there are minor 
variations from the approved version; nevertheless, the style as I have moulded it, 
remains consistent throughout my thesis. In the Harvard and APA style of 
referencing, personal communications are not included in the final reference list 
but are cited, in parenthesis, in the text. I have referenced my personal journal in 
the same way, in parenthesis, in the text, because the journal entries are an 
intimate communication to myself. 
 
As a feminist ethnographer working in the field of social relations, it is necessary 
to define the meaning I accord to the term “field”. The assumption that the field is 
separated from the ethnographer’s own home world is widespread probably    
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because, traditionally, an anthropologist travelled far from home and, of course, 
this emphasises the ‘god trick’ already mentioned where the community is studied 
by an unrepresented being. In Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of social relations, the 
field is likened to the arena of war and is compared to a site of struggle, thus, “… 
any agent in the field may be assumed to seek maximum power and dominance 
within it. The aim is to rule the field, to become the instance which has the power 
to confer or withdraw legitimacy from other participants …” (Moi, 1991, 1021). 
The field in which I am working is, by comparison, more an area of connection 
and intersection between the women with whom I am working and myself; it is 
not being cut off from my own world nor a second home (Fortier, 1996, 307). For 
I believe that a feminist ethnographer does more than ‘study’ the field. I believe 
that, in many cases, the boundary between her life and field disappears, if it had 
ever been there in the first place. Shulamit Reinharz’s comment that “many 
feminist researchers … take the position that closeness with women is necessary 
to understand them” (1991, 67) resonates to my belief. The wry lament that it is a 
foolish anthropologist “… who mixes up the field with her life” (Behar, 1995, 77) 
gives some indication that there is emotional and spiritual paraphernalia 
associated with the process. But, here is the disclosure that the field I am 
researching  is my life; and this emphasises for me that, as a  feminist 
ethnographer, I do more than study the field: I live the field. 
 
There are problems, however. In the beginning I have doubts about the 
interviews; these manifest in cold feet and butterflies in the tummy that I feel 
before an interview. In my journal I write again and again about how 
apprehensive I am about conducting the interviews. I write of my worry that I am    
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‘doing it properly’ and that I still haven’t plucked up enough courage to phone 
Vivian, and then, to put this in the context of how I am able sidetrack and avoid 
things, the next sentence reads: “The liquidamber is turning at last. Soon it will be 
bare and skeletal again” (1999, Personal Journal). About a month later I write, “I 
still have to interview Amy. I don’t know what to do about Vivian”. And, again, 
“my main chore is to write in here as often as possible and to interview Amy and 
phone Vivian”. I know now that I am not alone in this place of nervous 
prevarication and procrastination; feminist Susan Mitchell is open about how 
nervous she is before approaching someone for an interview, about the stress she 
feels prior to an interview and often afterwards as well (Mitchell, 1997, passim). 
In interviewing I am aware of the skill of careful listening to hear the meaning of 
what I am being told, but being cautious not to read more into it than is there. I 
am aware that being sensitive to nuances that may need to be followed up and 
examined is something I sometimes handle clumsily. In my journal I remind 
myself “… to listen more than talk. Don’t cut them off. Follow up leads …” 
(1999, Personal Journal). I often seem to write in the journal about how difficult it 
is not to be ‘objective’ and I ask myself, is this because it is easier to judge than to 
participate? Sometimes I think how much easier it is to disengage and retreat into 
the patriarchal, traditional—albeit passive—position of the anthropologist’s gaze, 
the ‘eye of god’ role, and remove myself from the proceedings. In other words to 
talk and write about the women from a distance “…to represent while escaping 
representation” (Haraway, 1988, 581). Then, of course, there is the problem of 
trying not to introduce my own words into the mouths of my women, especially 
when they minimise or even disregard their own experience and maximise that of 
husband and/or children. There is difficulty in coaxing women to talk about    
11 
 
themselves, their own experiences. Early in April 1999 I wrote this in my journal: 
“I asked Vivian if she would be in it and she sounded quite interested but then 
downgraded herself and said she didn’t want to bore me. Nearly all the women do 
it. It is as if they are not important enough or don’t have interesting things to say, 
or have never experienced anything anyone else will find interesting!” (Personal 
Journal). Feminists have recognised for a long time that in traditional patriarchal 
research: “Almost all discussions of women deal only with what they are in 
relation to men in terms of real, ideal or value criteria. Nobody asks what they are 
for themselves” (Simmel in Reinharz and Davidman, 1992, 52 ). “Georg Simmel 
(1858-1918) was” according to Shulamit Reinharz, “one of the few early social 
scientists to recognize this problem” (Reinharz and Davidman, 1992, 52). It 
seems that at least some of my women would fit this assumption, but at least one 
is adamant this project is about her and not her husband. In my journal I write 
“Amy’s husband tells me I can use the journals he has kept on previous visits to 
Zimbabwe, Amy objects, she says to him, ‘This is about me, not you!’ She is very 
clear that it is her life, her experience, that we are talking about” (Personal 
Journal). Another, Vivian, tells me that her husband left her after they had been in 
Western Australia for four and a half years and her youngest child (of nine 
children) was two-and-a-half. This is the same woman who often excuses herself 
for “boring” me! Betty, who arrived here in the early 1980s, said to me ‘My 
husband … the only way my husband could cope was to get on, I mean, he had to 
learn a whole new system of law. The only way we could cope was, he could do 
his job and I could cope with everything else, look after the children, and work in 
the home … I was also having to look after a very frail and aging mother-in-law 
…”. The history spoken by minority groups such as this one contains in its    
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narrative the notion of multifaceted experience, “… they [migrant women] 
produce, necessarily, another version of history … the secret story which the 
overt story covers over” (Gunew, 1993b, 12). Therefore, the underlying premise 
in this thesis is the necessity for women’s experience to be made visible, and 
reflected in this notion is the analogy of an holograph, where each fragment 
contains an image of the whole. Thus, it is the women in my study and the 
minutiae contained in their experiences that comprise the story. 
 
The writer’s object is—or should be—to hold the reader’s attention. … I want the 
reader to turn the page and keep on turning to the end (Barbara Tuchman). 
 
The structure of my thesis falls into three major sections—a triptych—and the 
triptych is supported by sub-sections that form a visible infrastructure, a 
scaffolding, that shadows and supplements the whole. Initially, I was tempted, in 
the microcosm, to divide each page into three parts: the exploration, the thesis and 
the history; in the middle range, each chapter divided into three parts and, in the 
macrocosm, the entire thesis as triptych. In the event, because I believe the thesis 
needs to be accessible, transparent, and in order not to alienate the reader with 
obfuscation and elaborate techniques, I find that my thesis adopts the three 
partitions of the triptych in a way that is only marginally contrived. My thesis 
therefore, follows the macrocosm—the three major panels/chapters that mimic 
and reflect the tripartite pattern of the rites de passage as introduced by Arnold 
van Gennep and amplified by Victor Turner (Turner, Victor, 1977c; Turner, 
Victor, 1977b; van Gennep, 1960, passim). These three sections, therefore, 
comprise, but are not entirely enclosed by, in the first place, the left panel that 
depicts the separation from the homeland – the matrix from which we originate –    
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and this corresponds to ‘preliminal’ rites in the traditional model. The central 
panel is the limen (the threshold) where the transitional process of transformation 
begins and proceeds. This is the time an immigrant moves through a period of 
assimilation: “Since liminal time is not controlled by the clock it is a time of 
enchantment when anything might, even should happen” (Turner, Victor, 1977a, 
33), and the trope of time is recurring. Following the central partition is the right 
panel, that illustrates (if finality is possible) the final outcome, the ‘postliminal’, 
wherein the immigrant is integrated—sometimes incorporated—and there is space 
in this locus for abortive/unsuccessful integration too. Thus, the structure of the 
thesis is transparent, often flagged but other times segued into the narrative.  
 
By weaving the threads of immigration, identity, and rites de passage together 
there is the potential for something that is rigorous, clear, and engaging. Writing 
the narrative/thesis is paramount to, and part of, my research. Iain Chambers 
likens writing to travelling and draws on the imagery of Michel de Certeau: 
“Writing is to enter a space, a zone, a territory … everywhere characterised by 
movement: the passage of words, the caravan of thought, the flux of the 
imaginary, the slippage of the metaphor, the drift across the page … the 
wandering eyes” (Chambers, 1994, 10) and I explore this involvement of writing 
and identity in the sub-section of Chapter Five, Identity I: Being in the centre of 
my margin. I believe that writing is a method of discovery, “… a dynamic 
creative process” (Richardson, 1994, 517), and the combinations of writing and 
identity; writing and research; writing and memory, and writing and methodology 
that serve to enrich the hypothesis also support the transparency of the work.    
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Chapters: 
 
In this, the first chapter, I describe the impetus behind my research and the 
writing of my thesis. A significant aspect of this chapter is to introduce the 
women in my core sample and to express clearly the autobiographical content of 
the narrative. However, throughout the thesis, I remind, prompt, and reiterate 
information about the women in my sample, and in this way I remain respectful 
of the ethical practices implied in feminist social research (as cited on page two). 
I address the dilemma I face being situated as the author[ity] as well as a 
participant and indicate how I deal with this predicament. The methods I have 
used are elucidated and the paradigms in/by which I work are delineated although 
I (prudently) qualify any rigidity in the boundaries. In this chapter matters of style 
are discussed and I present my arguments as to the appropriateness of the 
referencing system, idiosyncratic textual tools, and the broader structure of the 
thesis as triptych. I define and clarify the rationale behind naming ‘Rhodesia’ and 
‘Zimbabwe’, and I show that the choice of name, in each context it is used, is not 
an erratic one; and this is further defined in the third chapter: The beginning is not 
at Perth Airport. Because of my desire for transparency in the writing of this 
thesis, I reveal some of the problems I faced during the research and illustrate 
these with excerpts from my personal journal. This introduction foreshadows the 
following chapter, which contains a review of the literature, in that the (aforesaid) 
transparency of writing allows me to layer the different sections of the work and 
elements of the methodology appear in the chapter (and thereafter) thus reflecting 
elements of the literature review in the introduction. 
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The Review of the Literature, subtitled Themes Already Formed, reviews the 
relevant (and sometimes irrelevant) literature and becomes, per se, an extension 
of this introduction. Indeed, as already indicated, the review of the literature is not 
confined to any one chapter, and where it is not embedded in the narrative, it is 
picked up and developed, throughout the thesis. Therefore, using the evocation of 
transparency in structure, in the review of the literature I continue to indicate the 
outline or map of the ground that the thesis covers. I consider the metaphor of a 
physical map of an area and decide it is pertinent to the shape and form of the 
thesis in general and the review in particular. Thus, where a political map would 
have distinct borders, sharp colours, and insular/rigid names, a physical map is 
fluid and the ground/earth is traced by the curves of rivers and the contours of 
mountains. The review advances notions of matrix and Axis Mundi and links them 
to the first panel of the rites de passage triptych, thus making a tentative 
connection to Bourdieu’s theory of habitus (seen as embodied history). 
Perspectives of migration and exile are seen from a psychological point-of-view, 
and also empirically, in the writing of immigrants. In my exploration of the nexus 
of history, identity, and memory I intersect literature by immigrants and 
emigrants to and from Australia, and search for autobiography to rationalise the 
use of my own. The autobiographical literature that situates women in the 
historical aspect of my thesis is more difficult to find, and I resolve this problem 
by examining ficto-autobiography and autobiography written by white men. 
Literature surrounding issues of identity in the colonial and postcolonial context 
is vast, and I engage with a representative sample. Finally, I permit myself to 
engage with some poetry that I see as inherent in the processes of memory and 
history – this indulgence serving to signpost the next chapter.     
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The choice of subtitle for chapter three: The beginning is not at Perth Airport, 
brings into the frame the history of white settlement in Southern Rhodesia.
ii While 
the main thrust of this chapter concerns a focus on the immigration and settlement 
of white people in Rhodesia, I flag Australian immigration and other issues (both 
practical and theoretical) that affect the hypothesis. The narrative embraces 
stories and biography from my own family whose history as early settlers in 
Southern Rhodesia reflects personal, present experience in Australia. This chapter 
serves to situate the white immigrants to Africa and the more recent immigrants 
to Australia in the context of migration as a rite of passage. Two significant 
themes in my thesis arise in this chapter: that of Australian identity, and that 
which contrasts the meanings attributed to assimilation and integration. The 
balance between personal and historical insights constitutes a locus for the first 
stage of the rites de passage, that of separation, to proceed. 
 
The fourth chapter, Migration/Separation, sub-titled: Leaving and landing, begins 
in a more formal way to address the first division of the rites de passage, that is, 
the separation from the matrix. I develop and explore the events of separation as 
an overt ritual within the framework of the rites de passage and how this theory 
relates to emigration. The separation from life in Africa in order to migrate to 
Australia and the issues that may have provoked the departure are examined; 
sharp fragments of dissonant memory are thrust into the bricolage. Severance 
from family, home, and friends is not gentle and even remembering the events 
can be harsh and painful. The tropes of homesickness and return start here, at the 
beginning. Engagement with issues of migration through the interviews allows    
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me to interweave the experiences in a way that augments and enriches the 
narrative. And, then, after we arrive in Australia, questions of identity begin and 
the complexity is compounded because of being mistaken for Australian women, 
for the language and the racial markers which symbolise difference, are absent. 
Among the identities that are attributed to recent immigrants is that of ‘new 
Australian’, that is, once we are recognised as being one. It is significant in that 
this attributed identity very likely becomes our preferred assumed identity. The 
attribution of ‘racist white South African’ that has been the experience of some of 
the women (including myself) is discussed and the repercussions of this 
pejorative attribution often ricochet from our assumed identity. In this chapter and 
the subsequent sub-chapters I explore this somewhat ambiguous 
attribution/assumption of identity and look at theories of compliance and survival 
adopted by the subjects of my study as they seek to confront the inconsistency.  
 
Notions of the pejorative in the attribution of identity lead me to the first part of 
chapter five: Being in the centre of my margin, which deals with questions and 
reflections of multiple identity; self-determined, assumed, and attributed identity. 
Positionality and observation from the margin re-introduces the topics of 
assimilation and integration; these are examined through prisms of coercion and 
compliance. I question why it is necessary to appear to belong, and the strategies 
that immigrants use to acquiesce to this tacit demand by mooting the point that 
assimilation is a form of anarchy. That this necessity to belong is a process of 
sublimation, even coercion, is embedded in the liminal stage of the rites de 
passage. The notion of the immigrant women as agents-of-change becomes valid, 
here, because if their behaviour is seen as being symbolic and indicative of    
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learning to be a white Australian, then Victor Turner’s argument that “symbolic 
behaviour actually ‘creates’ society for pragmatic purposes—including in society 
both structure and communitas” (Turner, 1974, 56) and thus the immigrants have 
the potential to be agents-of-change. The statement I have cited evokes a number 
of questions that are addressed in the next chapter of this work, the central panel 
of  rites de passage, the liminal. Among these issues Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus, that is, embodied knowledge is suggested. 
 
In the structure of this thesis as triptych, these two sections that make up chapter 
five are the exposed scaffolding that supports the central panel of liminality. 
Therefore, Identity II: True Mirrors,
iii uses the metaphor of mirrors and non-
reflecting mirrors to reflect difference. The theory I advance uses the metaphor of 
a True Mirror® that is, a non-reflecting mirror (and the work of Lacan and 
Bourdieu) to illustrate that minimal difference from ‘the norm’ is less acceptable 
to many white Australians than radical distortion: manifest differences such as 
skin colour, language, and other overt cultural differences. Linking this to Lacan’s 
theories regarding the mirror stage of human development, which I define as ‘the 
self-as-symmetrical’, I argue that it is the minor distortions we recognise in others 
that often reflect the traits we fail to see in ourselves, and that this denial of 
asymmetry in ourselves encourages us to denigrate those who are similar, those 
who resemble us. Therefore, it is in the realisation that being ‘a little bit different’ 
is not as acceptable as being radically different that the differences between the 
immigrant women and the self-designated (white) Australian women begin to 
appear, and the theme of identity, both Australian and immigrant, is developed. 
Bourdieuian theories of doxa, orthodoxy, heterodoxy, crisis and change flag the    
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immigrant women as agents-of-change in the microcosm, and the major changes 
wrought by immigration to social and political life in Australia in general, and 
this trope continues. 
 
Chapter six, The ambivalent neophyte,
iv is central to the thesis and examines the 
liminal stage of the rites de passage. The evocation of the historical aspects of the 
liminality of immigrants in Rhodesia, which has been explored and discussed 
more fully in chapter three (history) is seen, pentimento. Structuring the thesis as 
triptych based in the rites de passage makes this the central panel. The 
exploration of the central stage of the rites de passage, and habitus (as embodied 
history) in the context of migration is interwoven with narrative from interviews 
and personal annotations. The nexus between rites de passage and Pierre 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus becomes the locus for the discovery of those 
minimal but significant differences in the justification of my thesis. The notion of 
the immigrant as a liminal persona and the subtle differences that separate her (as 
neophyte) from the Anglo-Australian becomes the metaphorical province of the 
arcane procedures of rites de passage. Within this chapter I discover/uncover 
further feminine interpretations of rites of passage (Rutter, 1994) and in the 
context of participant ethnographer, discover there are additional aspects of 
assimilation and integration to understand. The quest for a secure placement in 
Australia reveals the struggle to separate from previous identity and allows a 
nexus for reflection on life in colonial Rhodesia. Notions of time/space, and the 
understanding that “liminal time is not controlled by the clock” (Turner, Victor, 
1977a, 33) remind me that space/time in Escher’s etchings is an evocative 
metaphor. Time, problematised and fragmented, reflects the metaphor of mosaic    
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and segues into this panel of the triptych. Fragmentation is inherent in the liminal 
period because this is when identities (self-determined, assumed, and attributed) 
disintegrate, possibly to be reformed, and this is associated with the flexibility I 
attribute to time in the liminal/transformation period.  
 
Chapter Seven: Memory and the myth of the eternal return.
v In this chapter I have 
projected the myth of the eternal return home into dreams and memory, and 
connected it to the overall theme of liminality: thus it is located in the meta-thesis. 
Elements of the research methodology thread through the narrative, moving the 
nostalgic into a locus more sterile. Through episodes of ‘returning home’ that are 
the experience of many immigrants, the costly (not only in financial terms) return 
to the home country invoke notions of time in memory and the significance of 
remembering and forgetting. Often driven by homesickness, the belief that we can 
return ‘home’ creates a passage filled with confusion. And, situated parallel to or 
circling the confusion, is the passage from the liminal stage to the aggregation – 
the passage that leads to the final panel of the rites de passage. I conceive this as 
the remembering and misremembering that sends the immigrant ‘home’ and then 
‘home’ again. While there is always the suspicion that things were not as bad as 
we remembered them, the return to the matrix is seldom permanent. There is no 
successful return because the return becomes a reversal of the immigration. 
Recent autobiography lends a poignancy to the remembering (Fuller, 2002) and I 
address the likelihood that not all liminal personae are successfully integrated; 
from here I draw in the trope of rite de passage to the final part. 
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Chapter Eight considers the final stage in the tripartite image of rites de passage, 
that of integration and incorporation: thus, I have titled this chapter A real Aussie. 
In this chapter I address the integration of the migrants into their adopted society 
and the rituals and ceremonies that are necessary, if not obligatory, when 
becoming an Australian citizen. By comparison, I draw on some historical 
occasions in the white settlement of Southern Rhodesia where the conferring of 
integration was problematic. This leads to the issue of ‘ownership’ of being 
‘Australian’ (or ‘Rhodesian’) and who is excluded and why. Here, notions of 
integration as the final step of rites of passage are clear. Elements of assimilation 
remain and the negotiation of identity that is shared by most individuals 
continues. In this chapter I examine the rites of integration, of being recognised 
by others as an Australian and the self-recognition of being an ‘Australian’. The 
interaction of family in society, and especially the presence of children, is 
significant for most of the women, in moving through the postliminal to 
integration. Through the interviews I learn of the experiences the women in this 
study have (and have had) of the official processes involved in gaining Australian 
citizenship and the validation bestowed by a public ceremony. The chapter 
concludes with a reflection on quotidian life pre-integration and post-integration. 
 
Reprise: the completion of the study. I revisit the map signalled in the 
introduction, and retrace the winding contours that have been associated with the 
rites de passage in immigration. This over-arching and retrospective view of the 
process brings a modicum of closure to the immigration experiences of my 
protagonists even as I acknowledge there is no general finality or answer. My 
own voice is part of the chorus for the stories in my life, too, have been heard. In    
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the event it is my own experience that has led me to explore the thesis and to 
determine how we work through the transformation from immigrant to integrant 
to finally achieve/contrive to locate ourselves in Australia, as Australians. Finally, 
as an ‘Australian’, I revisit the integrative ceremony that immigrants are required 
to participate in to become citizens, and from the vantage point of my (new-
found) Australian-ness, I realise that this is, really, just the beginning. 
 
                                                 
i Sections of this chapter first published in Outskirts, 5 (November 1999), as Women Working with 
Women: Determining my position in the field. http://www.chloe.uwa.edu.au/outskirts/index.html 
 
ii Sections of this chapter first published in the Journal of Australian Studies, 77 Sojourners and 
Strangers (2003), as Recollection of Identity: The Reassembly of the Migrant. 109-116. 
iii Material from this chapter was first presented at the Sixth Annual Humanities Postgraduate 
Research Conference: Liveable Communities. 7-8 November 2002. Curtin University of 
Technology, Perth, Western Australia as: ‘Using True Mirrors as an analogy in the attribution of 
‘difference’ (in similarity) to fabricate Other’. 
 
iv Material from this chapter was first presented at the Fifth Annual Humanities Postgraduate 
Research Conference: Undisciplined Thoughts. 8-9 November 2001. Curtin University of 
Technology, Perth, Western Australia as: ‘The Ambivalent Neophyte, Immigrant to Integrant: An 
Exploration of some English-speaking Immigrant Women in Western Australia’. 
 
v Material in this chapter appeared in my Honours Dissertation (1997) ‘When "Back Home" isn't 
England: making visible the memories, lives and experiences of some white women in Rhodesia’, 
School of Social Sciences and Asian Languages, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Western 
Australia.    
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Chapter Two 
 
 
 
 
Review of the Literature: Themes already formed 
 
 
This review of the literature follows themes already formed. The themes embrace 
emigration and immigration as rites of passage. Tropes of identity and 
autobiography fuse with memory, time, and history. The discourse of placement 
and home and the myth of returning to the past reveal aspects of experience 
otherwise denied. The motif and leitmotif of these recurring themes encourage me 
to extrapolate the past into the present and the present into history. Therefore, in 
this review of the literature I first explore the theoretical framework into which 
my thesis is cast, signalling the importance of the rites of passage in my thesis. I 
review the stories of other immigrants to Australia and their issues of identity, 
after which the space arises for the writing of Australian emigrants. Because of 
the autobiographical substance of this thesis it is necessary that autobiographical 
writing be examined and I do this by interweaving my own story with the stories 
of migration. This connects to the review of selected books written by migrants 
into and out of Africa (both men and women), and across time and the range is 
apparent in the dates of publication. The issues of identity in colonialism and    
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postcolonialism are intersected with the biographical and autobiographical 
narratives and the nexus is conspicuous in this review. My own worldview 
appears in this context. The study of migration and exile has a large literature and, 
in relating these issues to the rites of passage, the poetic and technical merge; 
being reconciled with my own history where appropriate. The boundaries 
between memory, time, and history are indistinct and I take advantage of this to 
examine these writings together. The final part of this review looks at literature I 
have considered for methods of ethnological and feminist research and integrates 
the literature within the hypothesis.  
 
The imbrication of the theories and themes is not only the canopy of the thesis but 
also its composition. I discuss this literature review with my supervisor, Dr Jenny 
de Reuck, and she says, “Yes, your structure offers you a format for the literature 
review which you may end up ‘embedding’ rather than foregrounding in the first 
chapter. Then, in the later chapters, you can expand on the topics (migration, 
memory, etc.) you've foreshadowed through the literature survey. It’ll ultimately 
be a matter of judgement as to how much is left in and how much deferred, but 
basically, the first chapter is synoptic, and the subsequent chapters expand and go 
into more depth” (Personal Correspondence 16/11/00). Reiterating the metaphor 
(introduced in the previous chapter) of the work as a physical map, this review 
serves to chart the research of the thesis and map the work itself, and is, therefore, 
legitimately situated following the introduction. 
 
The several (and fluid) paradigms in which I have placed this thesis begin when I 
approach Pierre Bourdieu through Toril Moi’s paper ‘Appropriating Bourdieu:    
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Feminist Theory and Pierre Bourdieu’s Sociology of Culture’. The conception of 
habitus, defined by Gillian Bottomley as ‘embodied history’ in her essay, ‘Living 
Across Difference: Connecting Gender, Ethnicity, Class and Aging in Australia’, 
guides me to the source, Pierre Bourdieu Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977). 
The hypotheses of habitus, doxa, heterodoxy, and change, coalesce with the 
central notion of liminality in the rites de passage as posited by Arnold van 
Gennep in The Rites of Passage, and developed and refined by Victor Turner in 
multiple publications including ‘Variations on a Theme of Liminality’ and 
‘Betwixt-and-Between: Liminality in the Rites de Passage’. Initially I am 
intimidated by the qualifications imposed by van Gennep in his (several) 
classifications and divisions, in and of, rites of passage. Victor Turner’s 
interpretation and softening of the theory, whilst no less rigorous, allows broader 
application and space for adaptation, a space which I find necessary in the context 
of my study, and I recognise, through Turner’s writing, the implicit universality in 
van Gennep’s work. The esoteric processes inherent in rites of passage and 
freeing the rules under which van Gennep devised his theory, are also evident in 
Terence Turner’s paper ‘Transformation, Hierarchy and Transcendence: A 
Reformulation of Van Gennep’s Model of the Structure of Rites de Passage’. The 
overlapping of these theories leads me to the significant interpretation of the 
Deleuzean body as embodied memory, spatio-temporally, (Braidotti, 2000, 159) 
and the notion I draw from this is of the body, in itself, as a rite of passage. The 
previously unspoken transformation of such immigrants (immigrants of minimal 
difference to the dominant group) yields, on examination, a bricolage fashioned 
from the minutiae of everyday experience, the (unwritten) history of the small, the 
personal (Bourdieu, 1977; Turner, Victor, 1977c; Turner, 1979).     
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Therefore, deeply embedded in the matrix of migration and identity is the notion 
of a rites de passage and the nuances of these (now) involuntary and arcane ritual 
processes shadow the work as the histories unfold. The experience of our 
immigration is compounded, somehow, by the lack of physical and visible 
cultural markers. Often, we white women from Rhodesia, are not recognised as 
immigrants—neophyte Australians. There is an ambivalence of identity that 
develops in this context. I ponder if it is from being taken for Australians before 
our liminal, the central stage in the rites de passage, is completed. Victor Turner 
calls this ‘betwixt-and-between’ and recognises it as a state of marginality “… 
people who for some reason had not settled into the static (sic) structure of 
society” (Turner in Turner, 1990, 167). Overall, the focus on the tripartite 
structure of the rites de passage informs my thesis, and I reiterate the metaphor of 
a triptych throughout the work. The three sections or periods of the rites of 
passage are classified by Arnold Van Gennep thus: “… preliminal rites (rites of 
separation), liminal rites (rites of transition), and postliminal rites (rites of 
incorporation), [however] in specific instances these three types are not always 
equally important or equally elaborated ” (van Gennep, 1960, 11). He defines 
rites de passage as rites which accompany every change of place, state, social 
position, and age in man’s (sic) life (van Gennep, 1960, 3), thus indicating a 
universality that, as I have indicated, allows me to adapt the theory for the 
purposes of my thesis. Victor Turner tends to focus on the liminal stage which he 
describes as being interesting in itself but also because of its “… implications for 
a general theory of sociocultural processes” (Turner, Victor, 1977c, 36). Whilst 
the liminal chapter in this study is the central panel of the triptych, the sometimes    
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astonishing stories that arise from both the separation and the integration periods 
have nuances that lend colour and intensity to the liminal stage; thus van 
Gennep’s comment cited above that, “… these three types are not always equally 
important or equally elaborated” (1960, 11), indicates the foregrounding of 
whichever section is deemed relevant. Therefore, extrapolating from the theory of 
rites de passage to migration is not an enormous leap. In broad terms, recognition 
of the absence of difference allows the nexus between rites de passage and 
habitus that becomes the locus for the discovery of minimal difference—minimal 
but significant in the justification of my thesis. 
 
Choosing the next point of entry, I approach this section of the literature review 
with the stories of migration so, in a circuitous way, I have an access to the spiral 
that any continuing history inevitably/invariably is. The history of parents and 
grandparents who immigrated to Rhodesia is woven through the histories of the 
women in my study; the stories of why they left Africa; the life they have 
encountered in Australia. Hence, it is an effortless operation here to move on to 
the review of experiences of immigration into Australia. 
 
Among the large literature surrounding autobiography of Australian immigrants, I 
find Eva Cox’s essay, ‘What Ethnic Identity?’ where she tells of her immigration 
experience as a child. She describes her struggle with her ‘new’ identity—the 
identity she takes for herself of ‘New Australian’; she writes of her joy at being in 
a place she can call ‘home’. But, the identity attributed to her was of ‘reffo’ and 
‘Jew’ so, the place becomes one of confusion, and she discovers “… my main 
sense of identity now was as an outsider” (Cox, 1992, 63). Lolo Houbein, an    
28 
 
immigrant from Holland, reflects on the search for her identity in Australia. In 
Wrong Face in the Mirror: An Autobiography of Race and Identity, she combines 
her autobiographical exploration of immigrant life in Australia with gentle 
criticism of the people she found here—the white Australians. She defines her use 
of the words ‘white Australians’ when she comments that, when she settled in 
Australia “… the Australians … were not only white, but specifically Anglo-
Saxon, Scottish and Irish” (Houbein, 1990, 37, 93-94). Drusilla Modjeska as 
immigrant and emigrant in her ficto-biography of her mother, Poppy, offers a 
history that is also autobiographical. She draws deeply on the tropes of identity, 
place and time. Her writing moves from space to space, identity to identity and 
time to time with a fluidity that resonates with my own story (Modjeska, 1996). In 
a later essay ‘Writing Poppy’ she reveals that, when writing the biography of her 
mother, “I pulled at the threads of memory until I found the life, or maybe only 
the tension in them. I began the work of remembering, weaving thoughts and 
feelings onto a loom …” (Modjeska, 2002, 73). And, in relating memory to time, 
she finds herself endorsing the realisation gleaned from popular science, “…that 
time bends and curves, and from Eastern religions that it’s fluid and we can 
change our consciousness of it in meditation” (Modjeska, 2002, 62). Where 
immigrants have written (in Australia) about their home country (or the home 
country of their parents), the evocation of memory is extraordinary, and I signal 
here, that this is significant in my hypothesis (Dell'oso, 1991; Gunew, 1991) and, 
from South Africa, Andrea Durbach (Durbach, 2000). By contrast to the many 
texts of immigration into Australia, I note that the works of emigrants from 
Australia are generally those of high profile women, academics and intellectuals, 
such as Jill Ker Conway, Germaine Greer, and Lily Brett—a migrant into and    
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from Australia, who comments that “[From a distance] Australia looks very 
beautiful and very comfortable” (in Lewis, 2001). Therefore, by intersecting the 
two, immigrant and emigrant, I add lustre to my search for history, identity and 
memory. 
 
If the image of immigrant autobiography is cast cameo, I find the writing of 
Australian emigrants as intaglio; for instance in the work of Jill Ker Conway. The 
Road from Coorain, originally published in 1989, tells the story of Ker Conway’s 
childhood and troubled transition into maturity in Australia (Ker Conway, 1989). 
The final chapters offer insights into her reasons for leaving Australia. I read this 
book soon after it was published and long before I set out to write this thesis. 
Memory tells me that I found it difficult to identify with the author but, on re-
reading it for the purposes of this study, I find points of reference that escaped the 
person/identity I was then. So, in this way autobiographical narratives written by 
Australian women become for me reflections on memory and identity. 
 
There is, indeed, enjoyment in the images/reflections present in Morag Fraser’s 
review of Jill Ker Conway’s When Memory Speaks: Reflections on 
Autobiography. She comments on Jill Ker Conway writing about autobiography 
and looks at this writing of the self as being something we all do in our own inner 
conversations. The voices of reviewed and reviewer seem to meld as Fraser writes 
of her belief that such inner autobiographies “… no matter what language we use 
[are] fundamentally philosophical or theological” (Fraser, 1998, 8; Ker Conway, 
1998, 178) Thus, she understands that Ker Conway is “… interested in the 
constants of autobiography [and] in the ways it mutates when taboos slacken and    
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writers, particularly women, find voice and courage to speak publicly of 
experiences they once would have kept private, hidden, or deflected into another 
genre that would have left them unimplicated…” (Fraser, 1998, 8). Morag Fraser 
draws attention to Ker Conway’s distinguishing between “... the persistent 
archetypal life scripts of men from those of women” (Fraser, 1998; Ker Conway, 
1998). The male form is usually that of the odyssey—whether (heroic) external or 
of the inner consciousness, whereas women’s voice, where it exists at all, is more 
concealed. The notion of women not wishing to be implicated in their own story 
may account for the resistance of some of the women in this study to talking 
about themselves. The preferred focus was, instead, husband and/or children—
and sometimes their own experience added as an afterthought, not given 
importance unless validated by the experience of the family. I consider, perhaps, 
that this was defining themselves by default. According to Ker Conway, the 
tradition of women’s autobiography originated in religious establishments: “... in 
narratives about the autobiographer’s relationship with God” women become 
instruments of experience rather than conscious agents “... [T]things happen to 
them, not because of them” (Fraser, 1998, 8; Ker Conway, 1998, 14). Because the 
author places such significance on memory, and because remembering and 
forgetting are such integral parts of my research, I find the concepts she 
introduces useful and thought provoking. The significance for me of Morag 
Fraser’s review of autobiographies, and Ker Conway in particular, is the emphasis 
on memory, and the character of memory, when it is drawn on for the purposes of 
autobiography. She writes of autobiography being ‘compulsive but also 
dangerous’ and she justifies this by saying, “Mnemosyne may speak when you    
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call her but she may not say what you want to hear. You may be able to suborn 
memory but you can also be laid bare by her, and in your own words” (1998, 8).  
 
Drawing the notion of immigrant and emigrant autobiography into the realm of 
white Rhodesian women writing, I find, with few exceptions, the little 
autobiographical literature there is on the topic of white women immigrating to 
Rhodesia, that it is either ficto-autobiography, such as Sally in Rhodesia and 
Martie and Others in Rhodesia, both by Sheila MacDonald and published in 1927, 
or of an historical nature, such as the journals of Marie Lippert, the Jewish wife of 
a German financier. Marie Lippert was not strictly an immigrant, she 
accompanied her husband to Africa where he was working on contract. She kept a 
journal (in English) and wrote letters to her mother in Hamburg (in German). Frau 
Lippert later published these writings. The very few copies that were printed were 
published in German as Zur Erinnerung an Marie Lippert, Ihre Reisebriefe und 
Skizzen aus Matabelelund, 21 September bis 23 Dezember 1891. (No place), 
1897. Needless to say, this volume is extraordinarily difficult to obtain, as many 
copies were destroyed by the Nazi Regime. In my search for women’s 
autobiography from Rhodesia, I find that Doris Lessing is the exception to my 
experience of the scarcity of writing. Her autobiographical writing covers her 
immigration to Africa as a young child and her life in the colony until her 
emigration—return to the United Kingdom—as a mature woman Under My Skin: 
Volume one of my autobiography to 1994, and her visiting and revisiting 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe African Laughter: Four Visits to Zimbabwe published in 
1992. In her 1957 book Going Home, Doris Lessing writes of her experience in 
returning to Rhodesia after a long absence. Passages of Going Home are    
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evocative and nostalgic, particularly when she reminisces about her childhood on 
an isolated farm. Seldom does she mention any personal interaction with black 
African people, mostly she writes of her interaction with the racist white 
population—and generally to their detriment. Doris Lessing’s observations of 
Southern Rhodesia from 1924-1949, in the first part of her autobiography, and her 
commentary about conditions from the point of view of a farm child, are 
articulate and appealing to me. I find a similarity with much of my own 
experience as a child brought up on a Rhodesian farm. However, both Sheila 
MacDonald and Doris Lessing, polar in social and political belief, show I believe, 
an implicit understanding that, although they are (or were) living in Rhodesia, it 
is/was where they lived ‘for the time being’, because ‘home’ was England 
(Lessing, 1957; Lessing, 1992; Lessing, 1995; MacDonald, 1927b; MacDonald, 
1927a).  
 
Other literature historically pertinent to historical section in this thesis is generally 
biographical or based on letters and journals, such as the account of Mother 
Patrick by Professor Michael Gelfand: Mother Patrick and Her Nursing Sisters: 
Based on Extract of Letters and Journal in Rhodesia of the Dominican Sisterhood, 
1890-1901 (1964). This is the story of the Dominican Sisters who trekked into 
Matabeleland – the south western province of [what was to become] Southern 
Rhodesia and the primary reason for the book was “… to place an important 
section of Rhodesian medical history on record when for about a decade the 
Dominican Sisterhood was given the nursing care in three of the main centres of 
Southern Rhodesia (Gelfand, 1964, Preface). I have mentioned the difficulty in 
obtaining copies of these historical texts, and among the most difficult to obtain    
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was one referred to in Professor Gelfand’s book. This is a history of the 
Dominican Sisters in Rhodesia written by ‘A Dominican Sister’, and titled: In 
God’s White-Robed Army: the Chronicle of the Dominican Sisters in Rhodesia, 
1890-1934 (that can be tentatively dated 1947). These books, journals, and letters 
used to be available in the National Archives in Salisbury (Harare) but, due to the 
present circumstances in Zimbabwe, this availability has terminated. In many 
cases I have had to refresh my own memory of place names and historical events 
by using (Encyclopaedia Rhodesia, 1973) and (Tabex Encyclopedia Zimbabwe, 
1987). The latter volume was given to me as a Christmas gift on a return visit to 
Zimbabwe in 1996, and I will draw on this presentation in chapter seven, Memory 
and the myth of the eternal return. 
 
Originally published in 1924, and available (by dint of a thorough search) in a 
1971 facsimile reproduction, is The Real Rhodesia by Ethel Tawse Jollie, a 
woman of eminence in Rhodesia. Ethel Tawse Jollie first visited Rhodesia in 
1904 with her first husband, Archibald Colquhoun “a writer and explorer … who 
had served as the first Administrator of Mashonaland
i until 1892”, and, after he 
died in 1914, she returned to Rhodesia to settle and, in 1915, remarried “… J. 
Tawse Jollie of Melsetter
ii, a former policeman turned farmer” (L.W.B. in Jollie, 
1924, i-ii). She was the first woman elected, in 1920, to the Legislative Assembly 
in British Dominions. According to the Encyclopaedia Rhodesia (1973) she 
became, “[i]n 1923 … the first woman Member of Parliament in Rhodesia, and 
the first woman to sit in an Empire Parliament” (Encyclopaedia Rhodesia, 1973). 
In the introduction to The Real Rhodesia, Ethel Tawse Jollie gives “two main 
objects” for writing the book; the first to defend Rhodesia “from the libel that has    
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smirched her reputation … that she has been a bad bargain for the Chartered 
Company” and, more significantly for my purpose, her second object “… is to try 
to give a true picture of a British community which is unique in many of its 
conditions of life, both politically and socially” (Jollie, 1924, xv). To connect this 
text with those of Doris Lessing and Sheila Macdonald, both of whom are fervent 
in their assertions of affection for Rhodesia (the weather, the countryside), Ethel 
Tawse Jollie also professes her love of Rhodesia but continually refers to ‘home’. 
This is clearly illustrated in this short excerpt:  
The reader of this book will not need to be told that it is written by 
one who knows the back veld and loves it. Unless that love is 
somehow ingrained in man or woman Rhodesia will be to them only 
the second best—their fate but not their choice. For there is nothing 
that a Rhodesian town or village can offer that cannot be had better at 
home or in some other part of Europe, except, perhaps, the sunshine 
and the cheap native labour … (Jollie, 1924, 192). 
 
In some respects Ethel Tawse Jollie would appear to be an incipient model for 
feminists—perhaps from the same mould as ex-British Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher—but, as can be seen from the above excerpt this is not necessarily so. 
And this consideration is ameliorated by her freely expressed opinion of women 
that is condescending to say the least, “Give them [women] a little love, and the 
feeling that they are indispensable to the welfare of the family, and most women 
will not only carry the burden gallantly, but will never own that it is a burden”. 
And she adds to this when she writes scathingly of the “real tragedy of the 
Superfluous Woman, who need by no means be a spinster” and offers her solution 
that, “On the back veld no woman is superfluous …” (Jollie, 1924, 205). Women 
coming to the colonies ‘husband hunting’ and women being brought in to marry 
settlers are matters addressed in Deborah Kirkwood’s Settler Wives in Southern 
Rhodesia: A Case Study (1984) and other essays in (Callan, 1984) and also in    
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Servants and Gentlewomen to the Golden Land: the Emigration of Single Women 
from Britain to Southern Africa, 1820-1939 (Swaisland, 1993).  
 
The preserve of contemporary autobiographical writing from Rhodesia opens 
with Peter Godwin’s 1996 volume, Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa. The 
evocative nature of this volume—in which he talks about events I remember, 
places I know, people I know—allows me the space to validate my own 
experiences, my own memories. His notion of Rhodesia as home is clearly set 
out. Godwin writes of the insight when he realised (being a Rhodesian) “… how 
we appeared to the outside, of just how far we had strayed from our mother 
culture and mutated into this quite separate people” (1996, 197). The notion of 
England being ‘home’ is still available but qualified. Godwin observes in the next 
sentence, “And I realized that was why my parents would never really consider 
going home to England, because England wasn’t home any more, even to them” 
(Godwin, 1996, 197). More recently the 2002 autobiography of Alexandra Fuller 
Don’t Let’s Go To The Dogs Tonight: An African Childhood, gives an insight 
into the Rhodesia (and Zimbabwe) that more recent emigrants have left behind. 
The tendency to ‘heroic’ autobiographical writing is altogether absent and the 
wonderful remembering of the quotidian details in the life of a young girl are 
entrancing and provocative. In this excerpt she tells of how she waits for her 
mother, who is a volunteer reservist in the British South Africa Police, and the 
vitality the minutiae impart to the story is delightful: 
I sit under the frangipani tree on the spiky, drying police station lawn 
with its ring of whitewashed stones and aloe vera flower beds, and I 
poke pieces of grass into an lion traps to the little ant lions leap up 
with sharp claws in anticipation of an ant meal … And then Mum    
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comes out and says, ‘Bobo’! And then, ‘There you are. Look, you’re 
all dusty’ … ‘come inside now. It’s time to rest.’ (Fuller, 2002, 64). 
 
I can recollect doing the same thing when I was a young child and, as an adult, I 
yearn to reclaim that warm, dusty, idleness waiting without expectations, for 
something or someone. 
 
Continuing the exploration of autobiographical writing and the African 
experience, I find much of historical interest in Peter Rainier’s autobiography of 
his life in Africa, My Vanished Africa, (published in 1940). Written in the early 
twentieth century, it brings to the fore not only the entrenched stereotypes of the 
age but also emphasises Ker Conway’s observation on ‘heroic’ male 
autobiography. Rainier stereotypes not only women, but also black Africans, 
Afrikaners, and the Portuguese. His observations of some of the native people, 
especially the Pagans in Nigeria and his detailed descriptions of cannibalism and 
other tribal customs are entertaining to say the least! The ‘Boy’s Own’ nature of 
the adventures contain in retrospect a certain innocence and charm. In the tales he 
tells I recognise many stories I heard as a child growing up in Rhodesia. Some of 
the anecdotes I recognise from when I lived in the manifestly white-male-
dominant environment of Main Camp in the Wankie Game Reserve. Whether 
Rainier’s autobiography is the true origin of these stories, or whether he also 
heard them and adopted them for his own, is a moot point. As a social statement 
and when taken in context, Rainier’s writing is rewarding. His tendency to 
promote himself is entertaining, and such self-aggrandisement is not unusual in 
many of the men I’ve met in the African bush (Rainier, 1940).  
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The theme developing from the autobiographical narrative is identity, and thus the 
problems of self-representation and the situation of the (postcolonial) subject 
moving (migrating) from one postcolonial locality to another as elucidated by 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in an interview with Angela Ingram, ‘Postmarked 
Calcutta, India’. The placement of the women in Africa and in Australia and the 
political ambiguity of being white and a postcolonial subject broaden the locus to 
include notions of assumed and presumed identity, memory, and returning 
‘home’. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, in this interview, talks of the problems of 
representation, self-representation and representing others, and the situation of the 
post-colonial subject. In the interview, Angela Ingram, who is British and claims 
she lived for some time in Rhodesia, states how contemptuous she was of our 
[Rhodesian] way of life. She says to Gayatri Spivak, “When we lived in what 
used to be “Rhodesia”, I was glad I hadn’t been born there …” (1990, 83). The 
subject arose in their discussion when Gayatri Spivak spoke of having two 
“mothers”: India where she was born, and the United States of America where she 
lives and works. The issue this raises is, where does her assumption of a place 
being a ‘mother’ leave people, like me, who are ambivalent about their birthplace, 
i.e. people who did not belong there for various reasons and who have little 
knowledge of their antecedents? In relation to this, Gayatri Spivak is scathing 
about those searching for their roots. She speaks of her ‘contempt’ and ‘distrust’ 
for “... anyone who can conceive of looking for roots, [they] should be growing 
rutabagas” (1990, 93). When someone is so confident in their background, 
perhaps they can afford to feel like that. For those of us who do not have that 
luxury, it seems harsh and not a little arrogant. Angela Ingram adds that “... 
everyone has roots, we carry them around, they’re right here” (1990, 93).    
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Carrying one’s roots around is one thing, but knowing them is another question 
altogether! If, as I choose to understand her statement, she is referring to our roots 
being reflected in our physical appearance, our cultural habits and so on, this is, in 
a circuitous way, one of the key arguments of my hypothesis. We come into 
Australia and are mistaken for someone other than who we are; it is a situation 
that is complicated by our not knowing what is expected of us (as ‘new’ white 
Australians) and confusion as to where we are placed in the society because of 
our similarities to white, Anglo-Saxon Australians—the roots we are carrying 
around. It is this, the absence of obvious differences, that requires us to find, or 
perhaps invent, an Australian identity. The metaphor that comes to mind is the 
exterior of a house. There is the part you can see at a glance from outside but the 
interior, the hidden space, is the exploration of the differences that separate us 
from the Australian ‘look-alike’ women—until we assimilate (by camouflage or 
other means) and (possibly) eventually integrate. Reverberations of the rites of 
passage are evident within this metaphor. Another metaphor that comes to mind is 
that of ‘pentimento’, the gradual wearing away of the paint to allow inceptive 
images to show through—but this speaks more of the hidden identity—hidden 
even from the individual herself. 
 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak comes from a high-caste Brahmin background of 
which she seems alternately proud and ashamed. Madan Sarup (Identity, Culture 
and the Postmodern World) delicately criticises Spivak: he comments that, “She 
has strong views on the search for roots … I can understand her view that it is 
important for people not to feel rooted in one place, but I wonder: why is she so 
unnecessarily emphatic?” (Sarup, 1996, 163). Sarup comments on Spivak    
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referring to herself as a “post-colonial diasporic Indian who seeks to decolonize 
the mind” (1996, 163): for myself, I wonder, in her self-assumed role of 
‘decolonizing the mind’, whose mind it is she seeks to decolonize? Hers or mine? 
I find the notion of what I consider to be a British sense of entitlement clearly 
illustrated in this interview. Angela Ingram is British and appears confident in her 
powerful historical background; the sense of entitlement that many people, 
usually of British background and/or close descent, possess. Possibly, because I 
take exception to her louche remark about being glad she wasn’t a “filthy colonial 
born in Rhodesia” (Spivak, 1990, 83), my perception is that she somehow 
requires postcolonial subjects to be distinctly ‘other’, distinctly ‘different’, 
perhaps distinctly ‘subaltern’. How does this impact on my own search for 
identity and the research for this thesis? It seems that I am to be placed in the 
precarious position of having no ‘postcolonial’ identity—in the terms of her 
implication, and certainly no sense of entitlement. Following the questions 
initiated by my paper ‘The Ambivalent Neophyte: Immigrant to Integrant, an 
exploration of some English speaking immigrant women in Western Australia” 
presented at the Undisciplined Thoughts conference at Curtin University in 
November 2001, I gained a valuable insight into the differences between my 
experiences of immigration, and those of the women in my study who are of 
British descent. It seems the sense of entitlement that I have indicated is 
something that many British people possess, and this is evident in much of the 
literature examined for this review. It seems that, for many British immigrants, 
there is no lurking feeling of not belonging, or not being welcome in the new 
country. For these privileged immigrants there is no peering over one’s shoulder 
and waiting to be told, “you are not wanted here”, a feature that is clear in Eva    
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Cox’s essay (already cited), and in my own experience. My insight regarding 
‘entitlement’ arose from a question/remark from a Scottish woman in the 
audience following the presentation of my paper. She said that [for her], 
“Immigration was not particularly traumatic and that one could go ‘home’ any 
time one wished” (Personal Journal, 2001). I reflect on my 1997 Honours 
Dissertation entitled When “Back Home” isn’t England: making visible the 
memories, lives and experience of some white women in Rhodesia in which I 
found that, for many immigrants, there was no ‘home’ to return to. In terms of 
entitlement, the British sense of entitlement in immigration is nowhere more 
evident than in Sheila Macdonald’s ficto-autobiography already cited (Venables, 
1997).  
 
Notions of identity and memory are embedded in postcolonial discourse. Situated 
within the colonial and postcolonial literature reviewed for this dissertation are 
the works of Homi K Bhabha. The projection of many of his writings such as 
‘The other question: the stereotype and colonial discourse’, and ‘Interrogating 
Identity’ into this and other themes in my thesis (particularly those of memory 
and identity), makes situating him in the structure of this review complex 
(Bhabha, 1987; Bhabha, 1996). Therefore, as I prefer to keep the form fluid, I flag 
Bhabha here and cite him elsewhere where appropriate. Similarly, Trinh T. Minh-
ha’s writing segues into much of the thesis. Relations between coloniser and 
colonised define Edward Said’s book Culture and Imperialism  (1993) and, 
although there are elusive similarities with Albert Memmi’s The Colonizer and 
the Colonized (1965), and Julia Kristeva’s essay ‘What of Tomorrow’s Nation’ in 
Nations Without Nationalism (1993), the differences are (to me) more    
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conspicuous. Expanding the spectrum to include the notions of migration, exile 
and foreignness that spring from coloniser and colonised, there appears a 
reflection, a mirroring. The similarities of displaced emigrants exist between 
Albert Memmi, writing from the perspective of a colonised Tunisian (and an 
entirely male experience); Julia Kristeva, writing as a ‘cosmopolitanist’ born in 
Bulgaria and living in France; and Edward Said who grew up in France, Britain, 
and the United States and, who in his own words says, ‘Although I feel at home in 
them, I have remained, as a native from the Arab and Muslim world, someone 
who also belongs to the other side’ (Said, 1993, xxiii). And in his essay 
‘Reflections on Exile’ (2001) he proposes that the the discussion of nationalism 
and exile “without reference to each other” cannot be neutral. He writes, exile is 
unlike nationalism because it “… is fundamentally a discontinous state of being” 
(Said, 2001, 177). It is necessary, however, to take into consideration that 
Memmi’s book predates Kristeva and Said by nearly thirty years. The refraction 
of the images presented in these texts warrants an exploration of the minutiae 
within history, and within individual experience. I speak of the paradox of 
postcolonialism that fails to address those who belong neither to the colonised nor 
the coloniser. Issues of identity and notions of colonialism and postcolonialism 
distend and collide with incipient identity in the arena of migration, exile, and 
foreignness. Migration itself can become a metanoia that enforces changes, not 
only on the way of life, but also in the character and spirit of an immigrant. This 
notion is embedded in the liminal space of the rites de passage—before moving 
into the integrative stage. Within the paradigms of my research, invoking the 
spectre of colonialism that informs the paradox of a postcolonialism, becomes an 
exploration of personal history. The concepts that inform migration, exile, and    
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foreignness, within the ambiguity of time, location and history, integrate with 
notions of ‘otherness’ and identity. 
 
These notions of postcolonial identity in colonizing and decolonizing, are salient 
to the examination of migration made by psychiatrists Leon and Rebeca Grinberg 
in their comprehensive study, Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Migration and Exile 
(1989). Migration as a mental health and trauma issue has a wide literature. 
Grinberg and Grinberg define migration thus, “In general, migration (emphasis in 
original) has been used in its strict sense to refer to the geographic mobility of 
people who move from one place to another … for the purpose of settling there” 
(Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, 16-17). The authors explore the experience of 
emigration and immigration from a psychoanalytic perspective. The detailed 
definitions of the terminology and the pathology of immigration, together with 
case studies, permit relevant analogy to the words of the women in my research. 
Grinberg and Grinberg examine those people forced to relocate and those who 
relocate for other reasons. In relation to my research the point that Grinberg and 
Grinberg make and to which I respond is; while some people are forced to leave a 
country as refugees, others immigrate to places that are distant geographically but 
where the social conditions are similar to the country of origin, “… before the 
change took place” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, 19). The lives of the women in 
this research fall overtly into the second group. However, for some of the women 
in the study it was the fear of having to leave eventually, that often precipitated 
the emigration. The notion of emigration by choice is posited by Grinberg and 
Grinberg who call this category of emigration ‘sedentary migrations’ and define 
them thus, “… to leave a place so as to be able to remain in the same place … to    
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leave in order not to change” (1989, 19). The authors categorise the ‘tendency to 
emigrate’ in two groups: ocnophilic, that is, those morbidly attached to familiar 
faces and places, and philobatic, those who tend to lead an independent life, seek 
pleasure in adventures and especially in new emotions (1989, 21). Looking at the 
history of the white settlers in Rhodesia, and the women in my research the 
adventurous spirit seems likely. The interviews from which I draw my 
conclusions will show this is often the case. 
 
Connected to the notion of migration is the issue of ‘exile’ and exile may be 
sought by a person as an immigrant, and may be felt only by the immigrant. Exile 
can be, and often is, forced upon a person or upon a whole community. According 
to Grinberg and Grinberg, exile is defined as separate from other migrations: “for 
the exile, departure is imposed and return impossible” (1989, 157). Madan Sarup 
comments that to be an exile means “… someone who is obliged to stay away”. 
He expresses this view in his critique (already cited) of Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, who says that she does not feel that she is an exile (Sarup, 1996, 163). 
The area in Bulgaria my paternal grandfather’s family came from (Thrace, now in 
Greece) was, according to notes written by him, settled by refugees, exiles, and 
wandering people; people whose homes and livelihood had been taken from them 
in forgotten wars. He writes of the mournful songs he heard as a child, sung by 
descendants of these people, who are also my people, and I reflect on a minor 
detail, that my blood group (B+) is common in people from the Russian Steppes 
and China but relatively uncommon in Northern Europeans; indeed, according to 
the statistics, in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, this group 
occurs in only eight or nine percent of the population (NBS, 2001; Red-Cross,    
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2001). The picture that emerges is of the eternal movement of people, and this is 
illustrated in the words of South African president Jan Smuts who wrote in his 
state paper to the League of Nations in 1919, after the First World War: “The very 
foundations have been shaken and loosened, and things are again fluid. The tents 
have been struck, and the great caravan of humanity is once more on the march” 
(in Blake, 1977, 183). 
 
Julia Kristeva demonstrates the significance of situating migration in history and 
she gives an overview of the history of immigration and foreigners (Kristeva, 
1993). In her writing, the spiral of history winds through and around the scenes of 
migration. She writes of the confusion, the geographical and ideological 
restrictions of, and toward, foreigners and emigrants, throughout the world and 
throughout history. In the essay, Kristeva has selected moments in history where 
she challenges the various historical solutions applied to immigrants and 
foreigners. She begins her examination with immigrant women, the Danaides 
from Greek mythology; proceeds to Paul from Tarsus; and Ruth the Moabite. 
Parallels can be drawn with almost any migration trends, and the movement of the 
women in my research is no exception. Her ‘distant ideal’ is that of “... a world 
without foreigners” (1993, 35-36). The challenge, Kristeva maintains, is to realise 
we are all foreigners and are all, “... a resource in the search for new forms of 
community among individuals that are different and free” (1993, 47). The notion 
of ‘foreigner’ and ‘migrant’ together are not necessarily equivalent, or indeed 
connected. But, as I understand Kristeva’s concept of ‘foreigner’, it is that of not 
speaking the same language as the dominant group in the host country, of 
differences in food, physical appearance, dress, and so forth. I ponder if this is, in    
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today’s political climate, seen more acutely between, for example, the English 
and non-English, French and non-French etcetera? The notion of any immigrants 
to countries such as Australia being seen as foreigners by indigenous Australians, 
that is to say, the original inhabitants of Australia—the Aboriginal people, is not 
often addressed. Indeed, in Australia it is an issue that is generally avoided, or if 
spoken about, not acted upon. To be ‘foreign’ in Australia, therefore, is an 
ambiguous position; a question of identity with a multitude of answers (Ang, 
1995; Bottomley, 1991; Gunew, 1990; Gunew, 1994; Houbein, 1984; 
Papastergiadis, 1998; Stratton, 1996; Vasta, 1991). 
 
The historical nexus of exile is multilayered for, in the Athenian democracy, exile 
was seen as harsh punishment. Today, exile caused by violent upheaval is seen as 
having serious consequences with the segregation of “sectors of the population 
from national life, [thus] forcing them to adjust to unwanted, hurtful, and 
frustrating situations” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, 157). In directing the notion 
of exile into my thesis, I find that elements of exile are present but the extremes: 
“exile flattens and crushes one’s life…” (Benedetti in Grinberg, 1989, 158) are, 
overtly, absent. In pondering the notion of exile, I find that, if it is a state of mind, 
perhaps the seed lies in the feeling of connection to the home country, and the 
memories we retain. If this is the case, the individual’s response to emigration 
and/or exile is rooted in something other than material goods or lifestyle. The 
notion of identity and reassembly of identity in exile is elegantly addressed by 
Edward W Said through the use of poetry, particularly the “… earlier poems 
Mahmoud Darwish, whose considerable work amounts to an epic effort to    
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transform the lyrics of loss into the indefinitley postponed drama of return” 
(2001, 179). 
 
In the notion of rites de passage there is the moment of separation, the initial 
movement into the limen. I find that moving from what the liminal persona is 
familiar with and into the unknown, there is a point where, for some people, grief 
begins. I ponder on my own grief at leaving my country of birth and this leads me 
to ask, “When does the grief associated with emigration ease”? Perhaps after a 
trip ‘home’ and being confronted once again with the reasons for leaving in the 
first place (Ferrari, 1998, 41). There is, in this grief, the connection to 
remembering: re-membering home, family and friends, and consequently, the 
myth of the eternal/successful return. And there is, perhaps, in the sadness, the 
sense of abandonment—abandonment of the homeland and the abandonment of 
self. So, what are we left with but the memories.  
 
In his book on the study of memory, Daniel L Schacter acknowledges that 
remembering and memory are not the objective material that many cognitive 
psychologists would wish. He comments that previously the study of memory did 
not include the subjective experience of remembering. Schacter says ‘we now 
believe with some degree of certainty that our memories are not just bits of data 
that we coldly store and retrieve computerlike’ (my emphasis) (Schacter, 1996, 
4). He says, “We cannot separate our memories of the ongoing events of our lives 
from what has happened to us previously”. I wonder why? Does this mean that as 
we remember we stop remembering the event and just remember the memory? 
Eviatar Zerubavel concurs but comments that “… there are certain things that one    
47 
 
should forget also underscores the normative dimension of memory, which is 
typically ignored by cognitive psychology”. He goes on to comment that “… 
remembering is more than just a spontaneous personal act, as it also happens to be 
regulated by unmistakably social rules of remembrance that tell us quite 
specifically what we should remember what we must forget” (emphasis in 
original) (1997. 84). The depth of social memories and where they begin is 
interlinked tacitly “… in the way we begin historical narratives” implicitly 
consigning memories that preceded this arbitrary yet conventional starting point, 
to a place of unimportance, a place that can be forgotten (Zerubavel, 1997, 84-
85). Thus begging the questions: who determines the timing where this rule of 
social remembering forecloses on preceding memories? And, who/where are 
those people who have memories of before the beginning of the conventional 
historical narrative? Therefore, in the context of my hypothesis, I believe where 
Barbara Myerhof, in her book, Remembered Lives, speaks of links with the past 
and the need to re-member “… to forge a link with the listener, to retain one’s 
past, to find evidence of sense—above all it is an assertion of unextinguished 
presence” (Myerhof, 1992, 240), is the nexus where we may begin to touch the 
nerve point of memory. 
 
In Michael Ondaatje’s biography of his parents, Running in the Family, he writes 
of his memories of Ceylon—Sri Lanka, his family and his family history. The 
evocative nature of his poetry opens the doors of homesickness for any migrant 
who cares to read it. To illuminate this I have chosen an excerpt from one of his 
poems; he writes in the final part of the poem ‘Light’: 
These are their fragments, all I remember,    
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wanting more knowledge of them. In the mirror and in my kids 
I see them in my flesh. Wherever we are 
they parade in my brain and the expanding stories 
connect to the grey grainy pictures on the wall, 
as they hold their drinks or 20 years later 
hold grandchildren, pose with favourite dogs,  
coming through the light, the electricity, which the storm 
destroyed an hour ago, a tree going down by the highway 
so that now inside the kids play dominoes by candlelight 
and out here the thick rain static the spark of my match to a cigarette 
and the trees across the field leaving me, distinct 
lonely in their own knife scars and cow-chewed bark 
frozen in the jagged light as if snapped in their run 
the branch arms waving to what was a second ago the dark sky 
when in truth like me they haven’t moved. 
Haven’t moved an inch from me (Ondaatje, 1989, 5). 
 
After a trip ‘home’ to Zimbabwe in 1996, in the confusion of my memories not 
fitting the reality, I wrote in my journal ‘Maybe I misremember?’ But now I 
ponder on what Bhabha says, ‘Remembering is never a quiet act of introspection 
or retrospection. It is a painful re-membering, a putting together of the 
dismembered past to make sense of the trauma of the present’ (Bhabha, 1994, 63). 
And Mary Douglas writes of “forgetting [which] includes different kinds of 
selective remembering, misremembering and disremembering” (Douglas, 1985, 
13). It is the returning that was painful—so the issues of grief at leaving and 
sadness on return are both salient in respect to memory. I reflect on the memories 
of Africa and the early days of my immigration in Australia—where is the 
connection? Is it the relinquishing of the pre-liminal persona—and how does that 
happen? Each return to Africa emphasises the changes in the country and in the 
self. I notice each time I return how real Africa seems, and how indistinct 
Australia. The feeling of identity being connected to place is explored by Marilyn 
Strathern, who argues that: “Moving between locations can [thus] seem an act of 
disorientation. Indeed, Western geography combines with a perception of    
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individual mobility to partition the sense of place” (Strathern, 1991, 117). There 
is indeed a disorientation, the disorientation of living in Australia and heeding my 
past in Africa. Is it necessary to confront the silence, challenge the mirror with the 
question, where do I fit? And I ponder on where my place is. I find this entry in 
the journal I kept when revisiting Zimbabwe in 1996 and I reproduce it here as I 
wrote it, structured (almost) like a poem: 
Homesickness. 22/12/96 
It’s the terror you see—the terror of feeling home is going to  
forget me. 
Or me forget home?  
That’s what this kind of homesickness is.  
It is quite different from the homesickness which brought me  
back to Africa.  
Africa is so much more REAL than Australia. 
One more thing 
I have not remembered one dream since I’ve been here. 
In Australia, all my dreams are of Africa. 
In Africa, there is no need to dream?  
Or, no need to remember dreams?  
Is Australia really the place of dreaming?  
Does Australia cease to exist when I’m in Africa? (Personal Journal). 
 
Marilyn Strathern discusses the concept of the ‘cosmopolitan anthropologist’ 
returning home: “Images of neither integration nor fragmentation convey what it 
feels like to have returned home. Neither trope adequately indicates the nature of 
presences that impinge” (Strathern, 1991, 23). The implication is that the 
‘cosmopolitan anthropologist’ knows the whereabouts of her/his home. There is 
an expectation that the home that has been left behind (the people, the place) will 
remain the same. On returning, there is a jolting awareness that the home/place 
has changed and I have changed. Then follows the renegotiation, and 
reintegration, of role and of identity. The sanctuary becomes the people who 
remember as I remember. The sanctuary is myself, my memories. The    
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rootlessness becomes self-perpetuating and is perhaps a sanctuary in itself? It is 
the significance, the strength of homesickness, that often accounts for the myth of 
the eternal return. 
 
Whether there is evident metanoia in the immigrant, or whether the subject, the 
immigrant, is unaware of any transformation in her or his identity, the action of 
relocating into a new society compels an altered perspective on life. It is in this 
liminal space that the exploration of ways of being (and ways of being seen) for 
this research, opened me up to aspects of my own identity, previously 
unacknowledged. The interview process triggered a similar experience for some 
of the women in my research, a discovery of fragments of character of which we 
were unaware. Understanding unfolds that there is a perception of personality, 
and hence identity, often attributed to white Rhodesian women in Australia, that 
may or may not be appropriate. In the liminal period of my own relocation, the 
attribution of a racist identity led me to assume a camouflage that, on reflection, 
became the metanoia of my experience of immigration. Knowledge of how we 
reinvent ourselves as Australians and how that reflects on self-assumed identity 
leads me, as researcher and author, to understand the complexity and depth of 
insight required in any process of self-examination. In this place I am aware of 
the responsibility I have assumed of speaking on behalf of the women in my 
study, and the logical extension of that responsibility which is, as posited by 
Sneja Gunew, who reads this and from where (Gunew, 1993a, 7). The 
significance of identity and representation in the postcolonial sphere is discussed 
in the Angela Ingram/Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak interview, already cited. 
Spivak considers the problems of representation, self-representation and    
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representing others, and the situation of the postcolonial subject (Spivak, 1990, 
passim). The overwhelming impression is the struggle between identity and 
nationality, and that is reflected in my own experience of immigration. The 
question I ask myself is, “Am I this or am I that or am I something else entirely?” 
given that I have no distinguishing language, racial or cultural markers that stamp 
me as different from other white Australian women.  
 
A part of being an immigrant with no distinguishing markers, save perhaps a 
moderately distinctive accent, tends to make me think of my own background in 
Rhodesia. The desire to sound British, to be British, is reflected historically in the 
thesis. There was already in 1912, only a few years after white settlement in 
Rhodesia, concern about accent – and by extrapolation about national purity – 
being expressed by the Director of Education. A warning was circulated to the 
parents of high school scholars about the standard of English pronunciation, and 
the purpose is clear: 
You have undoubtedly realized that the youth in this country are at a 
disadvantage in the manner of learning the correct pronunciation of 
the English language. More often than not their ears are accustomed 
to variants of the English language far from pleasant to hear and 
which, if acquired, would in later years betray a lack of cultured 
training (Gann, 1969, 315). 
 
This admission, albeit by omission, that not all settlers were English speaking 
was, most likely, directed at the Afrikaans settlers from South Africa. In my 
experience, acquiring (the Rhodesian equivalent of) a cultured English accent was 
important to achieve social status in Rhodesia. In this context, there is a 
connection to Lacan’s notion that the effect of mimicry is camouflage, “not a 
harmonization of repression of difference, but a form of resemblance” (in Bhabha,    
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1994, 90). The similarity is smoothly extrapolated to Rhodesian migrants in 
Australia. The idea that even unquestioning compliance with the dominant culture 
confers acceptance on the immigrant is attractive—but the literature shows this is 
not necessarily the case. For instance, Frank Clements writing of the Greek 
community in Rhodesia cites the example of a Greek who 
gained one of the most distinguished Rhodesian records as an Air 
Force pilot in the war; shortly after his return he applied to join the 
Salisbury Club and was blackballed. No reason was given, of course, 
but ‘dagos’ and ‘yids’ were as unacceptable to the normal 
memberships as were ‘coolies’ (Clements, 1969, 73).  
 
Thus, the Greek was good enough to fight for the British, but was unacceptable in 
the colonial society because of his ethnicity. Bhabha speaks of “the major trope of 
social and psychic identification”, when the Other only becomes “one of us” in 
death. “He was one of us” reveals the fragile margins of the concepts of Western 
civility and cultural community put under stress” (Bhabha, 1994, 174). No doubt, 
had the Greek been killed in action, he would have been “one of us”! The 
postscript to Frank Clements’ anecdote reads: “The Greek announced that he had 
in consequence returned his medals and decorations to the Queen. This incident 
was remarkable only in that it was publicized” (1969, 73). The paradox is that the 
dominant culture requires compliance but seldom confers acceptance. It may be 
that it is in the performance of compliance that the notions of assimilation and 
mimicry originate. 
 
The notions of rites de passage, of assimilation and integration, that follow from 
this are grounded in the historical events of white settlement in Rhodesia. I 
expand this, with our experiences of immigration into Australia, into the    
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Australian locus. I return to the work of Peter Godwin and his statement of 
unremarked integration into Rhodesian society: that the mutation happens, that 
curious divergence from the mother culture whether British, Rhodesian, or 
Russian, the identities becoming “this quite separate people” (Godwin, 1996, 
197).  
 
While there is a tendency to reiterate material in the methodology (in the 
preceding chapter), I find that the literature that influenced the research process, 
both the fieldwork and the writing can be situated here. The literature includes the 
experiences of ethnographers, historians, feminists and other researchers. The 
methods I use to meld the sense of history and the rites of passage in immigration, 
and to establish my own connections with autobiography, identity, and memory—
and to situate the whole in a theoretical framework—are drawn from a multitude 
of sources. I work as the insider’s voice and as the author’s voice. Ruth Behar, 
ethnologist and poet, has inspired my research. Her book The Vulnerable 
Observer: Anthropology That Breaks Your Heart and her essay ‘Writing in My 
Father’s Name: A Diary of Translated Woman’s First Year’ are articulate and her 
voice is authentic. She does not shy away from the emotional and stressful 
situations that occur. In this respect, Anne Marie Fortier’s paper, ‘Troubles in the 
Field: The use of personal experiences as sources of knowledge’, has also proved 
valuable and, when I have had to (often reluctantly) step away from the research 
as an insider, and use the authoritative voice I am comforted that my emotional 
investment is not unique (Behar, 1995; Behar, 1996; Fortier, 1996). Trinh T. 
Minh-ha, whose work I initially found ‘too difficult’ has become more familiar to 
me now. I had to learn to read her in small bites/bytes. She says, “Writing, in a    
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way, is listening to the others’ language and reading with the others’ eyes. The 
more ears I am able to hear with, the farther I see the plurality of meaning and the 
less I lend myself to the illusion of a single message” (Minh-ha, 1989, 30). What 
does that mean to me as the author of this text? It is, I think, the understanding, 
and appreciation, of being able to configure all the research I’ve done into 
something others can read and endow with meaning—mine or their own. I have 
read Judith Abwunza; in her ‘Conversation Between Cultures: Outrageous 
Voices? Issues of Voice and Text in Feminist Anthropology’ she addresses the 
complexity of speaking about women while avoiding the tendency to speak for 
them. She is passionately aware that we only hear women’s voices because ‘I was 
there!’ (Abwunza, 1995, 255). The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in 
Post-Colonial Literatures (1989) situates the overall theory in a postcolonial 
paradigm—and pushes me to research further (when, really, I should be writing 
and not reading) (Ashcroft, 1989). Shulamit Reinharz’s seminal text Feminist 
Methods in Social Research (1992) and Donna Haraway’s essay ‘Situated 
Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective’ (1988) have been (are) necessary adjuncts to the research (Haraway, 
1988; Reinharz and Davidman, 1992). 
 
Edward Said writes in his introduction that colonisation was ‘about the notions of 
bringing civilisation to primitive or barbaric peoples ... “they’ were not like ‘us’ 
and for that reason deserved to be ruled” (1993, xi-xii). I understand where this 
applies in Kristeva’s writing of foreigners and exile (1993) and in Memmi’s 
notions of colonizer and colonized—but it is, I believe, too general for the women 
in my study. Although my sample base is small, there is diversity in our    
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backgrounds. In the event it is my own experience that has led me to explore—
within the discourses of postcolonialism, feminism, rites de passage, and 
postmodernism—and to determine where these immigrants’ sense of dissimilarity 
and division between themselves and within Western Australia is located. 
Reflecting on the multiple identities inherited in nationality and historical 
background, I reiterate the autobiographical content of the work. Situating the 
research in context from the beginning (or a beginning), in the following chapter I 
discuss the history of colonisation in Southern Rhodesia in the early twentieth 
century and the placement of white settlers not of British descent. 
 
                                                 
i Mashonaland: the central and north-eastern parts of Rhodesia. 
ii Melsetter: farming area in the Eastern Highlands of Rhodesia, near the border of Mozambique.    
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Chapter Three  
 
 
 
 
The Beginning is not at Perth Airport.
i 
ii 
 
 
In this chapter, which takes the form of a prologue to the main thesis, I address 
white immigration to the British colony of Rhodesia in the early twentieth 
century. I draw on notions of colonialism, and postcolonialism as an inversion of 
colonialism and, in this context, I am able to discuss the history of colonisation in 
Southern Rhodesia in the early twentieth century. By drawing on personal family 
history and examining the positioning of ‘foreign’ immigrants in British colonial 
society I am able to extrapolate from this experience to the positioning of white, 
English speaking immigrants in Western Australia. In this process I am better 
able to embrace the immigration experience, both currently and historically. In 
this way the reflections and memories of people in other times and other places 
reveal how memories intersect with the twisting threads of ‘new’ life and ‘new’ 
identity in Africa and in Australia. Therefore, I am able to signal from the very 
beginning that the context of this work is autobiographical; that the research, 
writing, and thesis are embedded in personal and family experiences. The themes    
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and tropes flagged in this opening chapter are the first images of the deeper 
reflections that follow.  
 
I discuss my writing about the history of Rhodesia in this thesis with a colleague, 
an ex-Rhodesian. She questions the necessity of going into the historical sphere in 
Rhodesia when my thesis concerns the identity, positionality and experience of 
some white immigrant women in Western Australia. My explanation to her (and 
subsequently to myself) is that it is necessary because, for the sake of my 
narrative, there needs to be a beginning and Perth—or even Harare—airport are 
not that beginning, just as when my grandparents left Eastern Europe to go to 
Africa, that was not the beginning. Therefore, by positioning myself (and this 
thesis) historically and currently, I celebrate time as a presence, a prescience that 
ebbs and flows, circles and spirals. Notions of time are visited throughout this 
work and tendrils of time wrap around ideas and issues in shadowy (smoky) 
embrace. Viewing time as fluid, the similarities and differences between migrant 
identity in colonial Rhodesia and migrant identity in postcolonial Western 
Australia can be shown in an intimate and transparent manner. I find that, by 
looking at the minutiae of experiences, issues arise for exploration that otherwise 
might not have been accessible; areas that otherwise might not have been seen as 
pertinent, become integral to the work. Therefore, as the thesis progresses, the 
context becomes clear, and the notions, lucid. I reiterate, the content of this thesis 
is substantially autobiographical.  
 
So, in this chapter I look at the situation of immigrants into Southern Rhodesia 
who were not British by birth or close descent. I relate this position to issues of    
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gender and social stratification within the colony. I initiate the theme of 
assimilation (or otherwise) in the case of ‘foreign’ immigrants into colonial 
society and flag here an integral part of my thesis which defines (for me) the 
difference between assimilation (which may be seen a strategy for survival for the 
immigrant), and integration. Exposure of the accepted history of Southern 
Rhodesia occasionally surfaces in this exploration with the proviso that the events 
are seen from my own (and my family’s) worldview. Therefore, the chapter tends 
to be biographical and deals particularly with my paternal grandparents, who were 
brought to Southern Rhodesia from Eastern Europe in the early years of the 
twentieth century. Interviews with my aunt, who was born in Southern Rhodesia 
in 1914, and the use of notes that she has kept over the years concerning family 
history allow me to situate the non-British colonial. Expanding from my own 
experiences, and the experiences of other family members, the minutiae of 
familiar history are available to expand and fill the margins where such identities 
are situated. Personal memories of half-remembered conversations (and half-
forgotten conversations) with my mother and father, both long dead, begin to 
reassemble the narrative of colonial Rhodesia with which I am/was familiar. So, 
from this internal/insider perspective I look at the situation of immigrants who 
were not of British descent in colonial Rhodesia. I touch on the assimilation (or 
otherwise) of ‘foreign’ immigrants into this particularly British colonial society. I 
reflect on my grandparents’ experiences, their gradual transit from conscript to 
immigrant; from immigrant to integrant. Following, indeed embedded in, this are 
my own experiences as immigrant to integrant in Australia—vastly different 
perhaps, but with points of reference that touch and, when they do, burn with 
recognition of shared experience across time, distance, and culture.     
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The motif of the rites de passage is evident from the beginning, with separation 
from the familiar, the homeland, the matrix; isolation and seclusion in strange 
surroundings as the liminal space unfolds; and the eventual integration (or 
otherwise) into the new society. 
 
Without doubt, the British as colonisers of Rhodesia maintained strong social 
divisions. The broad racial division occluded the more subtle social divisions that 
were common in colonial Rhodesia. For those white immigrants drawn from non-
English speaking backgrounds, acceptance into the community was difficult—if 
not impossible. Historian Robert Blake discusses the inequities of status as 
commonplace in the historical context, not least the gender/black/white issues. He 
states that the only white people of any importance in early Rhodesia were 
English men. ‘The truth is that Rhodesia was a white male-dominated society’ 
(Blake, 1977, 159). In my reading of the literature, I find that the belief in the 
supremacy of the English male is so strong that most writers only mention race or 
nationality if the men referred to are not English. However, it is interesting to read 
that the first white woman who entered Bulawayo after the conquest of 
Matabeleland was Jewish, as was the first white child to be born in Bulawayo—a 
girl. Her name was Lily Tempofsky born on the 4 April 1894 (Kosmin, 1973, 
205). The Jewish woman mentioned by Kosmin is unnamed but could have been 
Marie Lippert, wife of a German financier, who kept a journal (in English) and 
wrote letters to her mother in Hamburg (in German). As I have indicated in the 
previous chapter, Frau Lippert later published these writings (in German as Zur 
Erinnerung an Marie Lippert, Ihre Reisebriefe und Skizzen aus Matabelelund, 21    
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September bis 23 Dezember 1891, Leipzig 1897). Because of Frau Lippert’s 
Jewish antecedents, it is presumed by the antique book dealers I have been in 
contact with, that most were burned by the Nazi regime during WWII. The few 
copies that remain are in private hands and in the Archives in Zimbabwe (Kane, 
1954,79). Therefore, although ‘foreigners’ such as Jews, Greeks, Afrikaners, and 
the like, were significant in the settlement of Rhodesia, they were, nevertheless, 
held in contempt by many of the British colonisers. There was a tendency to treat 
‘foreign’ immigrants to ‘their’ colony as interlopers invading a select club and 
this metaphor is reflected in chapter two of this thesis where I cited the 
circumstances of the Greek war hero who was blackballed when he applied to 
join the (elite) Salisbury Club (Clements, 1969, 73). It is ironic, therefore, the 
value that is now placed by ex-patriot settlers on these historic writings and on the 
exploits of the original ‘foreign’ Rhodesians, not to mention the homogenisation 
of what little white society remains in Zimbabwe at the time of writing. The main 
divisions among the people of Zimbabwe, both black and white, are political and 
economic. 
 
So, who are the ‘foreign’ immigrants into present-day Australia, and who are real 
Australians? On a spring day in October 2000, I was sitting at the North Cott 
Café, looking out over the Indian Ocean and I overheard a woman at the 
neighbouring table say to her friends, “He’s a real Aussie, from the bush!” In my 
mind, I keep returning to this phrase. It is the perfect stereotyping of the 
Australian as a white male, from the bush, and the implications of laconic, steely-
eyed masculinity are too delightful to pass. The fact that it was spoken in a group 
of women ‘doing lunch’ in a fashionable eating place, in a fashionable suburb,    
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makes the notion even more delectable. This stereotyping in Australia, by (I 
presume) Australians, encourages me to flag the argument of postcolonialism as 
an inversion of colonialism. 
 
In comparing the treatment of non-English white people in Africa to the 
representation of ‘foreign’ immigrants in contemporary (twenty-first century) 
Australia, begins my speculation of postcolonialism as an inversion of 
colonialism. I reflect on the overall identity of ‘Australians’ because it is 
necessary to define whom I am speaking of, or to, when I refer in general terms to 
‘Australians’ and ‘Australian culture’. So, this is my discourse; I recognise that 
the notion of homogeneous ‘Australian culture’ is problematic, as is the reductive 
notion of ‘the Australian’ per se. Therefore, for the purposes of this project, when 
I refer to ‘the Australians’ it is to the white Anglo-Saxons. Other immigrants to 
Australia have also defined Australians thus, “… the Australians … were not only 
white, but specifically Anglo-Saxon, Scottish and Irish” (Houbein, 1990, 37, 93-
94). Indeed, it is those white Anglo Australians who have customarily assumed 
for themselves, and attributed to the few, the mantle of the ‘real’ Australian. (The 
image in the mirror becomes less murky!) I return to this trope throughout the 
thesis, expanding and contracting; changing and rearranging. 
 
The notion of ‘real’ Australians being white and male is reflected in notions of 
white male dominance in colonial Rhodesia. Rhodesian barrister and judge, Sir 
Robert Tredgold, in his career as the Minister of Defence during WWII, Federal 
Chief Justice and acting Governor General, was noted for his liberal views. His 
autobiography reveals a consummate presentation of how the English male    
62 
 
dominated life in Rhodesia. Sir Robert was born in Bulawayo in 1899. He led an 
enormously privileged life—even for a member of the white population in 
Southern Rhodesia. His autobiography, perhaps typically for the time, is 
characterised by the invisibility of women, family or strangers, white or black. 
His wife, Lorna, is mentioned twice, and appears (unnamed or, occasionally, as 
“my wife”) in two or three photographs. However, he mentions his dog on a 
number of occasions! There is a picture of Lady Tredgold, Sir Robert, the Queen 
Mother and Tim—the dog. The caption reads ‘With the Queen Mother and Tim in 
1957’ (Tredgold, 1968, 224). The prejudice between white people of different 
backgrounds is reflected in Sir Robert Tredgold’s story about an old Afrikaner 
friend of his (Tredgold’s) father who said “I hate the English but I have never met 
an Englishman I did not like” (1968, 67). This begs the question of how the 
English felt towards the Afrikaner and other white minority groups.  
 
Frank Clements directs our attention to the inflexible social stratification evident 
in colonial Rhodesia, a stratification which depended on origin rather than class 
or education. The divisiveness extended to the Afrikaners, Jews, Indians and 
Greeks, particularly the traders, whom Clements considers the most ‘vulnerable’ 
and who were held in contempt by the other marginal groups. Clements writes of 
the “deep resentment at the arrogance and scorn shown by the whites of British 
birth and close descent, who repulsed every effort made by the Greeks to be 
accepted as unqualified members of the elite” (Clements, 1969, 73). This view of 
the British considering themselves as the only ‘real’ people is reinforced by other 
writers of the same period, although not self consciously. A sense of déjà vu 
arises in me when I read this passage in Clements’ book, a feeling of ‘revisiting’ a    
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situation—as an Australian immigrant—evoking childhood memories of not 
belonging, of being on the outside, in the margins, invisible.  
 
The social hierarchy in Rhodesia extended, of course, to the wives of the settlers. 
Deborah Kirkwood writes that even in1897 it mattered where one lived, certainly 
in the towns (Kirkwood, 1984, 148). Within this hierarchy, the placement of 
settlers (and their wives) from different backgrounds is barely mentioned by 
authors and historians, thereby adding to their invisibility—so it is from my own 
family history that I draw examples. In exploring the subject of the wives of the 
farmers settling in Southern Rhodesia, the literature focusses on English women 
and their social values and mores. There is little or no mention of those farmers’ 
wives—a minority group within a minority group—who were isolated not only 
through distance, but also by the lack of a common language. Their cultural 
background, social skills and values separated them not only from the dominant 
white population but the indigenous people too. The issue of isolation as an 
individual and as a family is revealed as the work progresses, and the relevance to 
the rites of passage, particularly the central, liminal stage, is developed.  
 
In a general sense, the comparison with contemporary Australian attitudes to 
waves of immigrants from areas other than Britain may, at first glance, seem 
superficial, possibly spurious, even banal—nevertheless, on reflection upon my 
own experience, I find the comparison valid. I question the overt differences 
between colonial Rhodesia and postcolonial Australia, and this thread appears 
again and again throughout the work.  
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In the review of the literature I commented on the dearth of writing by women, 
about their lives in colonial Rhodesia. Whether it is because of the perceived 
triviality of the books, or because of the subsequent history of Rhodesia and 
Zimbabwe, that they have not been archived is a moot point. Among those I have 
been able to obtain, the British bias is obvious (MacDonald, 1927b; MacDonald, 
1927a). In the Review of the Literature I have also devoted some time to the 
literature surrounding the experiences of the Dominican nuns who arrived in the 
territory around about the same time as the Pioneer Column, and where it is 
relevant, I draw on these texts (Dominican, 1947; Gelfand, 1964). As I have 
mentioned, the literature pertaining to immigration and life experience in 
Australia is extensive so, to expand my view, and seeking a simulacrum to the 
Rhodesian experience, I read the work of white women who have arrived in 
Australia from backgrounds other than British. Some arrived in Australia when 
they were children and some as adult women, for example: (Cox, 1992) and 
(Houbein, 1990). I find elements of similarity in our experiences that open out the 
trope of connections over time and place. Eva Cox reflects on her immigration (as 
a child) to Australia and the feeling of being somewhere she could call ‘home’. 
She was willing to do whatever necessary to assimilate (perhaps integrate?) and 
belong in her new home. She writes, as I have indicated on page 27 of the Review 
of the Literature: Themes already formed, “But I was not allowed to belong: I was 
still defined as a reffo and a Jew and I wondered what it all meant …” (Cox, 
1992, 63). I ponder, Where does the reassembly of identity begin? In the 
progression of my hypothesis and drawing on theories expounded by van Gennep 
and Turner in the rites de passage, the themes flagged in this chapter on the 
historical background begin to emerge with finer detail/distinction. The ebb and    
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flow of identity, placement, assimilation and integration merge, submerge, and 
separate—and shadowy images of me, fashioning the work—appear and 
disappear. 
 
As early as 1904 the chauvinism and xenophobia of many of the British settlers 
were apparent. Many of the English colonists were certain that ‘Greeks, Hindoos 
and Chinamen’ were a danger to the security and economy of the territory and 
therefore should not be granted trading licenses (Kosmin, 1977, 46). The 
Chartered Company (the British South Africa Company) ruled Rhodesia from 
1890 (the arrival of the Pioneer Column) until 1924. The Company was the main 
employer in the colony and, in 1907, to reduce the country’s dependence on 
imports and raise the value of the Company’s own assets, they decided to begin 
growing tobacco in the country. To this end they recruited farmers from Thrace 
and Anatolia, areas well known for the quality of Turkish tobacco. ‘They brought 
fourteen Hellenes from Turkey (Thrace and Anatolia) and apologized for so doing 
as they had been ‘unable to obtain responsible Europeans’ (Kosmin, 1977, 46). 
The men were recruited by a British South Africa Company employee, G M 
Odlum—who was ‘the Company’s’ agricultural expert—while on a trip to Turkey 
and Greece to learn more about Turkish tobacco. The men were engaged “for 
service in Southern Rhodesia, some of whom later settled in the country to take 
up tobacco-growing on their own account” (Gann, 1969, 170). It is one of these 
fourteen Turkish and Greek ‘settlers’ or ‘conscripts’ who is relevant to this thesis 
because, among the fourteen men who arrived in Southern Rhodesia in 1908, was 
Kiriaco, my paternal grandfather. In 1909 his wife Rosa (my grandmother) and    
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infant son George (my father) arrived in Salisbury to join him. Chronologically, 
this is less than twenty years after the Pioneer Column arrived in 1890.  
 
The history of white settlement in Rhodesia began in 1890 with the arrival of 
Cecil John Rhodes’ Pioneer Column in Mashonaland. This was the beginning of 
the formal colonisation of the territory and the raising of the Union Jack in Fort 
Salisbury took place in September of that year. The Pioneer Column was 
dispatched from South Africa by Cecil John Rhodes’ British South Africa 
Company. The group of 196 Pioneers, and some 800 other men, were led by Dr 
Leander Starr Jameson, and guided by the hunter Frederick Selous. Historian 
Robert Blake suggests that the men in the Pioneer Column were mainly drawn by 
the lure of gold (Blake, 1977, 68-69). Earlier, in 1867, the gold seekers in 
Matabeleland were warned by Moselikatse, the founder of the Matabele nation 
and father of Lobengula, “… on no account to bring with them a woman, a cow, a 
ewe or a she goat, because the permission is to carry away stones (gold), not to 
build houses and towns in my country” (Mackenzie in Kirkwood, 1984, 143). 
Clearly, the presence of women implied different purposes for the land to the 
Matabele king, and while this may have seemed implausible to the gold-miners 
and trophy-hunters taking part in the initial forays, hindsight shows that 
Moselikatse read the situation with keen perception.  
 
The women who came into Rhodesia in the early days of white settlement, prior 
to the Pioneer Column, were generally missionaries and the wives of 
missionaries, “They were the earliest white women to settle in Rhodesia, arriving 
during the 1850s” (Kirkwood, 1984, 144), and, for the most part, they tended to    
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be overlooked by the historians. For example, Hugh Marshall Hole, an eminent 
early Rhodesian wrote: “There was said to be a white woman somewhere in the 
camp, but she must have remained in purdah for we never saw her” (in 
Kirkwood, 1984, 144). However, it is worth mentioning that Deborah Kirkwood, 
herself, omits any mention of settler’s wives who were not English or of British 
extraction. The relative position of the missionary women is indicated by 
historian Neville Jones who writes that: “While it is hardly correct to describe 
these worthy missionaries as settlers, I should be sorry to miss this opportunity to 
do honour to brave men” (Jones, 1953, 8). No mention of honour to the few 
(three) brave women with them. As an aside, the Foreword to this book is written 
by Sir Robert Tredgold and in his remarks about Neville Jones says, “Mr Neville 
Jones has served Rhodesia long and faithfully, as a missionary, as an 
archaeologist and as a historian” (Tredgold in Jones, 1953). 
 
However, between 1890 and 1896, it is true that the white population was 
predominantly men seeking gold. In 1895 Mashonaland and Matabeleland were 
united under the name of Rhodesia (Caute, 1983, 10). After being crushed in the 
Mashona and Matabele rebellions in 1896 and 1897, the Indigenous African 
people were effectively silenced politically. Whoever was going to determine the 
political future of Rhodesia, Blake observes, “... they would not be black. With 
remarkable speed after the rebellions the Africans ceased to count politically ... 
[they] became literally a silent majority for more than half a century” (Blake, 
1977, 155). Throughout the colonisation and white settlement of Rhodesia the 
disproportionate power held by the small number of whites is remarkable. The 
comparison with other British colonies is commented on by Barry Schutz who    
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observes, “Perhaps of all the British colonies with established settler populations, 
Rhodesia has had the fewest in numbers both absolutely and relative to the 
indigenous population” (1973, 5). To understand the significance of this 
statistically, the white population in 1960 peaked at 223,000, under 8 per cent of 
the African population (Blake 1977, 243). The era during which my grandparents 
arrived in Southern Rhodesia was one of significant demographic change. The 
white population rose from 14,000 in 1907 to 20,000 in 1910 (Blake 1977, 166-
167). Statistics given for 1911 show an increase to 23,606 white settlers of whom 
15,580 were men (Kosmin, 1973, 206). 
 
The history of my grandmother, Rosa, before her immigration to Africa gives 
some indication of the reasons why she (and my grandfather) left their homeland. 
Rosa was born in 1875 (or thereabouts) in a village near Odessa in the Ukraine. 
She was one of the younger children in a large family of thirteen or fourteen and 
her parents were illiterate—hence her birth was never registered. As an adult 
Rosa learned to read and write Russian but she never went to school. When she 
was old (and she lived until 1967) she would reminisce about her childhood in 
Russia and I, a child of Africa, who had never seen snow or a frozen river, would 
listen entranced. She told me that as a small child, in winter, she was sent to fetch 
water for cooking and washing and had to break the ice on the river to fill the 
bucket. She told me that the old grandma slept on the stove where it was warm. I 
assume that Rosa was a rebellious and adventurous child as she left home to work 
in a cigarette factory in Odessa at a young age, but this could have been for many 
other reasons as the family was poor. However, it was during her time working in 
Odessa that Rosa met Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. I believe meeting Lenin influenced    
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her strongly and, indeed, she was inspired to join the Bolshevik movement. Rosa 
became a leader in her group and was imprisoned by the Tsarist Regime for some 
years for organising strikes. She met my grandfather, Kiriaco, while working at 
the cigarette factory in about 1905. Kiriaco was very young, probably only twenty 
years old, but already a seasoned revolutionary. He had fled to Russia from 
Bulgaria (Thrace, now in Greece) because of being wanted for assassination 
attempts on prominent Turks in the administration. Rosa and Kiriaco fought 
together during the manning of the barricades in the 1905 Bolshevik uprisings. 
Because of Kiriaco’s revolutionary activities in the Ukraine he had, once again, to 
flee—this time from Russia and returning to Bulgaria. Back in his own country he 
soon set about inciting the people in the villages around his home village of 
Ksanty to rebel against Turkish oppression, Greek religious domination, and for 
better work conditions. Rosa, by this time heavily pregnant, followed him to 
Bulgaria and, in 1908, my father was born in Sofia.  
 
Joining the British South Africa Company as a recruit (conscript) to work in 
Africa made good sense with the Turkish authorities closing in on Kiriaco. How 
do I know these things that happened so long ago and far away? Well, my 
grandmother and I had a close bond and she would tell me stories. When I read 
Doris Lessing comparing the Russian and African themes, she refers to Tolstoy 
and writes, “[It is] astonishing how often Russian experience is relevant to 
Africa” (Lessing, 1992, 204). And I reflect, Did Rosa find her Russian experience 
relevant to Africa? Perhaps to an Englishwoman the experience happening to 
another is relevant or, more likely, romantic—but to a Russian peasant 
undergoing the experience—somehow I doubt it! Do I find the notion of people    
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fleeing repressive regimes reflected in current Australian experience? Yes, there 
are points of comparison, but there seems to me to be more a parallel experience; 
perhaps because of time, perhaps because colonialism has inverted itself (or has 
been inverted) into postcolonialism. Perhaps the Australian postcolonial 
experience is harsher on the refugees who are ‘too foreign’? In the current 
situation (2002 and 2003) the Australian Commonwealth government has camps 
for illegal immigrants, refugees and ‘boat people’. When I consider the processing 
of these so-called ‘illegal immigrants’ by the authorities I realise that, had my 
grandparents in some time warp arrived in contemporary Australia, they too 
would be incarcerated in Woomera or the equivalent. And, as known trouble-
makers and revolutionaries would not, in all likelihood, have been granted 
asylum. 
 
Memmi writes that a European in the colonies, whether he wishes it or not, is 
received as a privileged person by the institutions, customs and people. ‘From the 
time he lands or is born, he finds himself in a factual position which is common to 
all Europeans living in a colony, a position which turns him into a colonizer’ 
(Memmi, 1965, 83). Freund writes that “Settlers rarely came to Africa intending 
to live from their own and their families’ labour alone, although there were a few 
exceptions in the Portuguese and Italian colonies. Elsewhere they aspired to be 
capitalist farmers requiring vast outlays of land and the subordination of a great 
deal of cheap, initially coerced labour” (Freund, 1984, 122). Doris Lessing, 
writing from an English background, states that “As soon as one sets foot in a 
white settler country, one becomes part of a mass disease; everything is seen 
through the colour bar” (Lessing, 1957, 18). This widespread assumption, and    
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generalisation, reproduced here by Freund and, to a lesser extent, Doris Lessing, 
serves to reinforce the invisibility of other minority groups of settlers in British 
colonial Africa. I think that what annoys me about these generalisations are the 
assumptions that we, as minority groups, either do not exist or, if we do, are not 
worth naming. It is, once again, the invisibility, the marginilisation, that I became 
accustomed to as a child. 
 
Albert Memmi’s notion of a colonial (as opposed to a coloniser) is clear: 
A colonial is a European living in a colony but having no privileges, 
whose living conditions are not higher than those of a colonized 
person of equivalent economic and social status. By temperament or 
ethical conviction, a colonial is a benevolent European who does not 
have the colonizer’s attitude toward the colonized ... Let us say right 
away, despite the apparently drastic nature of the statement: a colonial 
so defined does not exist, for all Europeans in the colonies are 
privileged (1990 (1965), 76). 
 
By this definition, Kiriaco and Rosa were colonials, certainly by comparison to 
the British colonisers. When they originally came to Southern Rhodesia, they 
were not privileged and the colour of their skin was irrelevant to the British 
settlers—the significance of their skin colour to the colonised, the indigenous 
population, is debatable, but cannot be attended to here. There is only one reason 
for this and that is the total dearth of information. No one in the family speaks of 
the relationship between Rosa, Kiriaco and the Indigenous Africans and the 
subject is seldom broached—apart from when I speak about it and am met with 
silence. In her old age my grandmother was cared for by Johnny, her servant of 
many years, and she often referred to him as her son. If this is any indication of 
her early relationship with the Indigenous African, I would have to say that it was 
more familiar than the accepted ‘master and servant’ model that prevailed in    
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colonial Rhodesia. As for my grandfather and his relationship with the Indigenous 
Africans, I can only hazard a guess, but, because of the silence that surrounds 
racial issues within the family, and because of his early history in Rhodesia as an 
itinerant worker living with the Indigenous Africans, I am tempted to believe that 
the relationship was egalitarian, at least until the obsession to become ‘English’ 
took hold. 
 
As Rosa and Kiriaco’s story unfolds and the transformation into coloniser begins, 
Memmi’s definition becomes sound. In the beginning in Rhodesia, Kiriaco was 
contracted to receive £5.8.0 a month, payable at the end of the first year. The 
contract was written in English and he signed it, although at that time he could not 
speak, read, or write English. The contract stated that he receive £6.6.0 a month 
for the second year and £7.4.0 a month in the third—the money only to be paid at 
the expiration of each completed year. Although he could have cash advances “if 
the Company’s representative shall seem fit” (Original Contract)
iii. The contract 
was for three years after which he would get a pre-paid return ticket to Turkey. 
By comparison, an Englishman, James Owen Armistead, engaged at the same 
time to do a similar job, was contracted at £500 per annum during the first year. 
His salary increased to £550 per annum during the second year and £600 per 
annum during the third year, plus sustenance allowance when travelling (Original 
Contract, NAZ)
iv. Regarding the comparison between Kiriaco’s wages and that of 
the African labourers with whom he worked, I am not certain, but my 
grandmother told me they lived in similar accommodation (pole and dagga huts) 
with furniture made from empty paraffin boxes. This remained their way of life 
even after Kiriaco withdrew from his contract and travelled the country working    
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for farmers in the capacity of a tobacco ‘expert’ but, more likely, as an itinerant 
labourer, much the same as the African men did.  
 
Looking at myself (and my small family) as immigrants to Australia in the early 
1980s, our search for employment, our search for a sense of belonging, I see 
again the inversion of colonialism into postcolonialism. I am fortunate to speak 
English, and have an adequate educational background, a good work history—but 
no Australian history, no Australian background. In this context, my education 
seemed to work against me when I applied for jobs: “over qualified” was a 
common response. I recollect how often I thought of my grandmother and the 
obstacles she had to overcome in Africa and thought how puny my struggles were 
by comparison. I came to Australia as an immigrant, not a coloniser; my 
grandmother went to Africa as what? Surely not to colonise? My aunt, who was 
born in Southern Rhodesia in 1914, told me: “Of this first year [in the colony], I 
do not recall being told very much. My mother [Rosa] told me that when she 
arrived to join Papa [Kiriaco] he was using newspaper in his shoes in place of 
socks, and cardboard placed in the soles which were worn out in places”.  
 
During the early years the family laboured in the back blocks of Southern 
Rhodesia. Money was scarce and, while poverty was not new to them, the whole 
situation must have been alien. Coming from the Ukraine and having fought at the 
barricades in Odessa, my grandmother’s view of the African landscape can only 
be imagined. When there was transport, it was usually a scotch-cart, that is a 
wagon pulled by donkeys or oxen; or a bicycle. My aunt remembers being told by 
her father that he had to cycle some seventy miles to buy the staples of tea, sugar,    
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salt, and flour. They were not given any farm produce on most of the farms where 
they worked, and had to pay a shilling for a (whiskey) bottle of milk. They had 
few clothes, and those they had were sewn by Rosa. Aunt tells me, “She would 
get a bolt of khaki and from that make Papa his longs, and shirts and shorts for 
[her brothers] George and Pete. A bolt of some cotton made her and myself a 
couple of frocks each”.  
 
Aunt tells another story, “I remember well being told when Mama was seriously 
ill with black-water fever. They had to catch a train into hospital in Salisbury. 
They must have been in Lydiate at that time for they had to catch the train at 
Norton Siding. As they arrived by scotch-cart, the train was already leaving and 
Mama had to wait for the next train. She had to rest next to the railway line under 
a grass shelter until it arrived. In the hospital, in the bed next to her, was a Polish 
lady married to a Greek, her name was Mrs Cambitzis. They could understand 
each other’s language and became friends for the rest of their lives.” I remember 
my grandmother often spoke about this meeting with Mrs Cambitzis. She told me 
that before they met, that for one full year she spoke only to Kiriaco and her 
children, and the sense of isolation and aloneness in her story breaks my heart.  
 
This issue of belonging and not belonging is paradoxical. To fit in, to belong in 
the society, and equally, to fit in, to belong in the text. Where and when does an 
immigrant begin to ‘belong’? The ‘new’ society seems to demand it of you but, 
paradoxically, seems also to block each attempt. For example, I have already 
cited Eva Cox being categorised as a “reffo and a Jew” and I mention here that 
this categorisation led her to try and join the group into which she was    
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pigeonholed that is, the Jewish community of Sydney’s Eastern Suburbs. 
However, the process led to her awareness that she did not identify with the 
Zionist youth group she joined and so she ended up drifting “in the margins of the 
many worlds I half knew, and, in doing this, wondered whether I would ever 
experience a sense of belonging … Even if it did not identify with me, it was all I 
really had, were I not to be always an observer in other people’s lands” (Cox, 
1992, 63). Psychiatrists Leon and Rebeca Grinberg discuss the notion of identity 
and integration in the immigration discourse. They speak of the “requisite’ of 
developing a feeling of belonging to become integrated and thus ‘maintaining 
one’s sense of identity” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, 28). In the issue of 
belonging, I find again a point of reference that touches and burns with the 
recognition of shared experience across time and culture. 
 
What is the Australian equivalent of my grandmother’s experiences of making 
friends, of understanding (or not understanding) another language? What happens 
when I take these stories out of their historical context and bring them into my 
own experience of migration? I puzzle over the metaphor—for that is what it 
becomes. I find the notion of meeting people, making friends who speak the same 
language, significant. In other words, is the English I speak the same language as 
my Australian friends speak? The differences are many: my conversation is 
coloured by my history, by my experiences, my life story. When I speak to my 
Australian friends what do they hear—through the filter of their own history, their 
own experience, their own life story? Are we really speaking the same language? 
Where is the point of understanding? Again, I ask, is this a point of reference that 
touches and burns with the recognition of shared experience across time and    
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culture? I develop this theme throughout the work and in doing so, find authentic 
connections to the three stages of rites de passage, a theory previously presented 
by Arnold van Gennep and latterly elucidated by Victor Turner. Through the 
middle stage of rites de passage, the liminal, the incorporation of the notion of 
habitus as embodied history and other theories mooted by Pierre Bourdieu are 
effective. Bourdieun theories of doxa, orthodoxy, heterodoxy and change support 
and maintain the central thesis. I define and embrace these theories in the context 
of this dissertation as the narrative unfolds. 
 
Between the years of 1908 and 1918, the family in Southern Rhodesia spoke only 
in Russian. They worked diligently to save the money for the return fare to 
Russia. Aunt told me, “They always wanted to go back to Russia. The idea was 
that when they’d made some money they would go back.” However, whether or 
not the onset of the Russian Revolution was the turning point, it seems that 
sometime during the final years of the Great War, but probably in 1919, my 
grandparents decided the children would have better opportunities in Rhodesia. 
With the money saved for the return ticket to Russia my grandfather purchased a 
small farm on the outskirts of Salisbury (now Harare). He built a house for the 
family and autocratically decided that from that time on they were to speak 
English and only English till they could speak it “without an accent”. I have 
referred, earlier, to the obsession Papa had about ‘becoming English’, and realise 
that this is where it began. 
I asked Aunt about the languages the family spoke at home:  
Eleanor: Was your home language English? 
Aunt: We only heard Russian, and it was when George went to school ... he had to learn 
English. Papa tried to teach him a bit, because Papa was learning too ... that's when we    
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started learning English. Papa always ... and its a pity in a way, but at that time this is 
what happened, Papa said, “If we are staying here, we must learn to speak English 
without an accent!” and so they stopped us speaking Russian. 
 
So, to initiate this instruction my grandfather bought an English newspaper, and 
this was the tool he used to learn English and teach it to the three children and his 
wife, until they could speak it without an accent. My father, being the oldest 
child, was the focus of this regime. He was eleven or twelve years old—although 
I remember him telling me he was at least fourteen—when he first went to school, 
the local school where English was the only language. In my experience, 
acquiring (the Rhodesian equivalent of) a cultured English accent was important 
to achieve social status in Rhodesia, and I surmise this was the reasoning behind 
Kiriaco’s decision. My grandmother never acquired an English accent. As she 
aged, her Russian accent became so strong her speech was difficult to 
understand—unless you knew her well. I don’t know about my grandfather’s 
accent because he died in 1944, before I was a year old and, when I ask my older 
brothers or my older sister, or my aunt, “Did Papa lose his accent?” their replies 
are not helpful, and vary from person to person and from time to time. Memory 
fades, memory changes, and perhaps the re-membering is of his accent at 
different times in his life. 
 
As an immigrant in Australia, I have found that my accent is usually the way 
people pick me as being ‘non-Australian’. Many times I am taken to be a ‘pom’ 
(English immigrant) and, when first I arrived here, that was unsettling for me. At 
other times I am mistaken for a South African and, as a new immigrant, I would 
carefully explain the difference between Rhodesia and South Africa. However, as    
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time has passed, I no longer take issue with being mistaken for South African, 
‘pom’, or, on one or two occasions, as an Indian from the subcontinent. I asked 
some of the women in my sample if they had experiences where their accent was 
used to identify them as Rhodesians: 
Eleanor: Do you find that people do pick you out on your accent? 
Betty: Yes, even now it is a problem. When I played golf … I played a whole round with 
one lady. We got to the 18th hole she said, “where do you come from”? I thought you 
poor lady; you have been battling all the way round trying to work out where I came 
from. 
Betty: But they [usually] think I come from England.  
Eleanor: Yeah, English that’s what I got. 
 
The reverse of this is also relevant; certainly as a new immigrant I can remember 
that, when I heard an Australian accent, (as spoken in Western Australia) it 
needed some negotiating before I could properly understand, and it took a long 
time before I was able to identify the vocal nuances that represent class and 
education: my initial concern was that some Australian accents were more 
difficult to understand than others, and when I asked the women in my sample 
about this, I found some of them had also had problems:  
Eleanor: I found it very difficult to understand the Australian accent. 
Sarah: It took me six months to understand the news, because my ear, I didn’t listen very 
often, but my ears wasn’t attuned to the way they spoke and the accent—there is nothing 
like the country accent—which is really pretty broad. 
 
In retrospect I find that this is the real beginning of the theme that was 
fortuitously triggered when I asked Robin, my Australian friend and colleague, to 
help me transcribe the interviews, and which I clarify in the following chapter 
Leaving and Landing. However, I flag here that notions of language and accent 
have helped colour my hypothesis in general, and Robin’s transcription in 
particular. The development of connections between language and identity, 
accents and assimilation, and accents and integration occurs throughout the work    
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and the theme is interwoven into the rites de passage, from the separation, 
through the liminal and assimilation and into incorporation/re-aggregation.  
 
Thus, the association between conscious strategies to integrate and belong, and 
learning English, may be seen as significant in the sequence of immigrant to 
integrant in the colonial society. The sense of belonging may not arise even when 
the language is the same—perhaps it is the shared history that builds up over time 
that brings about the belonging. The points of connection between immigrant and 
resident, between colonial and postcolonial, become closer, and the inversion of 
one into the other, more clear. Reflections and memories of people in other times 
and other places reveal how these memories do intersect with the twisting threads 
of ‘new’ life and ‘new’ identity—reassembled identity. The movement from the 
‘separation’ stage of rites de passage into the ‘liminal’ is not clearly marked in 
the experience of immigration and neither is the movement into the final stage of 
‘integration’. I signal here, in the history, that the stages fold back on one another 
and time twists and turns too. Thus, I am able to write that, as in any history, there 
is no final ending, indeed, it is the continuation that binds me/us to the past—
perhaps the smoky tendrils of time and memory have more power than appears in 
their intangibility.  
 
To draw this chapter to a conclusion it is my personal experience that I turn to. 
When Aunt told me (in 1996) that my grandparents’ firm plan was to return to 
Russia, I was truly shocked. I reflected on her words for some time. As I 
pondered their decision to remain in Africa, the notion of process from conscript 
to immigrant to integrant took hold of my imagination. The provocative questions    
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their decision raised in my psyche have since led me to explore a multiplicity of 
theories and histories that are fundamental, not only to the thesis of my doctorate, 
but to my own identity and my positionality in Australia. I regret the fact that the 
protagonists are long dead and I cannot ask them how their story came about. But, 
the imbrication of experiences over time and space still occurs to me each time I 
invoke my grandmother’s name—contrasting her experiences as an immigrant 
from Russia to Africa in 1909 with, nearly eighty years later in 1982, my own 
experiences as an immigrant from Africa to Australia. Therefore, in this chapter, I 
have positioned myself and this thesis both historically and currently. By 
determining that the starting point for my narrative precedes arrival in Australia 
(or even Rhodesia) and examining the background of white settlement in 
Rhodesia I begin to have insight into the prescience of time, ebbing and flowing, 
circling and spiraling. By contrast and comparison, the immigrant in colonial 
Rhodesia and the immigrant in postcolonial Australia start to become accessible, 
and the continual reassembly of identity, transparent. Therefore, in the continuing 
spiral of time I start another beginning, the beginning of leaving. In rites de 
passages, separation is the first act and, for immigrants, the separation begins 
before we leave the homeland and in this way the first panel of the triptych is 
formed. Therefore, in the following chapter I examine the overt and covert 
actions/rites and the crucial decisions that accompany the resolve to transplant our 
lives from Africa to Australia. 
 
                                                 
i Sections of this chapter first published in the Journal of Australian Studies, 77 Sojourners and 
Strangers (2003), as Recollection of Identity: The Reassembly of the Migrant. 109-116. 
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ii Some of the material in this chapter was used in my Honours Dissertation (1997) ‘When "Back 
Home" isn't England: making visible the memories, lives and experiences of some white women 
in Rhodesia’, School of Social Sciences and Asian Languages, Curtin University of Technology. 
 
iii The Original Contract is in the keeping of my Aunt, Kiriaco’s youngest child. 
 
iv National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ).    
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The First Panel  
 
 
Separation    
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Chapter Four  
 
 
 
 
Leaving and Landing 
 
 
Migration is an upheaval which shakes the entire psychic structure (Grinberg & 
Grinberg). 
 
In this chapter I begin the metaphor that being an adult immigrant is like 
transplanting a mature tree.
i The metaphor has the potential to signify the turmoil 
that accompanies the separation from the homeland. In this analogy, the gardener 
(who may be the self) first has the difficulty of digging the tree out of the earth, 
the matrix—that in which anything is embedded as ground mass and, as the 
chapter proceeds, this image clarifies the separation process that is the initial 
stage of the rites of passage.  
 
In the preceding chapter I explored (and reflected on) aspects of migration and 
experience in colonial Rhodesia, and drew some parallels with corresponding 
issues in present-day Australia. I now intensify the focus on rites de passages, 
and situate the first panel of the triptych on which metaphor I have based my 
thesis. This, the first stage of the rites de passage is classified as “[The]    
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preliminal rites (rites of separation)” (brackets in original) (van Gennep, 1960, 
11). Therefore, in a general study of immigration as a rite of passage this is the 
period in which potential immigrants, for whatever reasons, make the decision to 
leave their homes, their family, and their friends to resettle in another country. In 
the particularity of my study I focus on the motives for immigration and the 
experiences of separation peculiar to the women in my research and, once again, 
flag the autobiographical content that underpins the thesis. 
 
The common understanding of migration is “… to refer to the geographic 
mobility of people who move from one place to another … for the purpose of 
settling there” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, 16-17). Disregarding the 
reductionist implications inherent in this statement, I embrace this inexact view of 
migration as a starting place to access and explore the bricolage, the fragments of 
experience, that configure migration. Thus, in this chapter I examine the motives 
for emigration from Southern and Northern Rhodesia in their significance (and 
insignificance), and I look at the minutiae of their ordinariness and how this may 
have led to the choice of Australia as a preferred destination. For some of the 
women in this study the move to Australia came after a succession of migrations 
within Africa and elsewhere in the world. The notion of migration as an 
unacknowledged  rites de passage allows me to evoke the trimerous theory 
posited by Arnold van Gennep and developed by Victor Turner (Turner, Victor, 
1977c; Turner, Victor, 1977b; van Gennep, 1960). In this paradigm I find that 
emigration and immigration—the leaving of Africa and the arrival in Australia—
fit satisfactorily into the separation stage. I begin to explore more deeply the ideas 
of homesickness that I pre-scribed in the review of the literature, and consider if    
85 
 
they may be interwoven with feelings of guilt. I speak of the guilt that is 
associated with leaving family, friends, and the country of birth and it seems this 
feeling occurs to some extent among all the women in the research. I contemplate 
and consider the concept Gemeinschaft in some immigrant communities, and the 
lack of Gemeinschaft in this immigrant community. I am referring here to the idea 
of social ‘solidarity’ that seems absent or, at best, feeble among the immigrant 
women from Rhodesia. The questions I ask myself when I contemplate this thread 
follow themes indicated by the colonial background we share with many white 
Australians. The connection of Gemeinschaft to the theme of rites de passage 
becomes apparent if I follow the parameters delineated by Victor Turner and 
Arnold van Gennep before him; those being that the neophyte requires some sort 
of assistance from those already initiated and presumed to be ‘adept’, ready to 
move from the separation stage into the liminal.  
 
Pursuing the metaphor of the thesis as triptych, and the overall image of rites de 
passage, this chapter lies to the left of the central panel—the panel in which the 
experience and life of the liminal persona are identified and interpreted, the place 
that Victor Turner calls ‘betwixt-and-between’ (Turner, 1979). So, this chapter 
recognises the act of immigrating as the separation stage of the liminal process. It 
is here that I signal the discovery that entry into the separation stage for the 
liminal persona is essential, but completion of the rites de passage (in the context 
of migration) the incorporation, that is, integration, may not be achieved, indeed, 
it may not be required; and that the temporal frame is nebulous—no chronological 
rules apply or can be applied. In concluding the chapter, I find the need to 
understand where the notion of our identity relates and connects the liminal    
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persona in the separation stage to the second stage, the limen, or margin, of the 
rites de passage. Therefore, how the process of separation from our home country 
impacts on our identity as neophyte Australians is flagged and is enlarged upon in 
the centre panel of the triptych, the chapter that addresses the middle stage of rites 
de passage, that is the liminal. 
 
How much of history is connected to stories of emigration and immigration? How 
many exiles, refugees, adventurers and explorers are contained in any one 
person's antecedents? I have revealed parts of my own history, and queried the 
unusual blood group that I have in common with Mongolian people; I ponder 
what this signifies about my ancestry, my roots. I ask myself, what reason or 
reasons lead a person or a people, to separate from all that they know and enter 
the daring displacement of this rites de passage? This is not an overt rites de 
passage if compared to those tribal rituals studied by Victor Turner. This rite of 
passage is an arcane process and, for each neophyte, each migrant, it is an 
individual experience that is not ruled by any formal observances—other than the 
bureaucratic. Knowing when it is time to leave the matrix – the home country – is 
associated with the notion of anomie, and this ‘knowing’ may be an epiphany or a 
drawn out process of judgement that makes the decision inevitable. But, once the 
decision has been made to separate from the home country, and for whatever 
purpose, the first steps into the liminal space have been taken. Transformation to 
a new identity has begun. 
 
Recent events in Zimbabwe (in the early years of the twenty-first century) have 
shown that the notion of white immigrants from Africa being seen as refugees or    
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exiles is problematic in Australia. For some reason the incentive to leave Africa 
preempts, even prevents, debate about white emigrants being seen as a refugees or 
exiles—whether by themselves or by the host country. However, the individual 
immigrant’s internal and unspoken feelings of exile foreground the (often) 
counter-perception of the people in the host country, in this case Australia. Thus, 
in a contrasted form, the anomie induced by living in a decaying, war-torn, 
possibly corrupt society, that is part of the incentive to leave Africa, accompanies 
the migrant into Australia. In the process of relocating, the sense of anomie 
changes and may subsequently take the shape of bewilderment, depression, and 
fierce homesickness. Within this nexus and closely associated with anomie in the 
new country, are feelings of guilt. Leaving the home country, beloved family is 
also abandoned, among them, often, aging parents who are unable or unwilling to 
uproot and resettle. 
 
Dr Clara Espinosa, a Bolivian immigrant to Australia, says, “Migrants starting a 
new life in their adopted country travel through the three stages of grief—shock 
due to the loss of their old way of life, preoccupation with that loss and resolution 
of the conflict” (in Ferrari, 1998, 41). In my experience, there appears a different 
perception for a migrant coming from an ostensibly similar country, a country 
such as Rhodesia. We come in to Australia as immigrants speaking the same 
language and with a similar cultural background, a culture that is grounded in 
British colonialism. Our lack of racial markers, together with cultural or language 
differences combine to render us, immigrants from another British colony, 
invisible. Therefore, looked at from the outside, it often seems to a casual 
observer, that white immigrants from Rhodesia and Zimbabwe have not    
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undergone much in the way of upheaval at all. For those white African 
immigrants who are fortunate enough to arrive in Australia with substantial 
financial resources, the notion of angst/upheaval may seem laughable. And 
money does cushion the change; the metaphor of a transplanted tree affirms 
comfort and growth with the addition of compost, water, and stakes to support the 
new shoots. In my experience there is a connection here to notions of hubris 
whether actual, perceived, or attributed. From time to time these more affluent 
immigrants are seen, by some Australians, as arrogant and, indeed, some of them 
are! For other immigrants this presumption of hubris and the phrase “white South 
Africans are arrogant” is insulting. I remember a Chinese-Australian woman 
telling me, after we had made friends, “And I thought all South Africans were 
pompous!”. My response was, “Some of us are”. However, whatever the 
nationality of the migrant, trauma may still be present and the anomie derived 
from guilt, fear, and the loss of social certainty/status cannot be denied. Within 
the sample of the women comprising this research, there were those who arrived 
here, in Western Australia, with little or no money, no employment, and no 
family or friendly support. For others, there was family already here, financial 
means and a familiarity with the country garnered from reconnaissance trips. The 
notion of pride, as opposed to arrogance, for the women in the research is overt, 
especially when issues relating to Australian Social Security arise. It is a source of 
pride to most of them that they have ‘paid their own way’. While the issue of 
hubris remains, I find the question of arrogance becomes irrelevant in the context 
of this chapter, but flag it here for inclusion in the discussion surrounding 
identity.  
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The overt reasons for emigrating may seem trivial and sometimes the reasons are 
rehearsed for the careless question, “So, why did you leave Africa?” that is often 
posed in a social setting. The covert reasons for emigrating may be from fear that 
the politics and the socioeconomic conditions are deteriorating making the 
homeland a place of danger and insecurity. In this project, when I ask the 
participants their reasons for migrating, some of the women say they left Africa 
for the sake of their children; and this is sometimes my own public justification. 
For the others, when I ask them, “Why Australia?”, the answers I receive are as 
follows: Vivian followed her husband, Sarah followed a dream, Marlene came 
with her parents, and Clare, my colleague at The University of Western Australia, 
having left Rhodesia for England when she married, fled the unfamiliar cold, wet 
English weather. The notion that people who emigrate by choice “tend to seek 
other places which may be far away geographically but nevertheless seem to have 
similar social conditions and characteristics to those of the country of origin 
before the change took place [may be characterised as] sedentary migrations … to 
leave a place so as to be able to remain in the same place … to leave in order not 
to change” (my emphasis) (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, 19). The integrity of 
this statement is layered; the belief or the expectation that a distant land will be 
the same as home seems superficial, and while the notion of life without change is 
ludicrous, the tenet may, very likely, be subconsciously available/agreeable for 
the immigrant. Therefore, in the conception of a ‘new’ life without change from 
the ‘old’ life, I find the theme of immigration reflects on itself to become a 
return—a return to a site/situation before the change took place—a site paralysed 
in time, and this foreshadows the theme in chapter seven: Memory and the myth 
of the eternal return.    
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The process that confirms the decision to relocate from one country to another, 
that is, knowing that it is time to leave, foregrounds notions of anomie as it 
pertains to this specific sample group. Feelings of hopelessness are often felt by 
an individual when they perceive the system they live in is breaking down, the 
loss of belief and sense of purpose in the world that they know engendering the 
climacteric that provokes the decision to go. For many immigrants the feeling of 
hopelessness may be unmistakable, perhaps manifesting in depression, and this 
intensifies the motivation to leave. The upheaval a migrant feels on leaving is 
very often carried over, in the separation, to the new country. Therefore, the 
awareness of when it is the right time to leave may be linked to the anomie, albeit 
unconsciously. The anomie that arises—perhaps already present in a new 
immigrant—may be revealed in homesickness, in a sense of not belonging, a state 
of “betwixt-and-between” (Turner, 1979). I flag here that this impression of being 
betwixt-and-between is addressed in the second period designated in rites de 
passage as the liminal stage; in the shaping of this thesis as triptych, it forms the 
central panel: The Ambivalent Neophyte (chapter six). I have linked the crucial 
decision of leaving to notions of anomie, and now I introduce the motif of 
‘knowing when it is time to go’. I recall that when first I recognise this ‘knowing’ 
is relevant to my thesis occurs when I am in the process of interviewing and 
transcribing the interviews. During this time I recruit my colleague and friend—
Robin—who is an Australian woman, to assist me with the transcriptions. The 
multiple layers of researching and writing this thesis are nowhere more evident in 
what transpires from this request/recruitment. 
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After Robin helps me with the transcription of some of the tapes, her interest in 
the experience of migration to Australia from Africa (a place that she knows little 
about, apart from news reports and popular fiction) is kindled. So, we talk. She 
asks me, “How did you know when it was the right time to leave?” And then we 
talk about that knowing, knowing when it is right time to leave a place like 
Rhodesia. The dialogue becomes a time of reflection for me. I begin to formulate 
my thoughts and ponder the values that underlie some of the dilemmas and 
uncertainties that have haunted me through the months and years. In our 
conversation we discuss the English/British attitudes in, or to, colonialism, 
looking at them as being predominantly patriarchal on a macro level. I reflect that 
employing servants in the colonial society of Rhodesia, while I lived there, was 
similarly patriarchal, on a micro level. I tell Robin of the obligation I felt as an 
employer to feed, clothe, house, and educate my servants and their families—the 
obligation becoming a self-imposed responsibility as a parent/authority figure—
not only because my skin was white and theirs was black, but also because of my 
privileged position. The privilege that is inherent in colour, class, education, and 
the colonialism of the Rhodesian society, emphasises the fact that I was, indeed, 
advantaged in that society. So, when does the recognition of this privilege become 
part of my knowing, and in/under what circumstances?  
 
In the conversation I tell Robin how the realisation of injustices starts so 
gradually it is barely noticeable. Initially, before the conscious awareness of 
injustice, I performed actions which, in retrospect, I see as subverting entrenched 
injustices. I recognise now that the process of realisation may embody a period of 
justification; remaining in the country, and employing three, four, or more    
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servants “because, otherwise, they don’t have a job or a home”. When I reflect on 
this now, I see that it is an explanation, but more likely, social guilt, for staying in 
Africa. Perhaps it was this unspoken guilt that led to the realisation that, although 
born and raised in Rhodesia, although Rhodesia was the only home I had ever 
known, I no longer belonged. That, for me, is/was the ‘knowing’ it was time to 
leave. I have discussed this insight with other ex-Rhodesians and ex-
Zimbabweans. A casual acquaintance at a social gathering said, “When you know 
it is time to go, there is no explanation.” The move becomes imperative—almost 
an obsession—whatever the cost financially, whatever has to be left behind; 
friends, family, property, identity. In my journal I draw the parallel with the quest 
for enlightenment, for complete awareness, for when the epiphany occurs, it is not 
a case of sacrificing anything, it becomes what happens. Remaining attached 
brings only grief and pain. Aspects of anomie in this process are transparent and, 
as the migration runs its course, as the rites de passage takes form, the anomie 
begins to become part of the process.  
 
What, then, are some of the incentives that lead to the awareness it is time to 
leave, and to initiate the leaving of Africa for Australia? I pose this question to the 
women in my study, and when I consider their replies I reflect on how much we 
are prepared to relinquish in the quest for a life that we anticipate may be better 
than that which we know. I hear nostalgia in Amy’s voice when she speaks of 
‘home’. Amy arrived in Australia in , the final years of white domination in 
Rhodesia. In 1998, during an interview, she talks about how it might have been 
different had she stayed in Zimbabwe, and she contemplates whether there really 
was a necessity to leave Africa and come to live in Australia:     
93 
 
Eleanor: I hear quite a lot of nostalgia in your voice? 
Amy: Yeah, I do. Sometimes I think to myself what would happen if we’d stayed there. 
And probably we would have been fine. I’ve still got some good friends there you know, 
[in] our age group.  
The kids still have good education there and so on. And I think we could have stayed 
there and we would have been alright. At the time we didn’t know it, but we could have 
been alright. 
 
Besides the near impossibility of remaining objective about leaving the homeland, 
the practicalities of emigrating from Africa to Australia are intricate and 
challenging. The evocative nature of the word ‘safari’ captures the essence of 
emigration from, and within, Africa. A dictionary definition of ‘safari’ describes 
it as a long expedition involving difficulty or danger and/or requiring planning. 
Anyone who has undergone the migration experience will concede that it is 
indeed a long and difficult expedition, sometimes dangerous and always requiring 
planning! The number of Rhodesians (and later, Zimbabweans) who have been 
prepared to take the risks associated with this life changing ‘safari’ with all the 
implications of being exiles, refugees, and strangers in a strange land necessitate 
the exploration of the motivation to relocate. Therefore, it is timely to examine 
the situation in Rhodesia as it was in the final years of minority white rule, the 
fourteen years from early 1965 after Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front party 
declared UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) (11 November 1964), 
until qualified independence in 1979, just prior to the assumption of power by 
Robert Mugabe and ZANU (PF) (Zimbabwe African National Union [Patriotic 
Front]) party in 1980.  
 
Throughout white settlement of Rhodesia the disproportionate degree of power 
held by the small number of whites is remarkable. Therefore, to clarify the 
situation relevant to emigration from Rhodesia, I reiterate the comment by Barry    
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Schutz that: “Perhaps of all the British colonies with established settler 
populations, Rhodesia has had the fewest [white people] in numbers both 
absolutely and relative to the indigenous population” (Schutz, 1973, 5). And, as I 
have already mentioned, the white population of Rhodesia, even at its peak, was 
only eight percent of the African population. This imbalance/disparity of power is 
characteristic of colonial societies and has been noted by a multitude of 
postcolonial writers, for example: (Bhabha, 1994; Bhabha, 1999; Memmi, 1965; 
Minh-ha, 1989; Nandy, 1983; Said, 1993; Spivak, 1999).  
 
Drawing on statistics and integrating them into the context of my own emigration, 
and that of the women in my study, I find that from around the mid 1960s there 
has been an exodus of white Rhodesians (and later Zimbabweans). In 1979 (the 
year that heralded the end of white rule) the white population in 
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia is given as 232,000 and over the next decade it dropped to 
80,000 in 1990 (Godwin, 1993, 315). Around the time I left Rhodesia, early in 
January 1977, whites were starting to leave the country at a rate of about one 
thousand a month. Historians Godwin and Hancock state that 18,882 Rhodesians 
left in the twelve months between October 1976 and November 1977 (Godwin, 
1993, 207) but fail to state if that was a net loss. The white Rhodesians who 
remained (for whatever reason) referred to the people who left during this period 
as taking ‘the chicken run’. Reflecting on the reasons for leaving and the 
invective directed at emigrants by members of the government and many of the 
whites that remained, I quote from an email exchange with a colleague, also 
researching the immigration into Australia of women from Southern Africa. What 
is not apparent in the exchange is the spasm of hurt that I felt when I first read her    
95 
 
words, “I see you took the chicken run …”. I presumed that, after many years in 
Australia, this tactless accusation would not be something that affected me—and 
when it did I was taken by surprise. I composed my reply to my colleague 
cautiously, even now I did not want her to realise that I found her “tongue-in-
cheek” remark offensive and hurtful—because, as I had to acknowledge, it was 
the truth, we did take the ‘chicken run’. In the event, the outcome of this email 
exchange was worthwhile in terms of the content of this chapter, and the self-
examination it encouraged has been productive: 
Clare (22 September 1999)  Eleanor 
I see you took the 'chicken run' to SA in 
1977 which was at one of the worst stages 
of the war! I'm most interested in how you 
did it, because according to 
Godwin/Hancock, people were considered 
'traitors' to the cause if they left. So, tell 
me a bit about it. 
We left at the beginning of 1977. We 
were fed up with the 2 weeks in the army, 
2 weeks home and the marriage was under 
some stress. We were not particularly 
concerned about what other people called 
us, common sense told us that our lives, 
Kathy's education etc. etc. was of more 
concern than what a bunch of (bigoted) 
people thought about us. 
 
Clare (23 September 1999)  Eleanor 
Anyway… I was a little concerned that I 
had been less than tactful about the so-
called 'chicken run' but happy that you 
took it in exactly the spirit that it was 
meant to be taken. I had my tongue firmly 
planted in my cheek. You were more than 
sensible I think. I would have done just 
that with a small child, and even without 
one. You had been through the worst I 
imagine.  
 
Reading this book Rhodesians Never Die 
(Godwin/Hancock) it is marvellous for 
bringing back all the sentiments about life 
in Rhodesia that one had forgotten. 
Godwin is expert at recalling 'the 
Rhodesian way of life' and how deluded 
they were, yes, and bigoted! 
 
(no reply) 
 
Emigration being seen as “… what the ‘true’ Rhodesians condemned as the 
ultimate selfish and unpatriotic act …” (Godwin, 1993, 287) was in my    
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experience a widespread response. Longtime friendships foundered when one or 
the other families took ‘the chicken run’. Clare’s email gives me cause to reflect 
on those last days in Rhodesia. I remember the turmoil of the war—terrorist war 
to some, war of liberation to others—the resulting danger for all of us and for 
Roland, the continual and preposterous demands of ‘call-ups’ into the Police 
Reserve—a division of the regular BSAP (British South Africa Police)—two 
weeks away in the bush followed by two weeks at home and work. The impact of 
the war on our relationship, employment, on every aspect of our lives was, and 
probably still is, incalculable and lasting. The intolerable circumstances in the last 
few years in Rhodesia may, indeed, have shaped the Zimbabwe of the twenty-first 
century. I read about “…[the] side effects of war which affected the entire nation: 
an economy virtually bankrupted by the cost of the war, a growing crime rate, a 
refugee population, the breakdown of government services; abandoned farms, 
broken marriages, rising alcoholism” (Meredith, 1979, 369). And I know that is 
how it was. 
 
I don’t remember them, but now I read about the Rhodesian politicians’ abusive 
speeches; one, P K van der Byl, said he had “nothing but contempt for those who 
left because they were afraid, or were tired of call-ups” (in Godwin, 1993, 207-
208). The call-ups into Operational Areas were fraught with danger—not only 
from the opposing side, but also from the inept security forces. The danger 
implicit in the lack of communication and aggravated by the service rivalry 
between the police, the air force, and the army, resulted in disorganisation and 
was the cause of a number of casualties within the forces. As the situation 
worsened more white people left the country; the age for call-ups into active    
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service increased and by 1976 had reached fifty years old. My mind goes back to 
Roland’s ‘stick’ of bank-clerks and salesmen, untrained ‘townies’ not soldiers, 
some elderly, some trigger happy, most unused to the bush—let alone bush 
warfare. So, never knowing exactly when (or if) he would be returning, I’d drive 
to Hard Square at Police HQ each fortnight to wait for the convoys. Two weeks 
later, the return trip, to leave Roland there at Hard Square. We never spoke much 
during that journey. Kathy might ask, “where’s my daddy going?” but what reply 
could we make? For this time and place I am not homesick; Hard Square, the 
milling Reservists, all dressed in dark blue boiler suits or dingy camouflage; 
nobody seeming sure of what they were doing or where they were going. The air 
of desperation and suspense and, it seems in my memory, always to be dusk when 
we said good-bye. And then finally the catalyst, the day that made us determined 
to leave Rhodesia.  
 
One day, in August 1976, the police arrived at Roland’s place of work and 
arrested him. Roland, only recently home from call-up, phoned me at my 
workplace. I could hear the urgency in his voice as he asked me please to hurry 
home and let them—the police—in to search the house. I asked if they had a 
warrant and he told me they said no warrant was required: he was under arrest 
and would be imprisoned (indefinitely) if we refused them entry. The police 
officers said the house must be searched. I can remember how my heart was 
racing as I drove home. What did they want, what were they were looking for? 
All our firearms were licensed so it couldn’t be that. Had they found out about my 
‘hoard’ of foreign exchange—the equivalent of one hundred and fifty (Rhodesian) 
dollars in Swiss Francs? A small amount, but there had been cases of people    
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being arrested for foreign exchange deals involving as little as $500.00—and later 
committing suicide (Godwin, 1993,376). But no, I arrived home and the purpose 
for the search emerged; not one but four (white) police officers had come to hunt 
for copies of Playboy magazine.  
 
Due to the war and subsequent dearth of foreign tourists, in 1975 Roland’s safari 
business had collapsed. One of his American clients had, unbeknown to him, 
subscribed him to Playboy magazine. Ironically, he had never received any copies 
of the magazine because, as we were to find out, they were all confiscated by the 
police from the mail. So, when one of the young police officers produced a 
tattered, well-read copy of the magazine—he held it up in front of us like an old-
fashioned school-master admonishing delinquent pupils—and said it was ours, we 
were confused; the more so when the magazine disintegrated in front of our eyes. 
Censorship in Rhodesia was strict, not only where political (subversive) literature 
was concerned but more particularly for literature that was deemed pornographic. 
In 1975 the Rhodesian Board of Censors had instituted a blanket ban that covered 
Playboy, Penthouse and Screw magazines (Godwin, 1993, 142). Thus, to be in 
possession of one of these magazines was a criminal offence. The police officers 
proceeded to scour our home. The country falling to pieces around us, my 
husband risking his life fighting for the pig-headed and corrupt Rhodesian Front 
government, and these smug and self-satisfied four, these young, healthy police 
officers, one of whom I recognised as a member of the Rhodesian Rugby Union 
team, shamelessly, even arrogantly, raiding our house looking for non-existent 
copies of Playboy. As I write this I feel, once again, my sense of outrage and    
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disbelief, and I can feel again my anger rising. For this, I am not homesick. From 
this one bizarre experience, I know why we left Rhodesia!  
 
Within a week Roland had resigned from the Police Reserve—citing his South 
African citizenship—otherwise there was no exemption from serving in the 
security forces. He handed in his uniforms and weapons and never served another 
call-up. He resigned from his job and we put the house up for rent; less than five 
months later, in January 1977, we were living in Cape Town in South Africa. And 
it was from Cape Town, four years later, we applied to immigrate to Australia.  
 
It was quite common when I arrived here in the 1980s for many Australians to 
have the delusion that getting out of Africa was difficult; that the South African 
government did not allow people to leave freely. It was some time before I 
realised that, when my new colleagues said, “you were lucky to leave!” they 
meant; “you were lucky to be allowed to leave”! They did not mean what I 
understood—that not only was I fortunate to leave the South African political 
situation, but that I had been accepted into Australia. The reality was, and still is, 
that in bureaucratic terms, it is easy to leave Africa and extraordinarily difficult to 
get into Australia. However, the physical transportation of self, possessions and 
money is seldom straightforward, simple or without peril. In recent years, since 
1998, there has been a proliferation of officially registered Migration Agents who 
purport to assist potential immigrants through the legal and bureaucratic processes 
of entering Australia. Many of these agents specialise in particular geographical 
areas and particular groups of people: for example, emigrants from Singapore, the 
United Kingdom, and of course Southern Africa. Frequently representatives from    
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the agencies will travel to the target country to generate business. It is tacitly 
acknowledged that the targeted clientele are people with financial means—not 
necessarily for immigration purposes but to meet the fees charged by the 
agencies.  
 
We did not have an agent when we applied to immigrate to Australia, and our first 
application (in 1980) was denied. A year later we applied again, writing a long 
and passionate letter that we attached to the official forms. I cannot recall the full 
declaration but I do remember writing about our desire to live in Australia; our 
record of being able to settle successfully in a new environment, and our 
willingness to work hard, to give Australia the best we could offer. This time our 
application was successful, we were accepted as residents in Australia. The first 
step into the separation stage of rites de passage had been taken—or had that 
been when we left Rhodesia? As I ponder on this question I realise the ambiguous 
boundaries of stages in those rites de passage that are not a traditional and formal 
ceremony and that there are multiple points of entry. However, on a mundane 
level, our tentative steps toward passage to Australia had to follow bureaucratic 
pathways, signalled by copious amounts of red tape. There were interviews with 
the Australian consular representative—for all three of us together—Roland, 
Kathy (aged 13) and myself; medical tests, worry about passports because mine 
had expired and Rhodesia, as such, no longer existed, following its own 
transformation becoming Zimbabwe. We had to sell the house and make 
decisions about what to bring and what to leave behind. For reasons I forget, I 
destroyed most of my journals and burned many of the letters I had kept through 
the years, peeling away the past by casting out each memento. Unconsciously, but    
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as decreed in the initial stage of a traditional and ceremonial rites de passage, I 
was fulfilling the purification rites albeit in a modified way: the stripping away of 
the life, the identity we were leaving, the separation stage that “… detach(es) 
ritual subjects from their old places in society …” (Turner, Victor, 1977c, 36). As 
individuals and as a family we were entering the margin and becoming 
“transitional beings” liminal personae (Turner, 1979, 237).  
 
In terms of exile, the difference between voluntary and involuntary emigration is 
not necessarily clear. Sometimes the overt reasons for leaving Rhodesia, or even 
Africa, seem prosaic. Only one woman in this project speaks of wanting to leave 
Rhodesia for fear of becoming a refugee. In my own story the fear of leaving 
Africa as a refugee was a factor but not until now clearly acknowledged or stated.  
 
During our talks, Betty repeated her desire not to have to leave Rhodesia as a 
refugee a number of times, each time with different emphasis, a different 
determination: 
 
Betty: As I say, I don’t want to be without, and I never wanted to be a refugee. That was 
my big fear that I would be a refugee.  
 
Betty: I still have some control over where I go; some choice. I don’t want to be a 
refugee with everything I own in a suitcase, getting through a border and [being] 
dependent upon others.  
 
Betty: Well, we had seen the Congo. We had seen people arriving at the Congo border 
with their trucks. But their trucks were taken away from them. And they were not 
allowed to bring them into the country. There were the most horrendous stories of what 
they had actually managed to salvage, losing it, and having nothing, absolutely nothing.  
 
Betty: I was so desperate to get out, as I say my fear of being a refugee was so huge, I 
just said, “we’ll come over here, we haven't got a lot”, I said, “[but] that's all right, we 
will cope”. 
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Remembering the Congo, remembering Tanzania, Mozambique, and Uganda. 
‘Maybe I’ll even confess the truth, that I rode in with the horsemen and beheld the 
apocalypse…’ (Kingsolver, 2000, 9). And for us, was the apocalypse situated in 
colonisation, or was it in the end of colonisation? 
 
Robin, my Australian colleague, helped me transcribe this interview with Betty. 
She seemed deeply moved by Betty’s words. When she handed back the 
transcript, she included a letter to me. She wrote: 
Just some notes on issues that came up for me whilst transcribing the tape. 
First, I couldn’t help but feel at the end that being in Betty’s position—and no doubt, 
yours as well; it seems like what people describe when they lose a limb. They can still 
feel it and have a memory of it, but the reality is a memory [because] the reality is, it is 
gone. They are not whole but still have a memory of the part that would make them 
whole. Is this a trick of the mind or a deep-seated longing for a missing part one 
psychological, one emotional? Is this how it feels leaving your home country to migrate 
to another? 
 
Robin’s transcribing of the tape became important in the analysis and 
interpretation of Betty’s interview and of the project generally. I have flagged this 
in the previous chapter and I re-articulate here that it is the notion of the use of 
language and accent that has coloured and skewed the transcript. Sometimes the 
misinterpretation was amusing and sometimes nonsensical. Occasionally I was 
bewildered by Robin’s reaction, it was as if she heard an unfamiliar word, found 
an association she was familiar with, and went off on her own fantasy. What does 
her imagination tell her about me, about women from Rhodesia? As I read her 
transcriptions of the interviews I find unusual meanings given to ostensibly 
straightforward remarks, trying, perhaps, to make them make sense to herself? 
The ‘mistranslation’ of the tapes becomes more significant when the notions 
grounded in the Bakhtian theory of heteroglossia are applied. Very briefly, the    
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theory infers the diversity of language and the interaction of dialogue between 
different worldviews. My interpretation of heteroglossia and its relevance to this 
thesis is this; as I talk to another, I am positioned in my own history—with all the 
associated epistemology—the voices, experiences, and knowledge—that are 
rooted in my culture and in my own psyche. It is through this ‘filter’ that I speak 
and hear. The other, in this case Robin, hears me from her place—through the 
‘filter’ of her history, experiences, and knowledge. The question arises, is she 
hearing what I am saying, or is she hearing (and struggling to make sense of), 
something that is so remote from her experience and so coloured by her own 
epistemological environment that it cannot be comprehended. Working with this 
perhaps idiosyncratic interpretation of heteroglossia allows me to examine the 
significance in the misunderstanding between people speaking the same language 
but coming from different backgrounds. The notion of situated knowledge 
permeates this thesis and, occasionally, becomes visible in surprising and 
challenging ways. The theme surfaces again in the following chapter where the 
liminal stage of the rites de passage is explored. 
 
Leaving home is sometimes a circuitous journey, and the detours are tricky. 
Sarah’s story illustrates that determining time frames for rites de passage is futile. 
Her term of separation took many years, and many factors influenced the 
successes and failures of the passage. Sarah told me about leaving Zambia 
(Northern Rhodesia) for South Africa. She arrived in Pietermaritzburg alone and 
with three young children to support: 
Sarah: I went to Pietermaritzburg. And I was really cut off. It was really rough. From 
being wealthy, I had no money, nothing. 
Eleanor: is that when you got a divorce?    
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Sarah: Yes, three years later I got a divorce. I hadn’t even got a work permit. I used to go 
and sell language courses door-to-door at night. Leave my kids alone at ages two and a 
half, six and seven. 
Eleanor: Because you had no option? 
Sarah: I had no option. I didn’t have anything to fall back on. He just said he couldn’t get 
the money out because of the political situation [in Zambia] at that time and I left a lot of 
money behind. So it was pretty rough and I learned hard right from day one… I didn’t 
like South African politics. And I never felt at home in South Africa. [I was there] twelve 
years and I never ever regarded myself as a South African. I was there to educate my kids 
and in the back of my mind, I still kept it in my mind that I would go to Australia. So, 
when I came here [Western Australia] it was a piece of cake. Except no one spoke to me 
for the first year. 
 
Sarah came to Australia after spending twelve years in South Africa. I asked her 
about her experiences with the Australian authorities when she decided to 
immigrate. In the incident described below, she was visiting Australia as a tourist 
and doing reconnaissance for her future move. In our interview she describes 
some of the obstacles she had to overcome: 
Sarah: I came across in 84 thinking it is time to emigrate [from South Africa]. And I went 
to [Australian] Immigration—I couldn’t get in. I didn’t qualify, I didn’t have a degree. I 
had no qualifications. I hadn’t worked in the workforce like you have to, for five years. I 
did not make the points. I realised that I had to look to go to one of the areas they wanted 
to develop.  
 
The drive to immigrate to Australia continued for Sarah and she worked hard 
toward that end. She told me of her next trip to Australia: 
Sarah: I came back again in 88 and I came to Perth because Perth was the place that I 
liked. And I realised that I still couldn’t come into Perth but by then I had saved enough 
money in Europe to come as an investor [business] migrant. I’d been working the [stock] 
market in London while I was in Cape Town to make a full business migrant allowance. 
From very little and I did pretty well. 
Eleanor: That’s incredible, yeah. 
Sarah: I aimed in this direction for fourteen years. I never lost sight of my goal. 
 
Thus, when the opportunity presented itself, Sarah committed herself to buying a 
farm in the south west of Western Australia. The commitment was made more by 
default than because that was what she wanted to do: 
Sarah: And my brother had made an offer on a farm in Denmark and he couldn’t honour 
it, and it would stuff up my application [if he reneged] so I ended up buying the farm. I 
thought I would use it as my [collateral] … I managed to get the permit from Canberra to 
buy the farm. Instead of six weeks I managed to get it in three days!    
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Betty’s experience also originates from her determination to leave Rhodesia; but 
where Sarah’s decision was made autonomously/independently, Betty had to 
convince her husband that it was the best move. As I have already indicated, she 
was strongly motivated by the fear of becoming a refugee and I think, in this 
respect, she did influence her husband. I believe that the effect of this had 
ramifications on the way she coped once they settled in Western Australia, and 
these become clear in the liminal stage of her rites de passage. There were 
unpredictable events and several obstacles in the process of separation for Betty 
and her family in leaving Africa and settling in Australia. Betty talks of several 
reconnaissance trips before the final decision to leave Rhodesia (by this time 
renamed Zimbabwe). On his return from an early reconnaissance trip, Betty’s 
husband told her that he was unimpressed by the house of ex-Rhodesian friends. 
Betty said, “He looked at how they were living and he said he didn't want to live 
like them.” She continued, “The thought of leaving everything and coming to a 
very uncertain and difficult future, he felt he wasn't prepared to take that chance 
at that stage. So he came back and we carried on in Zimbabwe.”  
 
For Betty’s husband, the change of mind—of heart, came when the government 
of Robert Mugabe came to power in 1980. She explains the circumstances and 
emphasises the political as opposed to the racial aspect of their motivation to 
emigrate: 
Betty: And it was only when the Communists took over, that was the crunch! We had 
actually decided it wasn't a race problem, it was philosophical, [we asked ourselves] 
where did we want to go, how did we want our children to be bought up. We just couldn't 
see that in the communist ideology, [and] we could not see [in the communist ideology] a 
future for Zimbabwe. 
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Betty: So at that stage Martin suddenly changed his mind, but he said he couldn't move 
unless I had actually seen what we were coming to. He felt I was the one who was going 
to have to make the major adjustments, being the housekeeper. 
 
Following the change of mind, Betty and Martin visited Australia together. As 
Betty explains, the process of immigration was already finalised, so the trip (she 
calls it a ‘holiday’) was possibly a confirmation of the necessity she felt to 
emigrate. The issue of gender in the decision making process is evident in that 
once Martin made up his mind to leave, the process of immigration was set in 
motion and, by the time of the joint visit, was “more-or-less completed”:  
Betty: We had come on a holiday, with Martin to see if he could find a job. We had 
more-or-less completed our immigration but it was subject to Martin having a job. When 
he got here he was actually offered three jobs, and he didn’t even go to the third 
interview because he said “I’m making a choice on something on which I really have no 
idea at all, which firm I should be joining”. 
 
Once the move was certain, Betty told me, “We came on a one way ticket.”  
The packing up in Zimbabwe was designated as Betty’s task. She told me that 
Martin came over to take up the position he had been offered: 
Betty: Martin came three months ahead of me because he got a job and they wanted him 
urgently. I started selling up everything and packing and collecting kids and that type of 
thing. 
Eleanor: From Harare? 
Betty: So he actually came three months ahead of me 
Eleanor: So you had all that [packing up to do by yourself]? 
Betty: I did all that by myself. But then, he came to the job by himself [and] he had to get 
started [by himself]. And I would say that they wanted him from November and I came 
towards the end of January, so he had three months to earn a bit of cash. 
 
Packing up the home was not the only task Betty had to complete before she 
immigrated to join Martin. Her roles as home-maker and mother grew to 
incorporate factory manager. She told me: 
And I also had to run a factory, a woodwork factory in Zimbabwe. My father in law 
started it with family funds and then it wasn’t making anything, and ran into difficulties. 
So he and his wife departed and I was the only one that was sitting at home and not 
working. I actually ran that for four years. When we had to pack up, I didn’t only pack up 
the house. We had to sell the furniture and the woodwork factory! 
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The theme of separation runs through Betty’s experience. When the question is 
raised, she is non-committal and when I comment on the disparity of her 
experience compared with that of Martin, she elides her own contribution. The 
repercussions I signalled previously begin to appear. 
 
Strangely enough, for me, the actual departure from Africa was not difficult. 
Leaving from Cape Town (where we had lived for five years) perhaps we got 
caught up in the excitement of the journey. Perhaps, because we flew from Cape 
Town to catch the connecting flight, it was staying overnight in Johannesburg—
sleeping on the lounge-room floor at a friend’s home. Perhaps it was the mad 
dash to the airport through the horrific Johannesburg rush-hour traffic. Whatever 
it was, there was no clue, no forewarning of the relentless homesickness that 
started almost immediately we arrived in Australia. The homesickness I felt was 
not only for Rhodesia, not only for Cape Town, but for Africa; perhaps for my 
life and an identity that was now fragmented and displaced. It occurs to me now, 
as I write, that the separation, the transplantation and fragmentation is something I 
inflicted on myself; even the homesickness and ‘my’ own identity was a self-
transplanted [ad]venture and it was me who stripped myself bare of all I knew and 
I reflect: What awareness allows me to fathom this knowledge, now. This is, 
clearly, the separation stage in the rites de passage where the neophyte puts aside 
all things of the past: “They [the neophytes] have no status, property, insignia, 
secular clothing, rank, kinship position, nothing to demarcate them structurally 
from their fellows” (Turner, 1979, 237). And in a metaphorical way, in a 
metaphysical way, that is precisely what happened. If this was the same for the 
other women in my study, they did not tell me.    
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But to emigrate is always to dismantle the center of the world, and so to move 
into a lost, disoriented one of fragments (Berger, 1984, 57). 
 
Contained within the separation from Africa is the arrival in Australia. In this 
space I again compare migration (as an adult) to transplanting a mature tree. The 
arrival in Australia is analogous of the turmoil inherent in transporting the tree to 
a new location, with the unwieldy branches shuddering and root system dangling 
uselessly after being hauled out and suspended above the matrix, with the soil 
falling away; but attachments that are rooted in a lifetime of experience and 
memories are not so easily breached. The experience of loss, the grief that is felt 
when surrendering a lifetime forged around family, friends, things, and places; 
and the perceived danger of losing part of oneself is not calculable by money, 
weights or measures. There may be an element of detachment, possibly denial, 
but to be consistently objective in the turbulence of emigration is hardly 
conceivable. The effect of the change is likely to provoke the attachment to 
memories and affections (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, 26). Associated with 
these ruptures is the feeling of guilt. There is the guilt of leaving family, elderly 
parents who the emigrant may feel she is deserting, but who are unwilling to risk, 
at their time of life, a new start in a new country. There is the guilt of leaving 
servants often of many years standing—and it is a reality that in Rhodesia 
servants played a considerable role in our lives—who stand (in my memory) 
bewildered and forlorn that the person responsible for their security of home and 
income, is leaving. It is in the grief of leaving that a sense of guilt first appears. 
Grief at abandoning the place that holds the heart; guilt that is ambiguous and 
refuses to be named. Guilt surfaces again and again among the women in this    
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study, but for the most part is tacit and well concealed. The conjecture that 
underlying guilt is resentment, and underlying resentment is anger is a conception 
that needs to be addressed. Is it the thought that had I stayed, I could have made a 
difference? Is this the manifestation of the anomie that forms the process that 
drove us? Dr Clara Espinosa, the Bolivian immigrant I cited at the beginning of 
this chapter, speaks eloquently of her sadness and guilt at leaving Bolivia. I 
perceive again the anomie that is, perhaps, significant in any immigration process: 
I can remember my country without crying and without yearning so 
much. I think that to survive I keep telling myself I did resolve my 
guilt, but it’s probably something I will never ever resolve (in Ferrari, 
1998). 
 
I asked Amy about her parents, both of whom have died since she has been in 
Australia. When she speaks I hear the sorrow in her voice, not only for their 
deaths but for the actual physical distance between them in Africa and herself in 
Australia before they died: 
Amy: Though of course, my mum and dad always said they would never come and live 
here because they didn’t want to be a burden on their family. So they would only come 
and visit. And then when things got too bad for them there and when they got really very 
elderly, and my dad quite frail, it was too late for them to come then.  
Amy: And so that was always a terrible wrench for me. You know having my mum and 
dad there and you [me] here. I mean you know it don’t you? It’s an awful wrench, you 
feel so guilty. And that was really one, I think that was, one of the hardest things. You 
know, especially when my parents got more dependent on us and you know, having to 
continually go over and do your best for them yet knowing you had to come back here 
and that was really very difficult. 
Eleanor: So by staying there they ended up becoming even more of a burden? 
Amy: In a way, yes but then you never know how they would have settled [in Australia] 
because my mum and dad were very Africa orientated. And there was something about 
Australia. I think my mum used to find it a little umm, crude. And I think that sort of put 
her off any idea of coming here.  
 
As Amy and I spoke, I told her about my feelings on leaving and revisiting my 
mother in Zimbabwe—and Kathy’s grandparents on her father’s side in Cape    
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Town. The associated feelings of grief and guilt are clear as I reflect on this 
conversation: 
Eleanor: Yes I sometimes feel Kathy is well, resentful that we took her away from her 
grandparents. Well, my father was already dead, but Roland’s dad and my mum and that. 
But I do agree about the guilt because I definitely had that. Especially after when we 
came here mum became very senile. Well, she got Alzheimers. 
Amy: Yes … 
Eleanor: And not only did I feel awful about that, but [also] that Marie had to carry the 
burden.  
Amy: Yes. Yes. 
Eleanor: Because, I mean my brothers were fine and everything and they didn’t mind 
putting their hands in their pockets, but they weren’t there as people for poor old mum. 
That was horrible. 
Amy: Yes. When did she die? 
Eleanor: 1987. She turned eighty in … We went over [to Zimbabwe] in 1986 for her 
eightieth birthday. And she didn’t really remember me. She remembered Roland, but not 
me. But that’s what Alzheimer’s can do. 
 
The return to Zimbabwe, on holiday or for other reasons, after time spent living in 
Australia raises questions that become part of this thesis. Earlier in this chapter I 
cite in the interview with Amy that she said, “perhaps things would have been 
fine” if she and her family had stayed in Zimbabwe. In my own experience, after 
each return visit I discover a longing to return permanently to that matrix of what 
was known; the life that, at holiday level, seems almost unchanged. And, 
embedded in that is the homesickness felt so intensely by myself and many other 
ex-Rhodesians and ex-Zimbabweans to whom I have spoken. Inherent in this 
homesickness is the recognition that thoughts of Africa still clutch at me. In my 
daily journal I find the following passage, written so recently I hesitate to date it: 
Sometimes, in the morning when I wake up and the air in Perth feels 
like the air in Africa, there is an overwhelming homesickness. A 
homesickness that penetrates me and has no knowledge of the 
practicalities of life (Personal Journal). 
 
The pungency and the immediacy of Africa is elegantly (and ephemerally) 
captured by Barbara Kingsolver, writing in the character of a visitor, a    
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missionary’s wife/widow in Africa; she writes as a mother who experienced the 
loss of a child—not because of war of independence—but at the beginning of the 
wars of independence in the Congo/Zaire and her words resonate/echo [with] my 
own memories of Africa. She says: 
Once every few years, even now, I catch the scent of Africa. It makes 
me want to keen, sing, clap up thunder, lie down at the foot of a tree 
and let the worms take whatever of me they can still use. I find it 
impossible to bear (Kingsolver, 2000, 99). 
 
I realise that it is part of me, part of my being, to know how Africa feels, smells, 
and is—and that this is something that cannot be dismissed or diminished because 
I live in Australia. And the knowledge is shared with this American woman 
whose writing about Africa is, by her own admission, based on memory and “… 
many people’s accounts of the natural, cultural, and social history of [the 
Congo/Zaire]” (Kingsolver, 2000, ix).  
 
Most of the women in this project have made the trip ‘home’ to Zimbabwe, to 
Africa, on at least one occasion. When we meet here in Perth, returning to 
Zimbabwe is one of the main topics of conversation. I notice that, on the few 
occasions when we do meet socially, the first question we ask each other is, 
“When were you last there?” [in Zimbabwe, in Africa]. We meet so seldom as a 
social group that I begin to question the sense of our origins in the same country. 
Some of us—the women in this study—knew each other in Rhodesia; others have 
never met, either here or in Africa, and there is no sense of community among us. 
I address this under the concept of Gemeinschaft. I reiterate that the context in 
which I use Gemeinschaft is that of social solidarity, and that this social solidarity 
is absent among the immigrant women from Rhodesia who comprise my sample.    
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I find the failure of the women to form a cohesive group in Australia worth 
exploring. It is almost as though the notion of grouping together within the new 
country is counter to our beliefs, perhaps our values? It seems when we do get 
together we enjoy talking to each other and catching up on news. However, not 
one of us makes an effort to organise regular—or even occasional—social 
meetings. The last time some of us met as a group the meeting was organised by 
the Old Girls Association of the senior school we attended in Salisbury. I ponder, 
does the ambiguity of our physical resemblance to white Australian women make 
it unnecessary for us to have or maintain contact with people (women) from the 
home country? Is the lack of contact between us due to unconscious recognition 
of our geographical isolation, our sense of independence—or perceived 
autonomy? Is it because we speak English? The ongoing and escalating problems 
in Zimbabwe do not seem to change the attitude of the women about making 
more regular contact. I think in comparison about what I have heard from friends 
in the Chilean community in Perth—they seem to have a very structured 
community, and association, also very gendered—which comprises the 
patriarchal ‘chief’ who gives advice and tells people what they may and may not 
do. Maybe that is the difference, we have no such structure—probably because 
we feel we do not need each other’s support, or see it as interference, in our 
personal lives. We can find our support elsewhere.  
 
In the interview process I discovered that most of us joined the ‘Rhodesia 
Association’ soon after we arrived in Perth. The arrival in the new country is 
probably the stage of migration when the liminal persona is most vulnerable, 
when the realisation occurs that the physical body is now situated in an unknown    
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space, and it is the time of crossing from the separation stage to the liminal stage. 
However, I also found that all of us who did join the association have left it for 
similar reasons—one of which is the ‘when-we’ syndrome among members. A 
‘when-we’ is a derisive expression used by some ex-Rhodesians to describe other 
ex-Rhodesians (and South Africans) whose conversation comprises “when-we 
were in Rhodesia” [everything was bigger, better, prettier, more interesting]. 
Another reason for not remaining a member of the association seemed to be that 
most of the other members were actually ‘expat poms’ (a derisive term for ex-
patriot British nationals) who had lived in Rhodesia for a few months or maybe a 
few years. One of the women in my research remains a member of the Rhodesia 
Association because she enjoys receiving the newsletter—a way to catch up on 
who has ‘gapped it’ from Zimbabwe. Roland and I never bothered to renew our 
membership after the one and only social occasion we attended. It is worth noting 
however, that there are now a number of websites on the Internet, including 
‘Rhodesians Worldwide’, and, as a result there seems to be more connection—but 
only ‘virtually’. There remains to be addressed the ‘adept’ notion in the rites de 
passage: the adept who guides the liminal persona through the mysteries of the 
separation stage and into the liminal. Perhaps we, the women from Rhodesia, feel 
we do not need the assistance of other ex-Rhodesians or South Africans. Those 
who required and requested assistance in Australia received it from Australians. 
 
I have, in this chapter looked at migration as the separation stage in an 
unacknowledged rites de passages, I have begun the exploration of homesickness 
and interwoven this with experiences of separation—leaving Africa. And, finally, 
I reflect on the notion of Gemeinschaft, and in doing so I discover another reason,    
114
 
an intensely personal reason, that leaving Africa and coming to Australia implies. 
It is, I think, like leaving an insular and exclusive boarding school—like the one I 
attended in colonial Rhodesia—and discovering there are other people to connect 
with and relate to. Other people who remind me that, not only is it unnecessary to 
cling to the old ways, but doing so can be limiting and handicap the movement to 
integration—the third stage of the liminal process. Therefore, deeply within the 
process of migration as rites de passage, is situated the concept of a metanoia. 
The transformation that occurs in an immigrant may be driven by their 
perceptions of the new society and their identity as a member of their new 
society. Whether the immigrant is aware of any transformation in her or his 
attitude or identity, it is clear that the action of relocating enforces a modified 
outlook on self-identity and attributed identity. Thus, in the following chapter I 
discuss issues of identity and draw on the metaphor of non-reflecting mirrors to 
examine the notion of difference within similarity. 
 
                                                 
i The metaphor of an adult immigrant being like a transplanted tree was suggested to me by my 
therapist, friend, and colleague, Theresia Johnston – herself an immigrant, from Holland.    
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The Second Panel 
 
 
Liminality    
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Chapter Five: Identity I  
 
 
 
 
Being in the centre of my margin. 
 
 
So I am Australian because my lapsed passport says I am, and because this 
country offered me a place to be (Eva Cox). 
 
Eva Cox’s comment on her Australian identity is appropriate as an introduction to 
this chapter on migrant identity in Australia. The notion of being offered ‘a place 
to be’ necessitates the question “to be what?” or “to be whom?” and these are the 
questions I ask the women in my study. These are the questions I ask myself. 
Therefore, I begin this chapter by seeking to locate the moment that begins the 
self-questioning—questioning my own positionality as an immigrant in Australia 
and as an Australian and finding “the margin as a space of radical openness” 
(hooks, 1989). Previously, I have situated the women in the separation stage of 
rites de passage and discussed the separation from Africa. The incline that leads 
to the liminal section begins here, and I further the exploration of identity in this 
space. In the second section of this chapter I amplify my hypothesis of minimal 
difference and examine issues not usually associated with the attribution of 
‘otherness’.    
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Examining the question of identity necessitates the defining of the word, and I 
choose to offer a variety of definitions, theoretical and observed, to mark what I 
consider to be the ambivalence of the term. In this chapter, the trope of 
immigration as rites de passage is reiterated in the discussion of assimilation and 
integration. The imbrication of identity and integration into Australian society is 
examined drawing on past experience of exclusion and belonging. Notions of 
identity and integration in the immigration discourse are well documented. In this 
chapter I draw, in the first instance, on the work of psychiatrists Leon and Rebeca 
Grinberg to define the paradigms of my hypothesis and to develop the 
implications/connotations in my use of ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration’. They 
speak of the ‘requisite’ of developing a feeling of belonging to become integrated 
and thus maintaining one’s sense of identity (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, 23). 
The significance I accord to this comment allows me to define and re-define the 
use of assimilation and integration in relation to my personal experience of 
immigration. Further, it allows a connection to the maintenance of self-
determined identity as opposed to an attributed identity—attributed by the new or 
host nation. In the personal environment of the new immigrant, I advance some 
parallels between assimilation and anarchy in the context of self-determined 
identity. I find the notion of assimilation, in the context of the desire to belong, 
becomes consistent with compliance—and the performance of compliance. This, I 
believe, generates the notion of assimilation as anarchic and I will open up the 
topic of assimilation as camouflage, not as compliance but as the performance of 
compliance. The notion of integration that is introduced here will be advanced 
and expanded in chapter eight, where issues that embrace incorporation,    
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aggregation and reaggregation as the final part of rites de passage, are 
determined. The interweaving of threads on the attribution of the other derives 
from the sub-chapter that follows, i.e Identity II: True Mirrors; and this, as 
mimesis, supports and embellishes the theme of identity and reflection. The 
attribution of ethnic identity in Australia is examined in the light of ethnicity, per 
se, principally being applied to non-Anglo-Australians. In conclusion, I continue 
the exploration of who the real Aussie may be, and use this to reflect upon my 
own multiplicity of identities positioned, as they are, in the context of author and 
subject, immigrant and Australian. 
 
The beginning of my self-examination of who or what I was came about towards 
the beginning of my life as a doctoral student. In the process of researching this 
work, in 1998, I had the opportunity to attend and present a paper at a Humanities 
conference in South Australia, Postcoloniality/Cultural Studies: Representing 
Difference. As the conference addressed issues of difference and postcolonialism, 
I heard a number of papers that addressed questions relating to people perceived 
as being situated in the margins. Most of the papers I heard were, in fact, about 
people in the margins—the (implicit) ‘Other’. I listened to many of these papers 
and it seemed that my critical mind heard a note of pious self-interest. The idea 
that the speaker was central and the subjects were situated on the periphery led 
me to ponder on the discourse that authorises a dominant group to talk about and 
for the ‘Other’ and, to consider how ironic it was that many of the papers 
presented, discussed this very issue. For example, one of the presenters spoke of 
‘Captured Aboriginal Lives: From P.T. Barnum to the Present Sunday Times’; 
and another presenter addressed ‘Essentialism, hybridity and identity amongst    
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Arabic-speaking youth’. However, this is not to imply that any of the papers were 
inferior, and I am not criticising any particular presentation. But, it is worth 
reflecting on Trinh T. Minh-ha’s belief that “… [at least] the danger of speaking 
for the other has emerged into consciousness” and continues, “… [but] it serves as 
an excuse for … their reluctance to involve themselves in the issue” (Minh-ha, 
1989, 80). While there was, at the conference, “inclusion”, per se, of Indigenous 
Australians (Aboriginal people), some as participants into the conference, and 
others as performers of Aboriginal dance and ceremony, I perceived a component 
of condescension, perhaps best described as an (unexpressed) attribution of 
subaltern ‘nativeness’ toward them that reflects Trinh T. Minh-ha’s observation 
cited above. To my eyes there were aspects of covert colonialism within, and 
informed by, the discourse of postcolonialism associated with the theme of the 
conference.  
 
Paradoxically, I also saw attribution of otherness, albeit tacit, to people at the 
conference who did not appear different; that is to say, exotically different. To 
define my use of ‘other’ in this context; I originally considered using the word 
‘outsider’, and the term is germane; however, as in much postcolonial theory, the 
sense of ‘outsider’ is incorporated in ‘other’, where issues other than that of 
foreignness, or of being an alien, apply. Therefore, using the precedent set in 
postcolonial and postmodern theory, I tend to use ‘other’ in preference to 
‘outsider’ to convey the sense of being an outsider, but not a foreigner. Toward 
those delegates whose differences were less defined or, I could argue, irrelevant, 
there emerged as the conference progressed, an almost calculated discrimination, 
leading to separation and exclusion from the (networking) centre. I observed that    
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those delegates who were, to the naïve eyes of this first-time conference attendee, 
part of the dominant group (white, academic, Australian) but who had some 
insignificant difference, were informally excluded from certain aspects of the 
conference. For example, among the excluded delegates were the overweight, the 
eccentric dressers, the physically disadvantaged and so forth; different—but not 
different enough—or not different in a suitably exotic way. Now, when I reflect 
on the experience, I ask myself about the element of hypocrisy that I sensed and I 
ponder, was it my imagination? Was I able to see something clearly because I, 
myself, was in the margin? bell hooks writes of how she learned that marginality 
is not a mythic place, but comes from lived experience; she identifies the margin 
as a place of radical possibility—the radical margin. She sees the margin as a 
place of resistance, of being able to look “… from the outside in and from the 
inside out” (hooks, 1989, 20). Being situated in the margin, being on the outside 
to define the centre, is a place “… to struggle to maintain …” (hooks, 1989, 20), 
and is, therefore, a space not to be relinquished. For myself in the context of the 
conference in South Australia, the most significant sense of my marginalisation 
came from being a white immigrant from Southern Africa. I reiterate, the physical 
differences are not marked and there is no distinguishing racial feature. At the 
conference I dress as I usually do, in a conventional, if not conservative, way for a 
woman, so perhaps it is my accent that alerts people that I am different. 
Presumably, I do not reflect the required symmetrical image. I flag the notion of 
‘symmetrical image’ here for concentrated examination in the following sub-
section. For another diagnosis, perhaps I must draw on the notion of habitus—
embodied history—as evidence of my difference; the way I move, sit, and stand, 
minor, insignificant difference that presumably accounted for my marginalisation,    
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but it was from within this locus that I was able, indeed am able, to observe the 
very place of marginalisation. And, in this radical margin I discovered that to be 
acceptable and accepted to the inner sanctum of Academe, it is better to be ‘very’ 
other. ‘A little bit’ other is not good enough. In other words, to be a white woman 
but not the same ‘white’ as the dominant (elite) group, additional issues come into 
play.  
 
In seeking to find effective notions of identity to exhibit in this thesis, I explore 
the work of psychologist and philosopher James Hillman. Hillman examines the 
current definitions of identity and finds, in his terms, that ‘identity’, as well as 
‘ego’ and ‘self’ “… are bare abstractions, telling us nothing of the human being 
they supposedly inhabit and govern. At best, these words refer to the unifying 
sameness of people while neglecting their unique differences” (Hillman, 1999, 8). 
The abstractions perceived by Hillman, and his recognition of the commonly 
accepted reductive theory of identity lead me to agree with his premise. In my 
examination of the individual lives of the migrant women of this discussion, in 
the context of their experiences of identity, the notion of a common identity is 
ludicrous. The recognition that they are individuals, and the particularities of their 
lives are what form their identity or multiplicity of identities. In the attribution of 
identity we do not always recognise ourselves. Sarah immigrated from Zambia, 
via South Africa in 1988. She started an emu farm in a small centre in the South 
of Western Australia. Her early days as an immigrant were not particularly 
auspicious. She found the local people unfriendly, even hostile. I asked about how 
she was positioned in the area and she replied that for the first few months, almost 
a year, nobody spoke to her in any friendly way. It was after her television broke,    
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and she needed to take it through to Albany that she discovered she had been 
attributed a name and an identity:  
Sarah: I took the TV into the workshop and started to say, “My name is …” and he said, 
“Oh I know who you are!” but he still didn’t greet me. And I’d been going in and out of 
town for a year buying my groceries, and nobody greeted me. I was just the “emu lady” 
“the South African emu lady” that lived up there. And then the neighbours started saying, 
“Oh we live up the road, next to the emu lady.”  
Eleanor: So, that’s where you say you became a landmark? 
Sarah: Yah, my name was the emu lady and I went to Victoria as a consultant when I 
finished farming, and I was the emu lady there as well. 
 
Reinforcing the argument of abstraction in the term “identity” is the observation 
that “[t]he concept of identity is based on the exclusion of difference, on a 
presumption of homogeneity. The word identity is derived from the Latin idem, 
meaning ‘the same’” (Bottomley, 1994, 65). Thus, identities are not only self-
identification, or assumed identity, or re-invented identity, but also attributed 
identity and the recognition that each one of these is valid. The literature 
surrounding the topic of identity is extensive and I uncover a complexity of 
identity; a multiplicity of identity and, for me, it is only a small step inward – on a 
visceral level – to identify with many of the voices (Appignanesi, 1987; Sarup, 
1996; Spivak, 1996; Suleiman, 1994) and (Nandy, 1983; Rapport and Dawson, 
1998). bell hooks writes of “… the multiple voices within me” (hooks, 1989, 16). 
It is in the sameness, the perceived symmetry, required by the self and, in a 
reciprocal way, by the ‘other’, that there arises a tendency to stereotype. In the 
case of the women in my study the confusion arises, I believe because the 
immigrant is so similar it becomes difficult to categorise her (or him), and the 
problem is resolved by stereotyping an attitude instead. For example, ‘all white 
Rhodesians are racist’ or, ‘all white South Africans (being racist) will bring their 
corrupt racist mores into Australia and infect the Australian society’. I have    
123
 
amplified the notion of stereotyping and related it to identification in reflection of 
image, in the following sub-section of this chapter, Identity II: True Mirrors. The 
thread of the reflected image is woven through this thesis, stitching together the 
trope of immigration as rites de passage, even a reflection of rites de passage. It 
is in the ultimate stage of the rites de passage that the topic of integration 
becomes ascendant and it is timely, therefore, to begin the examination of my use 
of the term and why I dispute the term integration and favour that of assimilation 
particularly in the context of the initial stages of rites de passage. 
 
The terms integration and assimilation are ubiquitous in this work and, to assist 
my defining of the terms, I use the following excerpts from an (email) discussion 
between a participant in this study, my colleague Clare, and myself. I reflect on 
the significance of the discussions I had with Clare, and many of my other 
colleagues, that at the time did not appear to be of any great consequence—but 
the succession of thoughts that many of these conversations provoked as I worked 
through the research and writing processes associated with this doctoral thesis—
have helped me shape the final work. There is in this reflection a complexity that 
connects to my arguments regarding assimilation and integration because material 
spawned from these collegial discussions and conversations has, I have come to 
realise, been ‘assimilated’ in a visceral way that I flag now and draw upon in 
chapter eight: A real Aussie [at last] (Gunew, 1999, 146). The discussion that 
follows originated after Clare had read, at my invitation, the formal proposal for 
my candidacy. In a succession of emails we work to clarify what we mean, 
independently, when we use the terms ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration’:  
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Clare’s email, Tuesday, 05 Oct 1999  Eleanor’s reply, Thursday, 7 Oct 1999 
You often talk about assimilation - my 
thesis has as a working subtitle – how 
females have integrated into WA society. 
My supervisor [and I] … discussed long 
and hard the difference between 
assimilation and integration and decided 
on integration as a more complete word 
for my thesis – I wonder at the reason 
you use assimilation and would be 
interested to hear from you on this. 
Yes, I do use assimilation as opposed to 
integration and I'll try and explain why. 
This is quite difficult ... In 'assimilating' 
we camouflage who we are so as to look 
like the rest of a group (which is what I 
feel I do). In 'integrating' we actually do 
become part of the group. So, I suppose 
there is an element of anarchy? 
subterfuge? subversion! in assimilation – 
I know I'm not really part of the group, 
and the group knows I'm not really part 
of the group, but we both pretend I am – 
but I’m not sure why! 
 
Clare’s reply, Sun, 10 Oct 1999  Eleanor’s reply, Mon, 11 Oct 1999 
Re assimilation and integration – this is 
why I chose integration – and what I 
wrote in my proposal "Assimilation 
entails the adoption by the minority of 
the majority culture: integration refers to 
a blending of the two cultures in a some 
balanced fashion. So it will be argued 
that the word integration is more 
appropriate than assimilation in this 
context". Assimilation in my reading of 
history refers more to the White Australia 
Policy and as such is used in another 
way. I remember it all now and still think 
I prefer in my context, to use integration. 
 
I suppose the assimilation and integration 
debate boils down to the fact that they are 
just words and we put our own 
interpretation on them. But, having said 
that, it makes me realise that I must 
define very clearly in my thesis what I 
mean by assimilation, and what it means 
within the context of my thesis. So, 
thanks for bringing it up and making me 
think about it! 
 
 
Interpretation of the words ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration’ within the context of 
my thesis is crucial. However, I am mindful that the terminology is bounded by 
the meaning accepted as valid by this society—however ambiguous that 
contemporary meaning may be. Thus, when I move to distance myself from this 
problematical limitation, the need to define the words ‘assimilation’ and 
‘integration’ is significant. To define the words I need to digress to notions of 
compliance, performance of compliance and the self-defined understanding of 
assimilation as anarchy. 
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The transformation from ex-Rhodesian to Australian is where these notions may 
be thrown into relief and become visible. The issue of a feeling of belonging in 
the new society is, as already commented on, a “requisite … [to] maintaining 
one’s sense of identity” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, 23). The desire to belong, 
to be accepted, may compel the immigrant to acquiesce in behaviour that is not 
necessarily sincere. In other words, the attempts to assimilate may not be what 
they seem. My use of the word ‘assimilate’ needs to be defined further and the 
definition may serve to emphasise the significance of the immigrants’ experiences 
of passage into the Australian culture. So, to return to the trope of immigration as 
rites de passage, I choose the term assimilation in preference to integration 
because in the rites de passage, integration is what happens when the liminal 
stage is successfully completed—and that may never happen. My preference for 
the use of the word assimilation lies also in the conviction that an immigrant’s 
perceived assimilation may be a performance of compliance; a performance that 
masks the anarchic potential of compliance and the anarchic potential of 
assimilation. The terms of compliance in this context are defined by Kelman as 
“… public yielding to an influence attempt without private acceptance” (in 
Oskamp, 1977). Kelman asserts that the “… satisfaction derived from compliance 
is due to the social effect of accepting influence” (emphasis in original) (Kelman, 
1958, 53). In the case of an immigrant, I would submit that it is the social effect 
motivating the compliance, the effect of a feeling of belonging in the society. 
And, in this performance of compliance by the immigrant, there is a pragmatic 
imitation of the dominant Australian culture. Thus, in this context, the imitation 
may be seen as camouflage. Consider assimilation seen as a camouflage that can 
be readjusted and renegotiated by the immigrant as the social environment    
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demands, much as an actor will perform on the stage, depending on the reaction 
of her or his audience. Therefore, seeing assimilation as a performance of 
compliance by the migrant, I understand it to be a necessary role, played for a 
sense of belonging, expediency, or even survival. 
 
Allied with the concept of assimilation as anarchic and as a performance of 
compliance, is the immigrant’s recognition that she or he needs to change or 
modify her or his identity. This recognition of the necessity to change is a 
moment of clarity, an insight. The reaction of an immigrant to this insight is 
illustrated by one of the participants in my study. In an interview, I ask Marlene 
to talk about her Australian experiences and in her reply she is explicit about her 
awareness of the necessity to change. Marlene cites her use of speech and 
language as a place to describe the process and, in retrospect, I find the totality of 
her argument intriguing, but I can offer no interpretation other than that contained 
in the remarks she made in the interview: 
Marlene: You just have to change. I found that when I came to Australia I had to simplify 
everything I said. I don’t only mean using big words, but just speaking in a less complex 
way. So, I found that I simplified everything. Instead of using one long word, I would cut 
down to shorter, simpler ones. 
Eleanor: But isn’t that a little bit like selling yourself out? 
Marlene: It is a bit, but it made me acceptable, to fit in, to blend in, to become part of our 
new home. 
Eleanor: And that was important? 
Marlene: That was very important. It is self-preservation I think. You just know what you 
need to do to survive. You have to behave in this way or that way so that you don’t stand 
out, so that you don’t attract attention. But, in your own private space, you can still be 
who you want to be (my emphasis). 
 
So, Marlene's apparent submissiveness, her 'public yielding' masks the anarchic, 
non-compliant content that I hear in her words. Clearly, she is not all she appears 
to be. The sub-text seems to say, “I resemble you, but I know that inside I am not 
like you. I will use the words that you use, and that is so I can be accepted, or    
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acceptable, here. But within myself I know I’m not one of you, and I don’t know 
if I ever will be”. Perhaps what is occurring is, as Bhabha has suggested, an 
imitation of the dominant culture by the colonised (Bhabha, 1994, 90), or in this 
case, imitation of the dominant culture by the migrant, and I submit that this is the 
source of the anarchy. In this context, there is connection to Lacan’s notion that 
the effect of mimicry is camouflage, “not a harmonization of repression of 
difference, but a form of resemblance” (in Bhabha, 1994, 90), and this trope 
develops in an unexpected manner in the following sub-chapter Identity II: True 
Mirrors. Among the women in this research Marlene was possibly the clearest 
about understanding the necessity of changing her identity in order to belong, to 
comply. I mention here that she was the youngest woman I interviewed for the 
study. Marlene asked me to remember that she immigrated to Australia when she 
was only twenty-one and said, “… at that age, if I wanted to fit in and be able to 
blend, I had to find common ground. I had to find some way without, inside, 
giving myself away.” And I find that Marlene’s statement again emphasises the 
enigmatic attachment to her ‘previous’ identity and leaves space within her 
camouflage for anarchy and non-compliance, thus befitting my interpretation of 
‘assimilation’ as a camouflage that can be readjusted and renegotiated by the 
immigrant as the social environment demands. Thus, the notion of assimilation as 
the performance of compliance achieves an effect that frees the neophyte, the 
immigrant, to live her own ‘inner’ life without prematurely sacrificing her 
previous identity—before her transit to the third stage of liminality—integration.  
 
In this way, I am able to view assimilation as a camouflage that can be readjusted 
and renegotiated by the immigrant. This reassures me as to the appropriateness of    
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my choice of the term ‘assimilation’ rather than ‘integration’ in this context. It is 
my conviction that assimilation is an adoption; a compliance; a camouflage, and 
thus, a way to ‘be’ without attracting attention and I reiterate Marlene’s words: 
“You have to behave in this way or that way so that you don’t stand out, so that 
you don’t attract attention”. There are issues of power linked to this hypothesis 
and it is, perhaps, one of the ways an immigrant can manifest some autonomy in 
the adopted country, even if only in his or her own private space. The perceivable 
lack of integration in this context, and the use of assimilation in my way of 
definition, suggests the immigrant is on the periphery of the dominant group. 
Being on the ‘outside’; being in the ‘margin’ but using the space as a centre of 
possibility allows the mimicry, a performance that may forecast, ultimately, 
integration. 
 
“He’s a real Aussie, from the bush” (overheard at North Cott Café, October 
2000). 
 
The repetition of this quote that I first used in Chapter Three: The Beginning is 
not at Perth Airport, signals a return to the notion of Australian identity that so 
delighted me when first I (over)heard it and, once again, pricks the argument: just 
who is this mysterious identity, this real Aussie that I, as an immigrant, should 
aspire to imitate if I desire assimilation/integration? 
 
The notion of performance mooted above raises the question; how do I explore 
the element of performance in mimicry of the host nation (Australia) to hasten the 
process of integration (that is, the third stage of rites de passage 
integration/reaggregation’) when I enact the performance myself? I ask myself,    
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who are the ‘real’ Australians that I am attempting to mimic? I take on the role of 
‘Australian’ but know that it is a performance, a role. My being an Australian 
only seems to happen when I am with people who are less Australian than I am—
other, more recent immigrants—or when I am visiting relatives in Zimbabwe. So, 
speaking with my rendition of an ‘Aussie’ accent for example may deceive some 
people but ‘real’ Australians will know that I am a fake! I consider the immigrant 
women in my study and observe that none of them has developed an Australian 
accent. 
 
The issue of ‘ethnic identity’ in Australia, as defined by the Anglo-Australians, 
seems never to apply to Anglo-Australians. The pejorative qualities I associate 
with the word ‘ethnic’, I assume comes from my antecedents, being considered 
foreign as a child in Rhodesia—with the ostracism and hurtfulness that entailed. 
And, more recently, I can remember the helpless fury I felt when an Australian 
woman with whom I worked when first I arrived in Perth insisted on referring to 
me as ‘the little ethnic’. The cause of my rage was not her identification of my 
alien ‘ethnicity’ but, rather, her condescending and sneering attitude and her 
pejorative tone. Once again, the feelings I had as a child surfaced and, once again, 
I had no place to go, no response that stopped or even restrained her. Indeed, 
whatever I said to deflect the indignity was fuel for criticism of my perceived 
alterity. Eva Cox asks, “What is ethnic identity?” The answer she gives is hardly 
ambiguous, for she writes: 
A valuing of diversity and an appreciation of the value of difference 
makes sense, but within an understanding that we are still part of 
societies with dominant cultures. As a woman, I am colonised by 
Anglo culture. It’s about power and who defines values (Cox, 1992, 
64). (my emphasis).    
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I reflect on the overall identity of ‘Australians’ because I have to define of (or to) 
whom I am speaking when I refer in general terms to ‘Australians’ and 
‘Australian culture’. So, to reiterate my discourse as to who these ‘Australians’ 
are, and taking note that the notion of an homogeneous ‘Australian culture’ is 
problematic—as is the reductive notion of ‘the Australian’ per se; when I refer to 
‘Australians’ it is to the white Anglo-Saxons. These white Australians are also 
referred to as Celtic-Australians by, for example, (Gunew, 1990) and (1994) and 
(Houbein, 1990) and others; hence their origin is manifest in their nomenclature. 
It is those white Anglo-Australians who have customarily assumed for themselves 
the mantle of the ‘real’ Australian—unless, of course, they are referring to “… a 
real Aussie from the bush”. Where I speak of Australians who are not in this 
group, I acknowledge their alterity.  
 
Historically, and continuing to the present, the popular press tells us that “Aussies 
are rebels. We are rebellious, adventurous and most of us believe rules are there 
to be broken” (Gora, 1999). The trope of the ‘larrikin’ is deeply embedded in 
Australian culture. There is the extraordinary situation where a convicted 
murderer becomes a national hero (in the person of Ned Kelly), but the reality of 
criminal activity is hardly supported. So, I reflect on the question: Is this is typical 
of how Australians see themselves? In the sub-section of this chapter I have 
considered the stereotyping of ‘other’ in comparison to stereotyping oneself, 
using the analogy of the True Mirror®, and discussed inversions in the process of 
self-as-symmetrical/faultless that I have observed in the course of my research. 
Returning to the Sunday Times newspaper article under examination I note that    
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among the activities the article describes as risk taking and being adventurous are, 
for example, eating ‘ethnic’ food, not mowing one’s own lawn, gambling, 
drinking to excess, and shopping on the Internet. The survey from which the 
published article is taken is described as “Australia’s largest consumer survey” 
conducted by KPMG Centre for Consumer Behaviour. However, in the cited 
article five people are interviewed (all of whom are local to the Perth area, and all 
are women) and their pictures are published. Of these five only one appears to be 
racially different or ‘ethnic’ in Australian terms. This interviewee says she is 
optimistic that Australia will develop as a multicultural nation and, taking notice 
of the date of publication, one of the other interviewees opines “Australians are 
laid back, and just go with the flow. We are willing to take everybody on board” 
(in Gora, 1999). In the environment of the subsequent refugee crisis and the 
recent [2002] Tampa debacle, I find her choice of words ironically prophetic. 
Another of the women interviewed is quoted as saying “To be Australian is to be 
proud, lucky and nationalistic. When I think of a typical Australian, I think of a 
man, drinking in a pub, watching football or having a barbecue” (my emphasis) 
(in Gora, 1999). So, the issue of gender enters the discussion of Australian 
identity at the popular level and, of course, the interviewee does not have to state 
that the man drinking in the pub is white! Only if he were not white would that 
need to be confirmed. 
 
For an immigrant the question of belonging and not belonging is paradoxical and 
in my hypothesis closely linked to assimilation and integration. I return to my 
words in the introduction where I begin the reflection upon where I belong, my 
identity as author and speaking for the other. For me, as author, I seek not only to    
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belong in the society but also to belong in the text. My difficulty is weaving the 
threads of immigration, identity, and rites de passage together to create/author 
something that is rigorous, clear, and engaging. In other words, I want an 
audience for my work. My multiplicity of identity—ex-Rhodesian, immigrant, 
Australian, and academic, requires an audience. Iain Chambers talks about 
writing as travelling and this speaks to me on an intimate level. Writing “is to 
enter a space, a zone, a territory … everywhere characterised by movement: the 
passage of words, the caravan of thought, the flux of the imaginary, the slippage 
of the metaphor, the drift across the page … the wandering eyes” (Chambers, 
1994, 10). He draws this imagery from Michel de Certeau (de Certeau, 1998). 
The notions of writing and identity, writing and research, writing and 
methodology combine to enrich the hypothesis. It is within the concept of 
authority and of speaking for ‘the other’ that I contemplate my own role—
because of my history in colonial Rhodesia, and confirm that I, too, am 
implicated. The issue of authority extends to, and extrapolates from, my authority 
as writer of this thesis and I refer to this again because it is the underlying motif 
of the methodology and subsequent writing of this work. I believe it is critical for 
me to acknowledge the imbrication of authority [of the author] wherever it 
manifests in the narrative. There is also the dilemma of taking the moral high 
ground—a tricky place on which to balance and one that requires critical self-
examination in the context of author/authority. I return to my own paranoia. I ask 
myself, is this why I cling to my notion of ‘assimilation’ without ‘integration’? 
Perhaps it is the desire to remain in the liminal—if the liminal is a margin of 
radical openness; an anarchic space where resistance is possible. And I ask    
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myself, when did Australia take on the semblance of ‘home’ and assimilation 
mutate to integration? 
 
In this examination and re-examination of aspects of assimilation and the defining 
the differences between assimilation and integration, I have placed the women in 
my sample on the incline that leads into the liminal stage of rites de passage. I 
have examined questions of identity and indicated the ambivalence of the term. 
The trope of immigration as rites de passage is reiterated and the imbrication of 
identity and integration into Australian society examined by drawing on past 
experience of exclusion and belonging. In the personal environment of the new 
immigrant, I have noted some parallels between assimilation and anarchy in the 
context of self-determined identity. The connection of the notion of assimilation 
to that of compliance, and performance of compliance as anarchic formed an 
hypothesis that is repeated in following chapters. The interweaving of threads on 
the attribution of ‘other’ derive from the sub-section of this chapter, Identity II: 
True Mirrors, and this continues the theme of identity and reflection. Finally, I 
continue the exploration of who is the ‘real Aussie’, and continue to reflect upon 
my own multiplicity of identities positioned, as they are, in the context of author 
and subject. In moving to the sub-section of this chapter I amplify my hypothesis 
of minimal difference and examine issues not usually associated with the 
attribution of ‘otherness’. 
    
134
 
 
 
Chapter Five: Identity II  
 
 
 
 
True Mirrors 
 
 
What does a true mirror do? The mirror “shows you what you look like to others 
and allows you to gain an accurate sense of yourself” (John Walter, inventor of 
the True Mirror®). 
 
The key insight into the mirror world is that it is a “folded back” version of the 
real one. To the extent that a glove folded inside out is perceived as one of the 
opposite hand, the mirror world will appear opposite in handedness to our own 
(Gillies, 2000).  
 
In this sub-section, Identity II, I explore the phenomenon of “True Mirrors ” to 
suggest that the attribution of otherness, previously defined as incorporating the 
sense of ‘outsider’ where issues other than that of foreignness apply, occurs when 
we recognise in others minor distortions we fail to see in ourselves. Using this 
observation/definition as the point of access, I argue that Australians, particularly 
those of Anglo Saxon and British origin—the dominant majority—tend to 
position English speaking immigrants from non-British backgrounds as ‘other’. 
The situation of white immigrants in Australia, using the hypothesis suggested by 
“True Mirrors”, gives some indication of asymmetries; the illusions we hold    
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about ourselves as immigrants and Australians—and how we are seen by other 
immigrants and Australians. Therefore, this chapter presumes to examine issues 
not generally seen as attributing to ‘otherness’ and the notions of assimilation I 
have mooted are re-slanted, but remain germane. In the rites de passage 
modification (of identity) occurs in the liminal stage and, in this chapter, the 
peculiarity of reflected image signals the enigmatic passages of this 
transformation. My hypothesis arises from the concept that the recognition of 
self-as-symmetrical is deceptive and fabricates an illusory justification to name 
the ‘other’, with all the accompanying paraphernalia. Therefore, I define and 
describe what a “True Mirror®” is and what it can do—what it does—so that the 
analogy develops and connections may be made and the hypothesis determined.  
 
To support my argument I draw on theories implied or defined by Jacques Lacan 
and Pierre Bourdieu. Both theories, with a minor degree of manipulation, are 
developed to illustrate and embellish the perspective that illusions of self-as-
symmetrical lead to naming the ‘other’. Bourdieu’s concepts of doxa, orthodoxy, 
heterodoxy, crisis and change, lead me to recognise the influence that migrant 
women from Southern Africa have as agents of change—albeit in a modest way. 
Modest or major, the substance of change is there and, in this reflection, is seen as 
a fragment of the bricolage of society and the change initiated by immigrants 
from many lands; the modification, reshaping, tempering, of the way of life and 
cultural development in Australia. The attribution of otherness is not examined as 
one-sided; I acknowledge that the women in my study ascribe otherness to (white) 
Australians, and the attribution is, in my hypothesis, based in the same notion of 
self-as-symmetrical. This reflected indictment of otherness presages the    
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movement to integration, aggregation (sometimes reaggregation) which is the 
final stage of rites de passage. It is in this final realm of the rites of passage that 
the immigrant is likely to become recognised formally as an integrant. The failure 
to make the transition from immigrant to integrant is alluded to here and is 
examined further in chapter eight.  
 
What is a true mirror? The first patent for a “True Mirror™”, was registered in 
1887 in England by a Catholic priest, John Joseph Hooker. There is no evidence 
that Hooker ever built a true mirror and the idea is now in the public domain. 
However, the name “True Mirror™” is the trademark of American inventors, 
Catherine Walter and her brother John, who live in New York. A True Mirror®, 
as registered by the Walters, is two common mirrors joined in a box at a perfect 
90 degree angle. The result is that the reflected image is three dimensional. The 
major difference between a True Mirror® and an ordinary mirror is that the 
reflection is not reversed, so an accurate description of the True Mirror® would 
be a non-reversing mirror. For example, when a person standing in front of an 
ordinary mirror raises her or his right hand, the image raises the left hand. 
However, when a person goes to shake someone by the hand, she or he generally 
presents her or his right hand as does the person being greeted. Ergo, it is the 
opposite hand! The mathematical, optical data providing an explanation for the 
effect of a non-reversing or asymmetrical mirror is beyond the scope of this thesis 
but, according to the literature, the theory of reflectivity of an asymmetric mirror 
may be determined using a set of equations: “These equations [will be] useful in 
the design of asymmetric mirrors and can be used to compare the trade-offs 
between the conventional, symmetric (quarter-wavelength), and asymmetric    
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mirrors” (Murtaza, 1996). In my research, the scientific purpose of the 
asymmetric mirrors is irrelevant: however, metaphorically the mirrors are relevant 
to my hypothesis, and the notion of ‘trade-offs’ between the symmetric and 
asymmetric mirrors is mimetic of the analogy I use—images within images. 
 
The first of the two theories I have embraced to support my theme of self 
assumed identity, attributed identity and otherness in similarity is suggested in 
Jacques Lacan’s essay, The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as 
revealed in psychoanalytic experience. In this essay Lacan reflects that, in the 
mirror stage of development in human behaviour (between six and eighteen 
months), a child begins to recognise his (sic) own image in a mirror, and then 
performs, “a series of gestures in which he experiences in play the relation 
between the movements assumed in the image and the reflected environment, and 
between this virtual complex and the reality it reduplicates – the child’s own 
body, and the persons and things, around him” (Lacan, 1977, 1). In other words, 
the child situates himself or herself in the reflection, distinguished (or distinct) 
from the surroundings and in the context of the surroundings. In my hypothesis it 
is in these initial experiences of looking in the mirror and identifying with the 
image that babies learn to allow for asymmetries in their reflected image, and 
become used to the reversed reflection. I argue that, from the first experience of 
recognising ourselves in a common mirror; that is to say, a reversed reflection, we 
begin in a comparable way to undertake the situating of ‘self’. Thus, the skewed 
(and asymmetrical) image in the mirror becomes our accepted view of ourselves. 
In Lacan’s drama of the ‘mirror stage’ there is a development of “… the 
assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid    
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structure the subject’s entire mental development” (Lacan, 1977, 4). This 
unfolding of his theory leads me to hypothesise that the acceptance of the 
reflected image as symmetrical (or regular) becomes self-evident in mimesis. The 
axiomatic notion of self-as-symmetrical, in this sense, is to make ourselves in the 
world—and the world as we know it—seem the ‘natural’ order of things. Without 
wishing to labour the point, the recognition of radical distortions from what we, 
as individuals, may consider ‘normal’ is more easily understood than minor 
distortions that may (and probably do) reflect the distortions we fail to see in 
ourselves. This is, indeed, the essence of my hypothesis and, as I have posited in 
the previous sub-section of this chapter, Identity I: Being in the centre of my 
margin, the realisation takes place that being ‘a little bit different’ is not as 
acceptable in Australian society generally—and certainly in Academe, if my 
experiences in Adelaide are an illustration of the prevailing model—as it is to be 
radically different; for example black, or non-English speaking.  
 
The notion of self-evidence introduces the second theory that informs this sub-
section. This is Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of doxa, orthodoxy, heterodoxy, crisis, 
and change (Bourdieu, 1977). In defining these terms I draw on the work of Toril 
Moi, whose writing has been influential in the shaping of my doctoral thesis in 
general and this chapter in particular (Moi, 1991). Bourdieu’s theory of doxa is 
presented in the context of an entrenched society, stable and, to all intents and 
purposes, unchanging. Bourdieu states that “every established order tends to 
produce … the naturalization of its own arbitrariness … [the] natural and social 
world appear as self-evident … [the] established cosmological and political order 
is perceived not as arbitrary, i.e., as one possible order among others, but as a    
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self-evident and natural order which goes without saying and therefore goes 
unquestioned” (in Moi, 1991, 1026). Therefore, in my understanding, doxa is the 
axiomatic, unquestioned acceptance of the perceived natural order. The axiomatic 
character of a doxic society is manifested by individuals in the society as a 
connotative cultural indoctrination of babies and children. To avoid heterodoxy 
(the effort to challenge the doxa) Bourdieu writes: “Between the child and world 
the whole group intervenes … with warnings that inculcate a fear of supernatural 
dangers …” (Bourdieu, 1977, 167). Therefore, it is not a huge leap to extrapolate 
from the notion of doxa, theorised by Pierre Bourdieu in a societal sense, into the 
individual context. The notion that orthodoxy is the effort to defend the doxa and 
that heterodoxy is a challenge to, a deviation from, or argument with the doxa, are 
concepts (in the context of the individual) which Toril Moi argues are more or 
less explicit to recognising the possibility of different arrangements; in other 
words the arrangements are not doxic (Moi, 1991, 1026). The dis-arrangement 
implied in the challenge/deviation is relevant to my hypothesis and will be 
revealed in due course, as will the significance of the theory to the analogy of 
True Mirrors. This chapter draws, indeed extrapolates, from both of these 
assumptions to the experiences (as immigrants into Western Australia) of these 
women from Southern Africa. And I reiterate, my own position in the group 
confirms that the autobiographical content of this dissertation is a given.  
 
The progress of this thesis has shown that the group of women in my research 
share few similarities. However, those general characteristics we do share are that 
we are all white; none of us was born in Britain, we were born either in Africa or, 
in one instance, Greece; and all of us come from a privileged background.    
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Beyond these, and a few other random similarities, the differences between us are 
considerable. Our experience of immigration to Australia is diverse as are our 
experiences with Anglo-Australians. The notion, for example, of Australians 
stereotyping white Southern African immigrants as racist is as meaningless as 
Southern Africans stereotyping white Australians as idle convicts. The (generally) 
pejorative nature of the stereotyping leads directly into my hypothesis and the 
assumptions within which I am framing this chapter. In other words, it is the 
inversion of the attributed stereotype into the reflected image (of self) in the True 
Mirror® that marks recognition of the asymmetry of self. In the examples given 
where this process occurs, there is, it seems, an approval of similarity, and it is 
this approval of asymmetry that allows approbation. The similarity is (or can be) 
in the moveable place—or even be the moveable space—where the initiate 
becomes the liminal persona in the rites de passage. I think this is another take on 
the actual notion of ‘passage’ in the sense that it is movement. The incipient 
recognition of difference occurs when the immigrant women comprising my 
study first arrive in Australia; and I reiterate the imbrication of the stages 
contained/released, in and by, the rites of passage and forewarn/presage the 
complexity of passages within passages. 
 
I find when I talk to the women in my study that the initial experiences with 
Anglo-Australians varies from helpful and friendly to out-and-out exclusion and 
ostracism. In my own experience the ostracism was usually based on the Southern 
African antecedents, supposed racist attitudes, and accusations of arrogance and I 
will elaborate on this in the course of this sub-chapter. Vivian’s first experiences    
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of living in Australia lie somewhere between the polarities of friendly welcome 
and thoughtless and inadvertent exclusion. 
 
Vivian was in her thirties when she moved to Australia in the 1960s. She came to 
Perth with her husband and seven children from Rhodesia, via Canada and the 
United States, where the family spent some years. Vivian loved living there, in 
America. She loved the lifestyle, the positive attitude, the friendliness, and the 
climate and, as she told me, “… most of all the sense of excitement.” She said the 
city they lived in, in California “… was like Johannesburg used to be.” After the 
friendliness of the Americans Vivian found the Australians “cold” and the feeling 
she got from them was not a welcoming one. Vivian remembered an incident 
when a woman she met through her church when first she arrived told her (but 
much, much later) that the other women in the church group talked about her—
this ‘new Australian’ and would say things like, “Look at all those well-behaved 
children…” Vivian said she asked her friend why she had never told her about the 
compliments when she was a new immigrant, as it would have meant a lot to her. 
I asked her what reply the woman gave but Vivian could not remember. Vivian 
insisted that, in her experience, this unwelcoming, exclusory attitude is not the 
case anymore and was inadvertent when it happened. She says that nowadays, 
compared to then, “Australians are becoming [have become] less parochial and 
less formal”. I wonder if her insistence that ‘Australians are less formal 
nowadays’ comes from the space where the image is inverted. The formerly 
derided traits become acceptable, axiomatic, part of the self-image and, 
ultimately, self-symmetry; in other words, ‘Australians are becoming more like 
me’; not, ‘I am becoming more like an Australian’. In examining this statement,    
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and reflecting that it is probable that an Australian looking at an immigrant thinks 
the same way—that is, ‘the migrant is becoming more like me’; not, ‘I am 
becoming more like the migrant’, the notion of an immigrant as an agent-of-
change evolves. This thread becomes entangled and begs the questions, who is 
‘an Australian’, who is ‘a migrant’?  
 
In the 1960s, when Vivian immigrated, Australia was, according to the literature, 
a time when migrants were treated with a degree of suspicion and hostility—even 
those who spoke English, albeit with an accent—for example (Gunew, 1993b; 
Pettman, 1991) and (Modjeska, 1996). Vivian comes from a Greek-Anglo 
background and is fluent in a number of languages—English, Greek, Italian, 
French and German. Physically, her image is a reflection of a white Anglo-
Australian. When I asked about her early days in Perth Vivian tells me that she 
found it very dull after the exhilaration she felt living in California. To contrast 
her experience of life in Australia to life in America, Vivian told me a story about 
her first Parents and Teachers (P and T) meeting in Perth. Having found what she 
thought was the correct venue, she looked through the window to make sure she 
was in the right place. She told me, “I saw these women in hats and gloves and 
big, fat, white shoes”. She said she thought it was a grandmother’s meeting so she 
went home. She remembered that on that day she herself was wearing “… Italian 
sandals and attractive shorts and top.” The detail of Vivian’s memory about 
clothes she was wearing some thirty years earlier reflects the significance of 
minutiae in women’s stories. If this detail is seen (metaphorically) as one of many 
bright tesserae, then it is these tesserae that create the mosaic of life and cultural    
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diversity in Australia and further, can be seen as markers of identity but not 
necessarily the identity the wearer chooses to claim.  
 
The significance of clothing and the memory of clothing as points of identity in 
[or out of context] is reflected in Dorinne Kondo’s experiences as a Japanese 
American working in Japan. Her physical characteristics are Japanese but she is a 
stranger to the Japanese culture and is discombobulated when she is mistaken for 
a Japanese, for not knowing the implicit and tacit cultural mores. She says: “How 
could someone who looked Japanese not be Japanese? In my cultural ineptitude, I 
represented for the people who met me the chaos of meaninglessness. Their 
response in the face of this dissonance was to make me as Japanese as possible” 
(Kondo, 1990, 11). And, then she writes of her startling experience [of reflected 
image] while looking after the baby of her host family:  
Mr. Sakamoto quickly tired of his grandfatherly role, leaving me to 
entertain Kaori-chan. Promptly at four p.m., the hour when most 
Japanese housewives do their shopping for the evening meal, I lifted 
the baby into her stroller and pushed her along ahead of me as I 
inspected the fish, selected the freshest looking vegetables, and 
mentally planned the meal for the evening. As I glanced into the shiny 
metal surface of the butcher’s display case, I noticed someone who 
looked terribly familiar: a typical young housewife, clad in slip-on 
sandals and the loose, cotton shift called “home wear” (hõmu wea), a 
woman walking with a characteristically Japanese bend to the knees 
and a sliding of the feet. Suddenly I clutched the handle of the stroller 
to steady myself as a wave of dizziness washed over me, for I realized 
I had caught a glimpse of nothing less than my own reflection. 
(Kondo, 1990, 15-16). 
 
She goes on to say “Fear that perhaps I would never emerge from this world into 
which I was immersed, inserted itself into my mind and stubbornly refused to 
leave, until I resolved to move into a new apartment, to distance myself from my 
Japanese home and my Japanese existence” (Kondo, 1990, 16). Milan Kundera    
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writes of a similar occurrence of identity and reflected image in his novel 
Ignorance set for the most part in Prague not long after the fall of Communism; I 
find the similarities to Dorinne Kondo’s experience astonishing. Irena, the female 
protagonist in Kundera’s novel, purchases a new dress in Prague and:  
Then, walking by a big department store, she unexpectedly passed a 
wall covered with an enormous mirror and she was stunned: the 
person she saw was not she, it was somebody else or, when she 
looked longer at herself in her new dress, it was she but she living a 
different life, the life she would have lived if she had stayed in 
Prague. This woman was not dislikable, she was even touching, but a 
little too touching, touching to the point of tears, pitiable, poor, weak, 
downtrodden.  
 
She was gripped by the same panic she used to feel in her emigration-
dreams: through the magical power of a dress she could see herself 
imprisoned in a life she did not want and would never again be able to 
leave …” (Kundera, 2002, 31). 
 
To connect Vivian’s experience and her remembrance of the clothes she wore to 
that of an Australian woman, I asked Julia, a [Western] Australian-born friend of 
mine who has often declared her interest in clothing fashions, her thoughts about 
European immigrants, especially when she was a young woman living in 
suburban Perth in the 1960s, the time Vivian arrived in Western Australia. Julia 
told me about her ‘New Australian’ neighbours, how sophisticated, romantic, and 
exotic she thought they were; their sense of style and fashionable clothes, and 
how much she wished to emulate them. It is worth noting however, that Julia’s 
mother would, from what she has told me, have fitted the stereotype coined by 
Vivian and quoted above of the women in “big, fat, white shoes, and gloves”. 
When I ponder on this conversation with Julia, and consider the inversion of 
images, I realise that the pitfalls of stereotyping are endemic and I need to be 
vigilant, not only in my interpretation but, also, within myself. However, I    
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mentioned Julia’s experience to Vivian, when we were speaking of immigrants in 
the context of agents-of-change. While Vivian agreed with the general concept of 
‘agents-of-change’, she was dubious about Julia’s perception of ‘sense of style 
and fashionable clothes’. She said that she when she came to Perth she found 
other ‘European’ migrants to be insular and often rude, “So bad mannered that 
they speak in their native language even if they have a guest who can’t speak their 
language.” The question that arises from this is, has the inversion of self-image 
between Julia and Vivian—Australian-born and immigrant who have never met 
each other—become the moveable, flexible, space I have already hypothesised? I 
suggest that it is in this arcane space that the mimesis of images and reflections of 
images are situated and, therefore, without manipulation I can suggest that the 
thread of the immigrant as an agent-of-change is situated in this nexus, and the 
trope is palimpsest in the text. 
 
Marlene’s experiences as a new immigrant were more pleasant than those of some 
of the other women in this study. Marlene was twenty years old when she 
immigrated here in the early 1980s with her parents and sister. She said that when 
she arrived in Perth she found the Australians, “Great, very, very friendly. 
Extremely friendly and helpful.” She gave the example that, although the family 
knew no one here, their house was fully furnished by everybody else—
Australians and ex-Rhodesians:  
Marlene: We had nothing because our furniture hadn’t arrived or anything. People lent us 
dinner sets, beds, furniture, everything until our furniture arrived. So, there was this huge 
amount of trust in us, which we found unbelievable because I don’t know if we would 
have done the same for them in Africa 
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I find it curious that Marlene was dubious about ‘trust’ not being available to 
Australians had they been immigrants to Africa and consider that, perhaps, her 
perception is due to the stereotyping, common in Zimbabwe and South Africa, of 
Australians being criminally inclined, a stereotype brought about, I suspect, no 
doubt because of white Australian antecedents as a convict colony and the 
suspicion of atavistic behaviour that are sometimes attached to the tendency to 
stereotype.  
 
However, Marlene’s experience shows that there may be some kind of 
approbation prior to the attribution of otherness and, when first immigrating to 
Australia, many of us see reflected in the white Anglo-Australian white people 
similar to those in the home country; and white Anglo-Australian may see an 
(approved) reflection of themselves in us. After all, the physical differences are 
not marked—there is no distinguishing racial feature and we speak the same 
language. The notion of ‘othering’ is not, as I have pointed out in the course of 
this chapter, one sided. Clearly, the white Rhodesian immigrant is just as likely to 
be hostile to negative aspects that she sees in the Anglo-Australian as when the 
Anglo-Australian sees the metaphorical non-reversed image of herself in the 
immigrant. Therefore, when we recognise in ourselves the same characteristics 
that we despise in others, we may very likely react by shunning the person, or 
people, who reflect that part of us. For when we see reflected traits that we may 
deny in ourselves because of the ‘self-as-symmetrical’ neurosis, it is conceivable 
that feelings of animosity and hostility emerge and the doxa is challenged—a 
silent heterodoxy. I believe that these feelings, which may become actions or 
words, are activated in defence of the doxa, i.e. the unquestioned acceptance of    
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the perceived natural order—the self-evident or, by my explication, the self-as-
symmetrical. And, pursuing this thread, I invoke Bourdieu’s interpretation of 
orthodoxy, (the defence of the doxa) that may take the forms of exclusion and 
resentment against the unwitting perpetrator; and, I suggest that the beginning of 
the ‘othering’ of those that are so similar is located in the defence of the doxa, i.e 
the orthodoxy.  
 
So, if my hypothesis is sound, where and when does the schism become apparent? 
I would argue that, when aspects of the ‘reflected image’ (either the immigrant by 
the Australian or the Australian by the immigrant) are seen as arrogant, racist, 
criminal or, perhaps, indolent, we see the reflection of an aspect of ourselves that 
is disturbing. Drawing again from Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage in a child’s 
development being formative of the function of the I, we become used to seeing 
ourselves in a certain way—symmetrical and, to a certain extent, faultless—and 
now, in this stranger, we see (and recognise, albeit probably, without awareness) 
the reflection of ourselves as something else. This reflected image is not 
necessarily whether we are thin or fat, beautiful or plain, but the overall image—
the habitus; the embodied history—what people like me should look like. 
According to the literature on non-reversing mirrors, many people are thrown off 
balance the first time they see themselves, their reflection, unreversed in a True 
Mirror® (Holt, 2000; Murphy, 1999; O'Mara, 1998; Walter, 2000). Therefore, 
when we see ourselves with all of our asymmetrical flaws, as in a non-reversing 
mirror, we tend to recoil and cannot believe that it is a valid representation. I 
submit that this is the point where, in the crisis that occurs, the schism happens; 
change is signalled and otherness attributed.     
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The spiraling development, from doxa, orthodoxy, and heterodoxy to crisis and 
change, follows from the schism where otherness is (or may have been) 
attributed. The axiomatic nature of self-as-symmetrical seen as the doxa 
(unchanging, established) is shaken when the individual recognises her or himself 
in the reflection. It is, therefore, in this context that my analogy of the True 
Mirror®, the non-reversing mirror, appears as the heterodoxy—the inadvertent 
challenge to the doxa. Although these incidents of heterodoxy are, more than 
likely, latent, it is threatening to the doxa, the accepted, self-evident view. This 
manifests in the widespread reactions of hostility and resentment. Thus, following 
orthodoxy, through the spontaneous reactions of defence already mentioned, I 
believe that the challenge in the situation is implicit. The heterodoxical challenge 
lies in recognising the distortion in the notion of self-as-symmetrical and it is in 
the paradigm that a crisis occurs. It is this crisis “… that is a necessary condition 
for a questioning of doxa …” (Bourdieu, 1977, 167). The crisis that is necessary 
to question the doxa is the moment, I believe, that jolts the individual into some 
form of self-examination. In my experience, the occasions (and there may be 
many) of crisis and change are individual, solitary, and may be unremarkable in 
any discernible way; the remembrance of the process may only enter the 
awareness after deliberate reflection or, in the case of the women in my study, 
having the notion drawn to their attention and provoking self-examination. So, the 
question and answer that introduce this chapter take their place at this junction; 
“What does a true mirror do? The mirror “shows you what you look like to others 
and allows you to gain an accurate sense of yourself” (Walter in Murphy, 1999). 
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Thus, using the True Mirror® as an analogy for an event that provokes the self 
into seeing its own image/identity as asymmetrical—not the habitual, ‘taken for 
granted’ reflection in an ordinary mirror—inspires the crisis necessary for change. 
Toril Moi, in defining Bourdieu, explains the transit as from acceptance to 
challenge: “For Bourdieu, crises also provoke a redefinition of experience, giving 
rise to new forms of language. When the everyday order is challenged by an 
insurgent group, hitherto unspoken or private experience suddenly finds itself 
expressed in public, with dramatic consequences” (emphasis in original) (Moi, 
1991, 1027). The trope of migrants as agents-of-change anticipates some of the 
extensive changes that have occurred in the two decades since I immigrated to 
Australia. I arrived in Western Australia in 1982. In my first place of employment 
(The University of Western Australia), I was ostracised by some of the employees 
(Anglo-Australians) who chose to see me as an advantaged white supremacist, 
personally responsible for apartheid, discrimination, and exploiting the black 
Rhodesians. And, in a less general sense, I was guilty of some of those things but, 
in my defence, I had come to see the inequities and injustices inherent in white 
supremacist rule and, as best I understood, had made amends. My ‘excuses’ for 
being a white Rhodesian went unheard for, each time I approached this elite and 
sanctimonious group, they would exit or turn their backs on me!  
 
However, since I have lived in Western Australia, attitudes have changed. The 
self-as-symmetrical/faultless image that (to me) was so prevalent in the early 
1980s has shifted. Nowadays I find that many Anglo-Australians recognise that 
they do not have an unblemished record in inter-race relations; that the situation 
of the Aboriginal people constitutes—and continues as—a social and political    
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disgrace. On reflection, the Anglo-Australian descent from the moral high ground 
of inter-race relations has had the effect of easing my personal process through 
the rites of passage. Somehow it is a less formidable challenge to integrate into a 
society where I do not have to perform the role of compliance inherent in my 
explication of assimilation, and apologise for being who I am and/or who I was. 
The descent from the moral high ground is compounded in the continuing refugee 
crisis that began with the Tampa incident in 2002, and I believe that it has brought 
about some self-examination by Australian society. The cynical exploitation of 
the situation as a political exercise has been widely discussed—praised by many 
and condemned by some. To relate this to Bourdieu’s theory there are, in the 
propensity for the subject to be denied, shades of a doxic attitude that will not 
allow exposure, and I submit that this is, in effect, fear of change. Orthodoxy (the 
defence of doxa) is, in this context, manifest: as Bourdieu comments “… the 
official way of speaking and thinking the world, conceals another, more radical 
censorship: the overt opposition between “right” opinion and “left” or “wrong”  
opinion, which delimits the universe of possible discourse, be it legitimate or 
illegitimate …” (emphasis in original) (Bourdieu, 1977, 169). The continuation of 
the refugee story may, very well, support the successive components of 
Bourdieu’s theory, that is, heterodoxy, crisis and change. However, it appears that 
the metaphor of a spiral that I have used previously is still appropriate, as all the 
elements theorised by Bourdieu appear to be taking place concurrently.  
 
When an individual faces a metaphorical True Mirror® as an adult and 
asymmetries are recognised or become apparent, for many people there is a 
moment of disequilibrium. In my own experience, I remember a moment of crisis    
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that made me question and reflect on my identity, my image of myself, as a white 
woman and a member of a minority ethnic group, in Rhodesia. This event took 
place nearly thirty years ago, in 1976, on a tourist bus in Greece—somewhere 
between Athens and Delphi. The poignancy of the experience is sharp, even in 
memory, even after three decades. An Austrian man sitting next to me on the bus 
was highly skeptical that any white people who were not of British origin or close 
descent had settled in Rhodesia. I remember how hostile and defensive I felt that 
this stranger could, so arbitrarily, dismiss my background. This bewildering sense 
of being unseen, feeling unseen, is an experience Adrienne Rich expresses as 
psychic disequilibrium: “When someone ... describes the world and you are not in 
it, there is a moment of psychic disequilibrium, as if you looked into a mirror and 
saw nothing” (in Rosaldo, 1989, ix). So, this remembered experience of mine 
goes beyond the reflected image in a non-reversing mirror being asymmetrical—
to there being no image at all—invisible. However, the experience of not being 
seen, or seeing oneself differently than expected, seems to segue here because 
there is an image and the image is of another, the other. And, in this there is a 
further disequilibrium and apprehension, even terror; with apologies to the 
cartoon character, Pogo, “I have seen the enemy and she is us”. 
 
In the imbrication of the two theories defined above; Lacan’s mirror stage as 
formative of the function of the I, and Bourdieu’s doxic quintet; I have interpreted 
the axiomatic, self-as-symmetrical as fabricating an illusory justification to 
attribute otherness where asymmetry is observed. It is, therefore, the unpleasant, 
uncomfortable recognition of the asymmetry of self in the reflection that 
engenders—or provokes—the attribution of otherness. The attribution of    
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otherness has not been examined as one-sided; that is, Anglo-Australian to white 
immigrant, and the theme has been developed to incorporate the inversion of 
attribution. The question of Australians stereotyping white Southern African 
immigrants and Southern Africans stereotyping white Australians has been 
discussed as the point of inverting the reflected image (of self) in the True 
Mirror®. The recognition of the asymmetry of self when this process of inversion 
occurs seems to engender an approval of asymmetry that permits approbation. I 
have situated the process in (and as) a moveable place where the initiate becomes 
the liminal persona in the rites de passage. With the use of the analogy of the 
True Mirror®, as a site for self-examination, seeing ourselves as we are, or how 
we appear to others, I reflect that the consequences may be unexpected. The 
continuation of Bourdieu’s concepts of doxa, orthodoxy, heterodoxy, crisis and 
change, allowed me to see as palimpsest, the nuances of migrant women as 
agents-of-change—in the microcosm, tempered by the major changes in social 
and political Australian society wrought by immigration. It is awareness of the 
self in the ‘other’ that leads to assimilation and, finally, integration—and the 
discovery needs to be reciprocal between immigrant and native. Thus, recognition 
of the substance of change as a fragment, or fragments, in the bricolage that is this 
society has been, and is, initiated by immigrants from many lands. The 
subsequent modification and reshaping of the way of life and cultural 
development in Australia becomes, in this event, a dense and complex mosaic of 
colour and beauty. And it is in this mosaic that the boundaries between the three 
sections rites of passage are concealed.  
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Chapter Six 
 
 
 
 
The Ambivalent Neophyte 
 
 
After the Russian invasion in 1938, since they [the Hungarians] had no inkling of 
communism’s eventual end [they] believed they were “inhabiting an infinity 
(Kundera, 2002, 13). 
 
But to emigrate is always to dismantle the center of the world, and so to move 
into a lost, disoriented one of fragments (Berger, 1984, 57). 
 
This section begins with a chapter that explores the central stage of the rites de 
passage, and habitus (as embodied history) in the context of migration. The nexus 
between rites de passage and Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus becomes the 
locus for the discovery of minimal differences—minimal but significant in the 
justification of my thesis. The notion of the immigrant as a liminal persona and 
what separates her (as neophyte) from the Anglo-Australian becomes the 
metaphorical province of the arcane procedures of rites de passage. Notions of 
research methods and methodology arise in this context and are examined as an 
integral part of the overall work. The interrelationship of the actuality of the work 
and the procedure of writing the thesis, in this central chapter, become visible. So,    
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it is here that, once again, there are glimpses of the history behind the thesis, the 
writing of the thesis and where, once again, the scaffolding supporting the 
structure of the thesis becomes apparent. In their revelation is the discovery of the 
semi-separated and occult triptych, the fragmented and detailed tesserae that 
make up the aggregated mosaic within which the sections of rites de passage are 
concealed. And it is the recognition of this section of the mosaic that becomes the 
(transient/incessant) moment of moving into the next stage of the rites de 
passage. In the broad structuring of this work as triptych I find it is the 
interconnection and interaction of embodied history and the stage in the rites de 
passage described as liminal, that sustain this, the central panel. The left panel 
(process/separation) and the right panel (incorporation/integration) of the triptych 
are indistinct when the lens is directed at the centre. Nevertheless, the nuances of 
past memory and prescience that they cast over this, the central panel, 
shade/shadow the work. The processes of transformation/metamorphosis or 
metanoia that reshape and modify identity and life/worldview protrude from both 
the left and right panels. I repeat that the stylistic idiosyncrasy, the passage 
between words and worlds, is indicated by the use of a slanting line—a forward 
slash—and that forward slash situates me as the author. I discover the use of 
textual symbols is not an entirely original concept because Nikos Papastergiadis 
has used the hyphen as a bridge; he has used the hyphen to indicate a cut in the 
time of transition and he designates this use when he writes of migration and 
identity in Greek-Australian literature (Papastergiadis, 1992, 149).  
 
To continue the metaphor that compares the migration experience of an adult to 
the transplanting of a mature tree, it is here in the liminal stage that, once the    
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transplanted tree is in place, the gardener finds the pared back root system takes 
time to adjust to the new conditions, to reach down into the earth for nourishment 
and stability. In this time the foliage of the tree may suffer and droop so that the 
branches must be trimmed back before, in due time, the whole tree starts to regain 
health and the promise of further development. And here, inhabiting the infinity 
of the limen, Kundera’s quotation at the start of this chapter is manifest. 
 
I continue to meld the historical and contemporary and the masculine and 
feminine interpretations of rites de passage. As these coalesce, there is the 
discovery that the differences (in interpretation), while minimal, begin to inform 
the discord that small differences can generate. This is reflected in the explication 
of where the minimal differences may occasion conflict between white, English-
speaking immigrants and white, English-speaking locally-born Australians. The 
overall structure of the thesis as a metaphorical triptych is not lost, because, in the 
feminine model, rites of passage tend also to follow a threefold pattern (Rutter, 
1994, passim). I reiterate that these parts consist of “enclosure, metamorphosis (or 
magnification), and emergence” (Flinders, 1998, 152), and this feminine/feminist 
contribution to rites of passage is, as I have already indicated, not entirely distinct 
from the male initiation patterns of separation, liminality (transition), and 
[re]incorporation but, in broadening the theory to incorporate these terms, I 
believe these feminist inspired nuances tend to colour this work with a deeper 
hue. In reworking the suggestion that as immigrants we “… become a metonymy 
of [my] past” and, that as immigrants, we “… [grow] a second skin wrapped 
around my self another self” (Kamboureli in Gunew, 1993b), the magnification or 
metamorphosis period evokes the notion of pentimento, where the second skin is    
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scraped away to show “my self”. The image presents itself that the ‘second skin’ 
is, indeed, the chrysalid process of the imago in metamorphosis. 
 
The chapter continues as the women in the study begin to find their placement in 
Australia balanced with (and/or against) their previous placement in Rhodesia 
(and/or Zimbabwe). I consider the impact of inconsistencies in the pre-liminal 
identity on their liminal identity as they struggle to find separation and acquire 
‘legitimate’ Australian identity. There are, in this sphere, flashbacks to life in 
colonial Rhodesia that serve to augment the experience in Australia and, as I have 
flagged in the introduction to this thesis, I examine the likely causes for isolation 
and sometimes self-isolating behaviour relating it here to the seclusion that is part 
of “…[the] rites of preparation for union …” (van Gennep, 1960, 21) in some 
traditional initiation practices. 
 
In his identification of rites de passage, Arnold van Gennep discusses the 
‘Territorial Passage’ and in the language of the day (early twentieth century) 
remarks that only ‘semicivilized tribes’ indulge in any form of rites de passage. 
He writes of the “…symbolic and spatial area of transition [that] may be found in 
more or less pronounced form in all the ceremonies which accompany the passage 
from one social and magico-religious position to another” (van Gennep, 1960, 
18). The semantics of van Gennep’s words give me the opportunity to illuminate 
some of the processes undertaken in researching and writing this thesis. In this 
chapter, as I discuss the “mixing up the field with my life” (Behar and Gordon, 
1995, 77), I extrapolate from the notion of ‘semicivilized tribes’ to my own 
experience of researcher, author, and subject.    
157
 
 
Having explored the initial stages of separation, peeling away layers of history 
and narrative, to come to this point of the migratory process allows me the space 
where I can, again, refine the distinction between assimilation and integration; the 
liminal stage being conducive to assimilation in the meaning that I give it. In the 
enigmatic passages of liminality I introduce another twist to the notion of 
assimilation and this repeated defining and refining of the terms ‘assimilation’ 
and ‘integration’ continues in the final stages of the rites de passage, 
incorporation/emergence. There is an intersection within this discourse that 
allows me to connect the liminal with the notion of habitus as embodied history. 
Working with theories of assimilation as mimicry and as a performance of 
compliance—the mimicry used as a method of camouflage—enables the process 
to loop around to touch on the temporal features (and the lack of paradigm) of this 
stage of rites de passage. In this context, I choose to use the analogy of Times 
Arrow (the second law of thermodynamics: whereby increasing entropy is seen as 
being inevitable) and this influences my examination of the lack of a temporal 
paradigm. The theory underlying Times Arrow is associated with the flexibility I 
attribute to time in the liminal/transformation period. Thus, time, problematised 
and fragmented, reflects the metaphor of mosaic and segues into this panel of the 
triptych.  
 
The notion of passages within passages, where the liminal persona may be seen as 
neophyte/novitiate and integrant within the same space, gives me the scope to 
yield to the metaphors of mosaic, palimpsest and bricolage. The focus on the 
minutiae that I consider essential to this work becomes intense as separate tessera    
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are examined. It is in the liminal, a place so astutely described by Victor Turner 
as being ‘betwixt-and-between’, that we intersect, subjectively, with the marginal 
spaces I have discussed in the preceding chapters and, as in that context, the 
liminal as marginal is a place to observe the centre. Indeed, by drawing a bead on 
the limen and the margin I am not breaking new ground. Victor Turner’s 
comment that, “If our basic model of society is that of a “structure of positions,” 
we must regard the period of the margin or “liminality” as an interstructural 
situation” (Turner, 1979, 234), and this ‘interstructural situation’ can be read in a 
variety of ways. The model of society we use to position ourselves places the 
transitional persona in an alternative interval, that is, not (yet) part of the society. 
Further, while the limen is marginal (to society), it is central to itself and in the 
internal, interstructural positioning, the neophyte may sometimes be perceived as 
being supraliminal. However, the threshold being negotiated in this rites de 
passage is formless and that which is ‘within’, that which is being 
‘structured/shaped’ is mysterious and invisible/intangible; indeed, Turner 
describes this transitional interval as being, “… structurally, if not physically, 
‘invisible.’”(Turner, 1979, 235), and the awareness of the novitiate may not be 
activated, the limen remaining concealed. Thus, I uncover the thresholds within 
thresholds, the passages within passages, and margins within margins—these 
spaces identify the esoteric (and often solitary) bewilderment of negotiating 
liminality.  
 
The liminal stages in rites of passage, as presented by Victor Turner and Arnold 
van Gennep (Turner, Victor, 1977c; Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982; van Gennep, 
1960) are mostly based in the ritual ceremonies of tribal peoples. Certainly, in    
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Victor Turner’s examination of Ndembu puberty rites there is often physical 
modification (for example, circumcision) and a degree of isolating the neophytes 
for long periods without clothing, and sometimes without food (Turner, Victor, 
1977b, passim). To connect these examples of symbolic and ritual procedures to 
the immigrants in this work, I rely on the metaphorical context. Therefore, while 
there is no overlord or elder decreeing physical modification, cold nights in a 
lonely shelter, or even ceremonial dances round a campfire for us as immigrants 
and liminal personae, there may indeed be an experience of cold nights in a 
lonely shelter but in this context it is metaphorical. The physical modification is 
not self-conscious but may be self-imposed—the habitus, the embodied history 
that, on an arcane level, may need to be adjusted, and readjusted, before the 
liminal persona—the transitional-being—is allowed to integrate successfully into 
the host society. I have already indicated in the previous chapter that the 
adjustment of embodied history may, indeed, be shaped by imitation (or the 
mirrored reflection) of the host by the immigrant, and the reverse is also relevant 
vis-a-vis the immigrant as an agent of change. Within the movements between 
separation, limen, and integration, there is a fluctuation in self-identity and 
identity of self as belonging in the new society. This movement is recognisable as 
that of “not-boy-not-man” (Turner, 1979, 235) in the traditional model of 
initiation rites; thus, not-Rhodesian-not-Australian in my hypothesis. 
 
The possibility of developing a feeling of belonging in the liminal period of rites 
de passage seems not only to be a requisite for becoming integrated into a new 
country, but also for maintaining a ‘personal’ sense of identity through this 
‘betwixt-and-between’ stage. After the initial shock of arriving in a new society,    
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stepping onto the metaphorical threshold, one of the first sensations felt is that ‘I 
don’t fit in, I don’t belong’. The layering of personal narrative with the view 
expressed by psychologists Grinberg and Grinberg is indicated by the comment, 
“The migrators (sic) experience accentuates for a time the feeling of not 
belonging. One ceases to belong to the world one left behind and does not yet 
belong to the world in which one has newly arrived” (1989, 23). And, in this 
phrase, is the suggestion of the metaphorical doorway that the liminal period 
represents. Indeed, the root of the word ‘liminality’ is limen, from the Latin for 
threshold. Therefore, Victor Turner’s notion of liminal time being a time of 
“betwixt-and-between” is appropriate in the psychological sense. The often 
enchanted meaning attributed to doors, to the limen, both mystifies and attracts. 
Opening a closed door or closing an open door seems intriguing even to a small 
child; the frisson of excitement that accompanies crossing the threshold of a new 
home, a new job, or into a new country, is loaded with implications. What lies 
beyond the doorway can only be discovered by stepping through it, “… doors are 
the beginning of ends, as evident in the etymology of “limit” and “threshold,” 
which both refer to the limen of the door” (Metcalfe, 2000). And this, as a 
metaphor, reveals that the liminal stage is (only) a passage from one place to 
another, but what mystery, what excitement, what challenges, take up that space. 
The enchantment associated with the liminal persona is equally arcane. Victor 
Turner writes, “The symbolism attached to and surrounding the liminal persona is 
complex and bizarre” (Turner, 1979, 235). Thus, the combination of mysterious 
space and “complex and bizarre” identity foreshadows a conflict/tension between 
existential and metempirical processes, particularly in the context of liminal 
personae who are unconscious of their role. To become supraliminal, or aware, in    
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the role of liminal persona is something that may take place spontaneously or 
may be searched for by different methods. 
 
At the deepest level, change or transformation in therapy involves an experience 
of death and rebirth: the death or sacrifice of an old way of being that allows a 
new way to be born (Rutter, 1994, 89). 
 
The interpretation of the mysterious ‘middle’ period in the transformation from 
neophyte/novitiate to integrant given by the feminist psychotherapist, Virginia 
Beane Rutter, is that of metamorphosis. Some neophytes/immigrants, choose to 
take the route of psychotherapy to ease the symptoms of initiation, and have for 
their initiator, or mentor, a professional therapist, who in the traditional model of 
rites of passage would be an ‘adept’, an ‘elder’, or an ‘instructor’. The instructor 
is, according to Victor Turner, part of the “interstructural character” of the liminal 
and is often authoritative. The instructor in these models often has “… complete 
authority and complete submission” and “… is in a sense the personification of 
the self-evident authority of tradition” (Turner, 1979, 237). In the case of a 
woman undergoing therapy to facilitate her movement through the liminal, the 
role of the therapist is, in my experience, more likely to be that of a guide. In 
viewing the liminal period as existential, the choice of a professional guide 
through the modification period may seem paradoxical but I, personally, have 
found the process of transformation becomes extraordinarily profound and, 
through developing awareness of the process when assisted by the therapist, the 
experience is enhanced and becomes something in which to take delight, 
something to be enjoyed. The tension between what is empirical/existential and 
what is (in a manner of speaking) metempirical remains but the more vividly the    
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metanoia is perceived, the deeper the experience. And, it is in this and from this 
self-proclaimed, self-positioned vulnerable space of an acolyte, seeking guidance 
in transformation, that I am able to sufficiently access the methods and experience 
of researching this thesis and to present it in a transparent, conscious way. 
 
Foolish, foolish is the anthropologist who mixes up the field with her life (Behar, 
1995, 77). 
 
Van Gennep’s statement regarding rites de passage being limited to 
‘semicivilized tribes’ throws into relief my participation in my own research as 
subject. Conventionally, ethnological research was done ‘to’ people, holding them 
under a magnifying glass so-to-speak, and giving the ethnologist or 
anthropologist what Donna Haraway calls the “… power to see and not be seen, 
to represent while escaping representation … the god trick of seeing everything 
from nowhere …” (Haraway, 1991, 581). This is why, and how, the total 
authority for the work remained lodged with the researcher and (his) 
interpretation, (his) voice, (his) analysis. Whereas, approaching my work from the 
point of view of feminist social research, I tend to look at myself as a member of 
the ‘semicivilized tribes’ spoken about by van Gennep and endeavour to hold the 
magnifying glass up, just as closely, to myself. I reiterate the three goals for 
feminist ethnography as described by Shulamit Reinharz, “(1) to document the 
lives and activities of women, (2) to understand the experience of women from 
their own point of view, and (3) to conceptualize women’s behaviour as an 
expression of social context” (Reinharz and Davidman, 1992, 51). Therefore, as is 
evident throughout the work, I am incorporated in the research, it is as much 
about me as about the women with whom I am working and I restate the    
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autobiographical content of this work. Thus, this liminal stage of the rites de 
passage becomes not only a voyage of self-discovery, but also a quest into 
memory and history. 
 
For the white, English-speaking woman from southern Africa, the ambivalence of 
immigration is compounded, somehow, by the lack of physical and visible 
cultural markers. Sometimes, when we first arrive in Australia, we white women 
from Rhodesia are not recognised as immigrants. There is an 
expectation/assumption that we understand the language, the cultural mores, and 
are often identified as ‘Australians’ before we know what that identity entails. 
There is an equivocation around the notion of identity that develops in this 
context. I ponder the question: is the source of this confusion of identity being 
[mis]-taken for an Australian before our liminal, the central stage in the rites de 
passage, is completed? Being in a position of not knowing your position is where 
the shaky ground of liminality tends to be disconcerting and turbulent and, in 
peripheral vision, can feel like being situated in an etching by M C Escher; doors 
open onto themselves and passages bring you back to those same doors. For 
example, it was my experience that, having been spatially adept for left and right 
when I lived in Africa, when I arrived in Australia the capability of knowing left 
from right vanished, and only returned many years later but much diminished. 
Ironically, when I return to Africa my confusion is with the points of the compass, 
and knowing left from right returns. In the centre of the central stage and being a 
liminal  persona these small idiosyncrasies add to the differences that are not 
physically apparent and, in addition, they shape self-identity in an indirect way. 
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It is, however, the lack of markers of cultural identity in our physical appearance 
and occasionally in our language that is, perhaps, the cause of the unexpressed 
hostility felt by some white Australians toward us—and vice versa. And, it is this 
locale of minor difference that requires, I believe, the acknowledgment that we 
are in a state of transition. From whom does the acknowledgment come? The 
concealed nature of the liminal process for immigrants in contemporary Australia 
means acknowledgment needs to be sought. For acknowledgment to be sought, 
the liminal persona needs to be aware of the process, and therein lies the 
dilemma. Cultural differences, albeit small, shape our transformation and, 
exponentially, shape our transformational identities; so, within this incremental 
negotiation/drama of change the acknowledgment may need to be generated from 
the self. Therefore, as the (conscious or unconscious) search for acknowledgment 
transpires, the minimal cultural differences of the immigrant begin to emerge 
(with nuances reminiscent of pentimento) and with this, the evolution of 
identification-of-self in the new society. 
 
How do elusive cultural differences shape personal identities within a ‘different’ 
society? As I mention in the introduction, sometimes we are recognised as 
different when we speak, but this is an unreliable marker. Sneja Gunew, in her 
essay on multiculturalism comments on the use of language [and/or accent]; she 
writes, “… [it] is certainly often a signifier of cultural authenticity” (Gunew, 
1990, 112), but in the case of my research sample, where the cultural authenticity 
is ambiguous, and is perhaps isogenous, this needs to be qualified: not every 
Australian has an ear for accents, and many white ex-Rhodesian women have 
English or indefinable accents. This is where the Bourdieuian concept of habitus    
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as  embodied knowledge and the Bakhtinian concept of heteroglossia (as 
previously defined) begin to prove useful in interpreting the elusive qualities of 
minimal difference. It is in the examination of linguistic patterns (i.e accent) and 
cultural and behavioural patterns where, possibly, the imbrication of assimilation, 
mimicry, and camouflage occurs. The transformation from ex-Rhodesian to 
Australian, in other words the liminal stage, is where these intangible features 
may be thrown into relief and become visible. And, in exploring this, I find, 
again, that the efforts to assimilate may not be what they seem.  
 
I return to my use of the word ‘assimilate’, which needs to be defined further in 
the context of my hypothesis. The unravelling of the word assimilation by 
defining and redefining, serves to emphasise the significance of these immigrants’ 
experiences moving into the Australian culture, and is, therefore, closely linked to 
the liminal period in rites de passage. Assimilation is, I believe, a necessary part 
of the immigrants’ rites de passage and precedes integration. Integration is what 
happens when the liminal stage is successfully completed (if it ever is), and is the 
third stage, the ‘aggregation’ or ‘incorporation’ stage of rites de passage. My 
preference for the use of the word ‘assimilation’ in the context of the liminal stage 
lies in the anarchic subtext that I discern; that is, the ‘practice’ of assimilation as a 
performance of compliance. Sometimes, assimilation as the performance of 
compliance, may take the shape of camouflage. There are two ways of 
considering camouflage; in the first place it can be a way of disguising oneself to 
deceive, and secondly as hiding by rendering oneself indistinguishable from the 
background. Taking both of these meanings as accurate, it is this performance that 
camouflages the anarchic potential of compliance/assimilation. The adoption of    
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language and behaviour that is not necessarily habitual is, in the definition of 
compliance, because the individual “… expects to gain specific rewards or 
approval and avoid specific punishments or disapproval by conforming” (Kelman, 
1958, 53). Therefore, the performance of compliance is, as I have suggested 
earlier, a (sometimes necessary) camouflage; a role played by the immigrant for 
expedient social survival. In other words, the performance of compliance (as 
assimilation) may be seen as camouflage in the liminal environment. Thus, 
assimilation in this sense becomes a [self]justification for a sense of belonging, a 
convenience, and a strategy for social survival and, as I have already argued in the 
process of defining assimilation, there are implications of anarchy embedded in 
the actor’s (immigrant’s) role. The recognition that one needs to comply to 
survive is a moment of clarity in this stage; indeed, it is one of the defining 
moments in liminality. I have already quoted Marlene, one of my participants, 
who told me, “you just have to change, to fit in, to blend in, to become part of our 
new home …You have to behave in this way or that way so that you don’t stand 
out, so that you don’t attract attention” (pages 124 and 125). The nuances and the 
implications of camouflage are indisputable in her words. 
 
To foreground notions of camouflage as a tool of expediency in personal survival, 
and habitus as embodied history in the liminal stage; and evolving my defining of 
the difference between assimilation and integration, I recognise that the liminal 
immigrant has an element of clandestine secrecy or deceit about her. This is 
unmistakable in the definition of camouflage in the previous paragraph as ‘a way 
of disguising oneself to deceive’; and is closely linked with self-attributed    
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identity. This trope has been examined in the preceding sub-chapter, Identity II: 
True Mirrors, devoted to reflected self-image and non-reversing mirrors. 
 
Popular ingenuity is often invisible. Occasionally, when gathered into 
political action, it becomes visible. The rest of the time it is used daily 
for clandestine personal survival at the practical level of dodging, 
picking up, hustling: and at the psychic level of turning in circles in 
order to preserve one’s identity (Berger, 1984, 63).  
 
I recognise that, once again, I am talking about the difference between integration 
and assimilation especially cognisant of my notion of assimilation as anarchic. In 
the passage quoted above, Berger, calls it ‘ingenuity’ but I read it as how a person 
‘is’, for expedient survival. It is the word ‘visible’ that nudges the notion of 
image. To me, ‘visible’ sounds like an image, maybe a reflection. This doubled, 
indeed trebled, reflecting of the textual, the actual, and the structural has been 
explored in the preceding sub-section, Identity II: True Mirrors, and linked to 
notions of self-symmetry. These enigmatic tesserae of text reinforce in my mind 
the connotations of mimesis within that theory, thus augmenting the anarchic 
constituent inherent in this theme.  
 
The notion of the performance of compliance raises the question; how do I 
explore the element of performance in mimicry of the host nation (Australia) to 
hasten the process of integration (i.e. the third stage of rites de passage 
‘incorporation’, ‘aggregation’) when I enact the performance myself? I ask myself 
the recurring question, “who are the ‘real’ Australians that I am attempting to 
mimic?” When I take on the role of ‘Australian’ by imitating the accent, I know 
that I am acting/pretending. Being a real Australian only seems to happen when I    
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am with people who are less Australian than I am—other, more recent 
immigrants. So, speaking with an Aussie accent for example, may deceive some 
people, but real Australians ‘from the bush’ will know that I am a fake! I consider 
the migrant women in my study and find none of them has an Australian accent.  
 
I have already flagged that an integral part of the research for this thesis has been 
the participation of Robin, my Australian-born colleague, who has helped me 
with transcribing one of the interviews on to a floppy disc. Robin has, in addition, 
provided me with commentary on many of the topics and themes I have 
researched. It was Robin’s ambiguous feelings about ‘translating’ the transcript, 
and her explanation of her own indeterminate reading of the dialogue—that is, in 
interpreting the Rhodesian accent on the tapes—that led me to explore Bakhtin’s 
theory of heteroglossia. At first I saw Robin’s [mis]transcription as a 
complication hindering my research and I was oblivious to the significance of her 
mis-translations. I began to re-transcribe the tape myself, and it was only after I 
had almost completed the exercise that I mentioned what had happened to my 
supervisor, Dr de Reuck. She immediately saw the richness in the episode and 
pointed out the possibilities it held for my study. Armed with Dr de Reuck’s 
encouragement and a list of potential readings, I enthusiastically began my 
exploration of heteroglossia, and considered how I would be able to use the 
theory in this dissertation. In an email to Barbara, my colleague in Melbourne, I 
told her about how the event impacted in the construction of this thesis, and 
further, how it illuminated my perceptions of how small differences—in accents 
and meaning—can contain such extraordinary misunderstanding. By writing 
about the incident to Barbara I was able to begin unpacking and teasing out the    
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theory and, consequently, to clarify my use of the term heteroglossia in the 
interpretation and analysis of the research – stated and unstated. The examples I 
use of the mis-translations are unearthed from re-listening to the taped interview 
and my unreliable memory as I re-read the transcription. I reiterate, that the 
methods I use are transparent and reveal through the narrative and in the text, 
images designed/devised to intensify the work. 
Eleanor, October 1999:  
Funnily enough, I think I’ve got the handle on heteroglossia, but only if I make a picture 
in my mind! The connection with my thesis is that (and this is the explanation) I talk 
from my history—all the voices, experiences, knowledge that are mine and rooted in my 
culture and in my own psyche. The Australian hears to me from her same place—from 
her history, voices, experiences and knowledge. So, is she hearing what I am saying (and 
vice versa of course) or is she hearing and understanding something not very like what 
I’m saying at all? This goes beyond slang terms, local words etc. What brought it home 
to me was, I think I told you, when Robin my Aussie friend was helping me with the 
transcribing. When I went through the tape she had transcribed I was amazed at the 
understanding she had of it, and the words (and meanings) she had changed to ones she 
could understand from her own experience, minor words usually – but also when we 
[Betty and I] were talking about the attitude of Australians to immigrants and how the 
education system in Rhodesia differed from the Australian – things like that. Her words 
fitted but changed the whole slant of the topic (Personal Email). 
 
When I listen again to the tape I am surprised at how similar Betty’s voice sounds 
to mine and perceive that would be an additional confusion for Robin. I discover 
an unexpected aspect to the transcription when I hear and read it now, and this 
subtle example is an illustration: Betty said “Martin left three months ahead of 
me” and Robin transcribed “Martin came three months ahead of me” and I realise 
that that is indicative of Australia being Robin’s home, therefore the migrant 
comes in—whereas Betty is leaving her home and that is where she left. Again, 
after living in Perth for a year Betty heard that her husband had been transferred 
to Kojonup; she said, “in this time we had found a house which we bought” and 
Robin heard it as: “in this town we had found a house which we bought”, thereby 
moving Betty to Kojonup before she even knew where it was as is evinced in this    
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excerpt: Betty: I said to Martin, ‘where is Kojonup?’ He said ‘I don’t know, we 
will have to look at the map’”. On another occasion I asked Betty about making 
friends in Australia and to ascertain her reply I said, “… and they were Aussie 
women?” Robin transcribed this as “… and they were older women?” and I have 
reproduced the error in this dissertation where I’ve used the quote.
i Another 
example is an excerpt where Betty’s husband decided to invite the partners in the 
law firm to dinner. I hear the dialogue like this:  
Betty: Martin came home and said, ‘you will have to get the partners around [for 
dinner]’. And they came and we gave them dinner but they never asked us back, and I 
found that really strange. I think they were so busy, themselves, to even stop and think 
what it must be like for someone to transplant to a completely new environment, leave 
everything behind, and start again. 
Robin heard something similar but where Betty mentioned the partners being “so 
busy, themselves,” Robin inserted “with themselves”, and that does give the 
incident a different meaning. There is another reason that I have used the above 
quotation, and that pertains to notions of assimilation. The connection between 
assimilation and food was brought to my attention when I researched the literature 
in preparation for this chapter. In a critique of the 1950s film No Strangers Here, 
produced by the Department of Immigration, Sneja Gunew comments: “The film 
signals assimilation in certain ways, notably linking it to the digestive model from 
which the term derives” (Gunew, 1999, 146). So, by using this meaning of 
assimilation allegorically the (unreciprocated) dinner party held by Betty and 
Martin, was an unconscious attempt to assimilate and the allegory lends support 
to my notion of assimilation as a precursor to integration and not as a form of 
integration itself. Ironically, during the interview Betty told me about an occasion 
when she was teaching; how she mis-understood an Australian accent. She said: 
“We both appeared to be speaking English but we were actually talking about 
something else”.    
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Then there is the linguistic component; eminent linguist, B. L. Whorf has 
commented on the affinities between cultural and behavioural norms and 
linguistic patterns (Whorf, 1941, 78). His comment relates to large-scale 
linguistic patterns but, drawing on the observations in this research, and the 
examination in the previous paragraphs, the link to the way I use heteroglossia 
and habitus becomes clear. If it is the difference in our patterns of speech, our 
behavioural norms, and the way in which we comport ourselves, then this time of 
metamorphosis, of being betwixt-and-between is, undeniably, a time of 
transformation that touches the essence of our identity. Not only do we change the 
way we move, initially perhaps for reasons of camouflage and deceit; we may 
begin to change the way we think—perhaps because our memories of previous 
homes, previous experiences, move to the background; and we also, unwittingly, 
begin to change the way we view the world. If this reflection is fitting, it is in this 
indistinct frame of liminality that the transformation from immigrant to integrant 
begins, and begins to end. 
 
“Philosophy is really homesickness, it is the urge to be at home everywhere.” 
(Novalis). 
 
So, I ask myself, how were we placed in Rhodesia? Is our feeling for Africa any 
less because we are white? Why is it that, because of the colonial history in which 
we were involved, the validity of our feelings for our land of origin is somehow 
negated? Is this existentialist conception a relevant observation or an apparition I 
have dredged up out of my psyche, my own paranoia? Or, is the paranoia part of 
the displacement, the step into the discombobulation of the liminal stage? The    
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tendency to determine the past by present standards needs to be unpacked. The 
notions of placement and displacement, vis-a-vis Africa and Australia, are 
integral to, and complicated by, the determining that occurs during the liminal 
period. In this section of the chapter I set out to explore the placement of white 
immigrants and the reasons for their placement in Australia from their own point 
of view. The notions that surround feelings of the guilt associated with leaving 
family and friends have been covered in the preceding panel of the triptych: 
Migration and Separation: Leaving and Landing. The guilt associated with having 
lived comfortably in the colonial regime and the tacit and subliminal feelings of 
disruption, dislocation, and not belonging, seem to belong here, in the liminal 
stage. It is the fundamental placement, in an historical sense, that seems so 
insignificant until the loss of all we know as familiar leaves us to search through 
our memories for our own identity, or to construct a new identity, a legitimate 
Australian identity. And, this happens here, when we are betwixt-and-between, 
and before we know what Australian identity means—or may mean. I reiterate 
my argument from the beginning of this chapter that, in this moment the liminal 
persona is [in traditional initiation] “not-boy-not-man” (Turner, 1979, 235) and in 
my hypothesis, not-Rhodesian-not-Australian. What does the neophyte do in this 
liminal stage of the rites de passage to experience herself or himself as an 
initiate—as an Australian? Where is my Axis Mundi now; the new matrix that, as 
a liminal persona, a neophyte, and an immigrant I search for most of all? Where 
do I belong? Where am I placed? The questions continue because that is how it is 
in the liminal stage, fluid, enigmatic, and timeless. In the passages that un-
constitute the eternally inchoate liminal, the future and the past impacts on the 
novitiate. Where am I placed … now? Where did I come from … before? How    
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am I to find the way to be at home ‘everywhere’? Kristeva has commented that 
subjectivity is always constituted within dialogue, and I ask myself: What does 
that mean in the context of this thesis? I read through my journal and keep finding 
the same phrase, “What am I doing?” (Personal Journal, 2002). This subjectivity 
intrinsic to (my) personal dialogue is, perhaps, rooted in the “strategies of 
reference which throw us back into everyday conventions, into the materiality of 
how to get from here to there, from the lived to the discourse” (Probyn, 1993, 86). 
The meaning of Kristeva’s statement and my questioning of my quest, becomes 
transparent, momentarily, but then is lost again in the existential dialogue within 
my ‘self’. 
 
The confusion of guilty feelings about race and status in one form or another, is 
one of the concealed issues in the liminal stage of emigration from an ex-colonial 
country. Among many women privileged by colonialism there appears to be a 
desire to be seen to be earnest and egalitarian about race and class. The issues of 
guilt associated with leaving behind aging parents, close family and friends are 
not elided but are not addressed in this section. However, I recognise that there 
are elements of guilt associated with all of these.  
 
When I handed my supervisor an early draft of this chapter, I wrote that I was 
grieved about how much had been lost to my nieces (still living in Zimbabwe at 
that time) in the Rhodesian experience. Without much deliberation, I wrote, 
“Carol and Lauren born in 1977 and 1979, never knew Rhodesia, never knew the 
country had a white Prime Minister, a white police force, and they are adult 
women! It grieves me”. My supervisor queried this and said, “… in order not to    
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valorize ‘whiteness’ clarify what does so, [grieves me] and why, before 
continuing” (Annotation, de Reuck, Jennifer). In the following email, where my 
ex-Rhodesian friend Barbara and I discuss aspects of our perceived ‘ownership’ 
of our country of birth, the meaning I give to grieving is exemplified and 
clarified. The unforeseen repercussions of our dialogue are shaded as a sub-text in 
the thesis and surface more distinctly in the final chapter: Reprise. 
Barbara, 3 August 1999 
We had some people over for dinner, 
and one of them was talking about 
their trip to Zim and how much 
they’d enjoyed it and which camps 
they’d gone to and their black guides 
and so on and so on. And I thought: 
this is MY country they’re talking 
about and yet they ‘own’ this 
experience and what they were 
talking about seemed far more real to 
them than to me. It sounded like a 
foreign country. Which I realise it is. 
And suddenly I started feeling like a 
‘stolen child’, like they’d stolen my 
country away from me. They being 
‘the Africans’. And I felt this  
absolute incandescent RAGE about 
it. Is this how the Aboriginals feel? Is 
this how you feel? Went for my walk 
yesterday and tried to sort my head 
out on the African situation. ‘Cos I 
know how horribly racist this all 
sounds. The thing is, I don’t 
‘approve’ if that's the right word, of 
the way things were run before. But I 
sure as hell don't approve of the way 
they are now. My ‘home’ no longer 
exists. New names for everything, 
new social structure, etc. It really 
pisses me. 
 
Eleanor’s Reply 
Thanks for your email. I have similar 
feelings! Roland too. ‘They’ for me, 
are the smug, materialistic white 
Zimbos who belittle those of us who 
have moved on. The kind who told 
me when I was there in 1996, “You 
Australians (ex Rhodies) are so 
boring!” I agreed whole-heartedly 
that I was boring and didn't want this 
particular person to think of me as 
anything else. The tourists who go 
for a visit, they’ve stolen it too. The 
sad bit is, the way Zim is spoken 
about to us now (Roland and me) by 
Australian tourists, excludes us, as 
though we have no knowledge, no 
experience of it! Yet I lived there 
until I was thirty-three. But then, 
Marie will talk to me about it as 
home, as though I should know it but 
I don’t! Because the experience of 
living in Zimbabwe (where I never 
lived) is different from the 
experience of living in Rhodesia. The 
minutiae of our lives, then, has been 
erased, the rich detail deemed 
dispensable and made to seem 
corrupt. It grieves me.  
 
So, the grieving is for the loss of repetition of the cycle, the spiralling and 
intertwining of home and family; and the loss of the rich detail of our lives. The 
grieving is not for the white colonial government. The cycle that buries, erodes,    
175
 
and replaces that domestic, private arena for which I grieve, ignores the history, 
the personal history, the fragments, and the minutiae that formed the mosaic of 
our lives; prohibits them and casts them out. And we are left with our children 
and grand children not knowing great grandmother’s name, not knowing the 
matrix from which we spring. This grieves me; this and leaving the writing of 
history to those who remove the minutiae that validates our place and our identity.  
 
The ownership of how we were and of how we lived in Rhodesia segues into this. 
My supervisor annotated an early draft of this chapter saying, “Remember the 
wealth/affluence experienced by many of your subjects in their country of origins 
could be seen to have been gained by [an] exploitative/racist political regime[es] 
that owed its position to colonial oppression” (annotation, de Reuck, Jennifer). 
And it is the guilt associated with this—even by failure to act, or oversight, that I 
am implying. In religious terms, sinning by omission. Kristeva discusses, wryly I 
think, that within the notion of British subject, and I presume she includes the 
colonial and ex-colonial in this broad term, is the apparent tolerance of ethnicity 
and religion. This, she writes, “... does not invite them to share an espirit général 
but claims to respect their particularities ... [it] ends up immobilizing the latter and 
perpetuating the racial or religious wars that are shaking up the Commonwealth as 
well as the United Kingdom”. The irony is evident when she then observes that 
“... even the European integration continues to upset British political circles ...” 
(Kristeva, 1993, 12). I ponder, if the subject (British or other) speaks about 
tolerance and acts in an intolerant manner, a racist or oppressive way; is a 
characteristic of paternalism/colonialism? The answer may shape the ‘guilt by 
association’ that is tacit in some of the subjects of my study.     
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One of the changes that seems to transpire for the women comprising my study 
pertains to material belongings. Betty remarked on this subject and connected it to 
moving from Africa to Australia:  
Betty: But I suppose that’s another thing about moving away, I am terribly aware that 
material things … that I want to be comfortable, but I don’t want to be tied down now. 
Whereas, before, I think maybe material things might have meant more to me. Not 
anymore, not now. 
 
Amy and I discussed the materialist behaviour of many white people who 
remained in Zimbabwe, and their attitude toward the black Zimbabweans. When I 
reflect on our discussion, I find that it illustrates the paternalism implicit in 
colonial behaviour that continued in Zimbabwe until fairly recently and reframes 
some of the material from the separation panel of the triptych: 
Eleanor: So, as I say it’s very much based on that extraordinary materialistic colonial sort 
of thing that still exists there. 
Amy: I suppose it’s got to go on for a time anyway, because umm, if people didn’t 
continue with their servants they wouldn’t have a job would they? 
Eleanor: Well, yes sure. 
Amy: So it has got to go on. 
Eleanor: Yes, in that respect, but there are other things involved, I mean [for example] 
Marie, when she came over, it broke her heart to say goodbye to her gardener. She knew 
he had AIDS and that he wasn’t going to last long when she wasn’t there to look after 
him. She spoke to me about it and I said to her, “Look, he’s an adult. He takes 
responsibility for himself. He follows his culture”, which is how he got AIDS anyway. 
Because his brother died of AIDS, and according to Shona customs, he had to then 
marry, take his brother’s wife in, and then he would cohabit with her. Of course he got 
AIDS pretty quickly. But, because he worked for Marie, and she is very particular about 
what her servants ate and so on… Because he had good nutrition and so on. His health 
was ok when she was still there. 
 
Sarah tells me that she misses the African people. She says that when you live in 
Africa, there are always many, many people. She found her first years in country 
Western Australia bleak and lonely without the ubiquitous presence of black 
Africans. Sarah’s style of speaking reflects something that may appear to be 
offensive, however, what she is saying needs to be seen in the context of the    
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experience of colonial Africa. She tells me about the loneliness and isolation that 
she felt in the first weeks in Western Australia: 
Sarah: I’d go sometimes for days without seeing a human being. In Africa you see 
Africans, they might not have thought they were human in the old days but you saw a 
human being, or hundreds every single day of your life. I didn’t see a single human 
being. 
 
Betty said that she had felt isolated in Australia and signalled the ‘tyranny of 
distance’ as being the cause. We spoke of not having family to call on the 
occasions we might need transport, and how, in the early days it is just the 
immediate family, clinging together—and inherent in this is the isolation from the 
society in which she found herself: 
Eleanor: What it boils down to it was just the five of you. 
Betty: Yes, absolutely. 
Eleanor: Yes, I was very similar. 
Betty: We’ve all been there. And in a way we’re still there. Because sometimes Martin 
can’t do something and I need transport, [I call a] taxi and that's it.  
Eleanor: This is the sort of isolation from blood relatives, really.  
Betty: Yes, because distances are so huge we really are isolated. 
 
It is in the liminal persona, the transitional-being, that the recognition of what has 
been left behind and lost takes new meaning. In the requirements of traditional 
rites of passage, it is in this transitional (transformational) stage that the liminal 
persona is stripped of “status, property, insignia, secular clothing, rank, kinship 
position, nothing to demarcate them structurally from their fellow. Their 
condition is indeed the very prototype of sacred poverty” (Turner, 1979, 237). In 
the case of emigrants, it is often the rich trappings of history and life experience 
that are stripped away, leaving the (metaphorically) naked transitional beings to 
reclothe and reinvent themselves.  
 
Eleanor: So, you were in a position where you re-invented yourself as Betty – 
Australian?    
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Betty: Right! 
Eleanor: And Betty coping … 
Betty: … coping in Australia (Betty’s interview, April, 1999). 
 
Sometimes the leaving of status and property is manifest. When Betty arrived in 
Perth in 1981, all of her furniture and household effects were still in transit. The 
shock of arriving in Perth on a scorching hot day without belongings, save what is 
carried, and without any idea of what is in store is very much in the tradition of a 
neophyte stepping into the liminal space:  
Betty: I was jet-lagged and thought what have I come to … of course we had nothing 
except what we had in our luggage. None of the stuff had arrived. Martin had been to the 
Salvo’s, or one of the second hand op-shops, he bought mattresses, which we put on the 
floor with some sheets, they were clean, but that was it. Just while we were waiting for 
things to come. I'd bought a few plates and things with me. I hadn’t brought saucepans 
and things. We were lent one saucepan so I cooked in one saucepan I don't know how. 
 
The immigrants who arrived in Western Australia with somewhere to go, 
someone to ‘look after’ them, often family who had migrated earlier, nevertheless 
enter a liminal frame that is, to some extent, mitigated. For example, Amy told 
me, “We were lucky because my sister lived here and she was established here 
and she sponsored us to come over.” Amy’s husband was transferred so the stress 
of finding employment was reduced. Later in the same interview Amy reiterated 
how lucky she felt in having family in Australia: 
Amy: And, of course, I had family here. I mean I had two sisters and a brother who had 
already immigrated. So I was very lucky. 
Eleanor: So you had the support? 
Amy: Yes, I had the support. I had my elder sister who was living in Bunbury. She and 
her husband were at a big school there. He was head master.  
Amy: And then Annie was a nurse here at Royal Perth and Rob my younger brother, he 
lectured at Edith Cowan all these years. So, I had this lovely network of family. So, I was 
very lucky. And [I also had] some cousins who had emigrated here sometime before.  
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The idea of transformation while not always spoken, is implied in this excerpt 
from the interview with Marlene. I asked her to comment on her reaction to being 
asked to participate in the research and she replied: 
Marlene: Just the impressions that really struck me, the thing that I wanted to say about 
coming to Australia is that I could forge my own identity here. I mean you could shed 
your skin and become whatever you wanted to be. Whether that is just because it was 
Australia or whether it was just another country, but I think Australia has a freedom we 
didn’t have [in Rhodesia]. So, I was able to become what I wanted to become, here. And 
without the restrictions of what you should be when you grew up, you become your own 
person here. And Australian society, because they were so accepting of people, allowed 
me to do that. 
 
Marlene was twenty-one when she immigrated in 1980. The notion of migration 
as metamorphosis is clear in her words. How long did the liminal period last for 
Marlene, for me, for any of the women in this research? That is what I will 
address now. 
 
If time is problematic in the liminal stage, how can the problem be resolved? 
According to Genevieve Lloyd in her discussion of St Augustine, it “… is 
resolved through finding unity amidst fragmentation … articulated through 
metaphors drawn from the unity of speech, and acted out in autobiographical 
narration” (Lloyd, 1993, 20). My own notions of time/space in the liminal are best 
described by the illusion/allusion of time and/or the absence of time in the 
etchings of MC Escher. His beguiling depictions of time/space spiralling back 
upon itself, going nowhere and everywhere, captivate me and I attempt to follow 
the steps to return to where I am. The fragmentation is inherent in the liminal or 
transformational period because this is when the identities (assumed, attributed) 
disintegrate, possibly to be reformed. Victor Turner says “Since liminal time is 
not controlled by the clock it is a time of enchantment when anything might, even 
should happen” (Turner, Victor, 1977a, 33). Therefore, there is in the formal    
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sense of rites de passage, a sense of time/space being magical and, being situated 
(metaphorically) in one of Escher’s paradoxical and illusionary etchings, the 
numinous aspects of liminality are (perhaps) something to revere. I reflect on the 
fragments of mystery and enchantment in my own experience of immigration, 
some of which did not seem (particularly) exquisite when they occurred but, in 
retrospect, the magical qualities sometimes start to appear; “… the lived 
experience of time – with transience, with the sense of self as fragmented, and of 
the past as lost” (Lloyd, 1993, 8) 
 
The notion of Times Arrow, the second law of thermodynamics is conducive to 
how I can think about time when passing through the liminal or metamorphosis. 
Notions of progressive disintegration and entropy segue into the fabrication of 
time underpinning the liminal. The idea that, in the linear way we think about 
time, the original is ‘whole’ or ‘ordered’ and that Times Arrow points inexorably 
to entropy, that is disorder or disintegration; even this does not give a rigid time 
for the movement/passage of wholeness into chaos. In the example of a coffee 
mug being smashed, time is quick, sudden. In the example of a mug of coffee left 
to cool, the time it takes is, in the words of my mother, “as long as it takes”. 
According to recent scientific research by prominent American physicist, 
Lawrence Schulman, there is evidence that time can, in certain places and 
circumstances, run backwards (in Chown, 2003). It is this phenomenon that I 
connect to the liminal or metamorphic time. It is the seemingly ordered state from 
which we start, be it as Rhodesian, Zimbabwean, Greek or Briton, we are 
supposedly ‘whole’ in that identity. Immigrating is a separation from that 
‘wholeness’ followed by movement into the liminal; that is, we step into the    
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doorway, and somewhere in this locus, we—our identity—begins the process of 
disintegration; shifting into entropy. As the process of disorder and disintegration 
takes place, somehow there begins a new ordering as identity re-forms, time 
begins to re-verse, the poetical connotations are deliberate, and so is the re-turn to 
another seemingly ordered state—with the important distinction that the 
subsequent ‘whole’ is not the same as the first. Parallel perhaps, but not a 
duplicate, not an identical identity. In this imbrication of Times Arrow, the 
liminal, and transformation, there is, I believe some indication of why this period 
is indefinable in any quantitative way. The temporal aspect of liminality as I have 
cited it at the start of this chapter is: “… liminal time is not controlled by the 
clock” and [it] “is a time of enchantment” (Turner, Victor, 1977a, 33), gives the 
pliancy, indeed the volatility, I associate with this arcane place of displacement. 
So, reflecting on the nature of time and the re-verse of time in rites de passage I 
find these words in T S Eliot’s poem, Burnt Norton: 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future, 
And time future is contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable (Eliot, 1963). 
 
And, in the liminal context, I perceive this to be a relevant notion of the 
eccentricity of time. Reflections on past identity, recognition of present identity, 
and anticipation of future identity are all required when a liminal persona moves 
into the third stage of rites de passage. As immigrants to Australia, we will 
always have our memories of Africa that do not fit in to the Australian context or 
relate to local understanding. We negotiate our place in the community on a daily 
basis, as most people do. But the moment we, as immigrants, step over the    
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metaphorical threshold and begin to reflect on what we were—and on the validity 
of our present Australian identity, that is when the process of integration and 
incorporation begins. And, for me, that is the moment I move into the third frame 
of the triptych that comprises my thesis. 
                                                 
i In Chapter Eight: Integration: A real Aussie [at last].    
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The Third Panel 
 
 
Incorporation    
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Chapter Seven  
 
 
 
 
Memory and the Myth of the Eternal Return 
 
 
Yesterday is a tree with great spreading branches, and I lie in its shade, 
remembering (Pablo Neruda). 
 
The theme of a tree recurs. In the beginning, it is the transplanted tree. It is there, 
in the chapter on migration, and here it is again but now it is a tree to lie under 
and dream of yesterday. So, in this chapter, I begin by exploring memory and 
how we remember, I question the notion of remembering as knowledge; who 
remembers the ‘truth’ and how that is related to gender, to our socially 
reproduced role. The themes in the chapter are the remembering of Africa, the 
remembering of Australia and the locus where the two blend—bringing together 
strands of memory, dreams, and experience. I explore the memories of women 
who came to Rhodesia in the early days, the women who have come to Australia, 
and reflections of home in Rhodesia and home in Australia. The remembering of 
our transplanting into Australia and transition into Australians is reflected again 
and again, until fragmented into the minutiae that shape our identities and our 
lives.     
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Dearest Elle, Happy Christmas1996 – We thought this Book might be a way to 
keep you coming back Home! (Dedication in Tabex Encyclopedia Zimbabwe 
from A & J). 
 
An element appears in this chapter of nostalgia and even sentimentality; I think of 
the poem about latter-day Zimbabwe that I found on the Internet: I printed it out 
and gave it to my sister-in-law (newly arrived in Australia) to read. I found it 
grossly sentimental but she wept as she read it. It seems that the subjective 
notions of memory for the individual remembering are evocative and poignant. 
By allowing elements of the research methodology to thread through the 
narrative, I move the memories into a locus less contaminated by sentimentality—
or perhaps this a strategy I use to distance myself from my own grief at seeing a 
beloved matrix destroyed. However, the use of my own journal in researching and 
writing this chapter emphasises the evocative and subjective nature of memory, 
remembering (and forgetting). And I find that there is another space to situate the 
notion of remembering in the rites de passage. I suggest that, within the 
transition/transformation from liminal persona to integrant, is an auxiliary locale. 
It is here, in a place that may be one of pathological nostalgia, that the notion of 
crippling homesickness is situated particularly if the transition is incomplete or 
not successful. 
 
Integral to the notion of the immigrant’s remembering is homesickness and the 
nostalgia that dwells in the homesickness felt by the immigrant—leading to the 
longing to return ‘home’. The concept of home being the axis mundi, the matrix 
from which we are never entirely separated is explored in the light of memory and    
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homesickness. There is an infernal, internal, voice that says, “Surely things 
weren’t as bad as you think you remember?” and in this sphere notions of time in 
memory segue into the second part of the chapter and I examine the myth of the 
eternal return; the persistent longing to ‘go home’. Translating the fantasy of 
‘going home’ into reality, the costly (not only in financial terms) return to the 
home country is often called the immigrants’ disease and I contemplate that it is 
often the remembering and misremembering that sends the immigrant ‘home’ and 
then ‘home’ again. Theories of remembering, misremembering, and forgetting 
serve to connect this to the multiplicity of experience and impression. 
 
The notion of memories being ‘passive’ or ‘literal recordings of reality’ stored in 
an album as we might store family photographs, is, according to psychology 
Professor Daniel Schacter, a longstanding myth. Previously, the study of memory 
did not include the subjective experience of remembering, “We now believe with 
some degree of certainty that our memories are not just bits of data that we coldly 
store and retrieve computerlike” (1996, 4). Therefore, the subjectivity of memory 
has credibility. The humanness of our remembering, the knowledge that “… we 
do not store judgement-free snapshots of our past experiences but rather hold on 
to the meaning, sense, and emotions these experiences provided us” (Schacter, 
1996, 5), allows me a different way of interpreting the data that is not only 
remembered but is also written, perhaps from memory. I ask, how much of 
remembering therefore, is remembering (or misremembering) the memory? In 
this context, the notion of mnemonic socialization “…a process that normally 
takes place when we enter an altogether new social environment [including] when 
we emigrate to another country” (Zerubavel, 1997, 87) leads me to ask: how do    
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we bring the memories, not only of migration but also of childhood, into our 
present life? Is this process, as Zerubavel posits, a tacit occurrence of “… 
listening to a family member recount a shared experience which […] implicitly 
teaches one what is considered memorable and what one can actually forget” 
(1997, 87). In this concept, the nostalgic component of the recollection of feelings 
and remembering of memories may indeed be partially mnemonic tradition, that 
is: a tradition of recollections and memories passed on within a family and within 
a society—but even in this model Zerubavel acknowledges the recollections are 
only “reinterpretations” (emphasis in original) (1997, 87). However, I believe 
there are other components—components that may be as random as the audience 
to whom the remembering is narrated that inform/misinform the memory.  
 
I reflect on a conversation I had with a woman, Philippa, an immigrant to 
Southern Rhodesia. At the time of our conversation, 1996, I was doing fieldwork 
in Zimbabwe and conducting interviews with women who were born in, or who 
had immigrated to, Southern Rhodesia before the Federation of Southern 
Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed (in 1953). In the course 
of the interview Philippa told me the story about her journey from Turkey to 
Southern Rhodesia with her parents when she was three years old. I ponder on 
how, as an adult, she makes sense of the experiences of a small child, and her 
insight that she is remembering the memory and not the event. She remembers the 
memory of a feeling and she is aware that that is so. In the conversation Philippa 
told me the adventurous journey to Rhodesia from Turkey happened in 1939 
“when the war broke …”. She said there was a mass exodus of British and    
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Americans and “everybody else” and, as they couldn’t come down through Suez, 
they had to come overland by car:  
Philippa’s remembering of a memory: 
I know we went to a place called Basra, I think it’s on the river Euphrates. This I 
remember because I had never seen a one-legged man before. They were bringing in 
soldiers who had been wounded. Flying them in on flying-boats. These planes were 
landing on the river ... I was sitting in the garden of the hotel watching. And this one 
English soldier with one leg, he was hobbling along on crutches. Obviously fond of 
children, he came up and offered me a sweet, and I was terrified. I had never seen 
somebody with one leg before and I ran away. And I cried and then I felt ... I remember 
feeling mean afterwards when my mother told me what had happened to this poor man ... 
I remember feeling nasty for having run away from him afterwards. I don’t know if I 
really remember feeling nasty about it, but I felt ... that I shouldn’t have run away, in a 
sort of funny three-year-old way. 
Eleanor: It’s amazing that you can remember feelings ... 
Philippa: I don’t know if I remember that feeling or whether I remember remembering it, 
because I always felt guilty for a long time afterwards when I saw somebody with one 
leg. I don’t know. Perhaps I don’t remember that, feeling bad about it at the age of three, 
but perhaps I remember remembering all along the years. 
 
So, when do we stop remembering the event and start to remember the memories, 
and does the insight change the memory? Perhaps we have a tendency to 
misremember the source of our memories, but when I talk to people about 
remembering, they seem sure of their sources. Somebody has to be remembering 
something and perhaps that is why memory needs to be subjective; because, 
although we might misremember our sources, the memory is valid for the 
rememberer. It is not unusual for people to remember events from childhood that 
may have been told to them as part of family lore. These memories may become 
part of our remembering although, like Philippa, we are remembering a memory, 
something that has been told to us through the years. The mnemonic tradition 
suggested by Zerubavel gives credence to this (1987, 87). The subjectivity of, and 
connection to, memory in ethnographic writing (in the context of Philippa’s 
memory and of this work generally) is my own situation within the study. This, I 
believe, speaks to/of the textuality of my work. Elspeth Probyn comments,    
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“Ethnography then is seen as a possible way into the personal, a potential 
grasping of the individual’s specificity” (1993, 62). Therefore, each remembered 
memory is re-membered and the sense that is made of it is contextualised in the 
time and and understanding of the reader/audience. 
 
I turn again to my 1996/97 research trip to Zimbabwe and find this note in my 
journal: 
[My brother] Graham says to me ‘Don’t believe Aunt Kay, she has 
got it all wrong. She’s old. She’s lost it. She remembers nothing 
right!’ I realise Graham has assumed the traditional role of patriarch, 
of dominant ‘elder’. This being the case, he is adamant that what he 
remembers is right, what Aunt Kay remembers is wrong, chiefly 
because it does not correspond in every detail with his memories. His 
memory is the historical ‘truth’. Ironically, Aunt Kay is the real 
‘elder’ in the equation. She is the only surviving member of the 
original family. She was born in Rhodesia in 1914 (Personal Journal). 
 
Exploring Graham’s self-designated role of family patriarch, and my own part (as 
researcher but also in the role of ‘little sister’) in the interpretation of his words, I 
consider the explanation that “socially reproduced role-holders can be such 
awkward customers, rejecting their upbringing, fighting one another and even 
appearing to change the course of events ...” (Tonkin, 1992, 103). Perhaps it is 
this manipulation of events that serves to fashion the social reproduction of role-
holders—if not the (socially accepted) hierarchy within a family group. In my 
fieldwork journal from this time I comment on the notion of attributed roles 
within the family—within my family, and my inability (at that time) to remove 
myself from the role attributed to me: 
The thing that gets me every time that I come back [to Zimbabwe] is 
the assumption that I am the same as I was twenty years ago before I 
left [Rhodesia]. I am immediately re-placed in the same category as I 
was when I was thirty years old! And I’m fifty-five years old now! 
I’m not the same! (Personal Journal).    
190
 
 
It seems I am not the only one who resists being re-placed in an outdated and 
attributed category. Marlene talked about how her experience as an immigrant has 
changed her and said, “We had one friend [from Rhodesia] visit us about four or 
five years ago, and we had him round to dinner. And he said to me, “Oh, you 
haven’t changed a bit!” and I found that really quite … I mean it was 
complimentary I suppose in a fifteen year gap, but I said, ‘You don’t know who I 
am anymore!’ He has no idea how much I have changed, and yet he just saw me 
as the same person.” I hear the indignation in her voice and I ask myself, is this 
sense of umbrage Marlene’s personal point of view or does her affront at the 
‘compliment’, in itself, indicate change—part of the transformation that came 
about during her liminal stage—to a previously unacknowledged, albeit latent, 
feminist perspective; so that when someone pays a misplaced (misguided) 
intended compliment based on physical looks, it provokes antagonism? I believe, 
in this case, it was an indication of Marlene’s liminal ‘modification’, combined 
with an insidious condescension in the ‘compliment’, a condescension that is 
rudimentary to assuming to know how another person is; and this layering of 
meanings made the remark presumptuous and therefore offensive. 
 
I reflect on the question as to whether we remember ourselves differently to how 
others may remember us and, following this thread, whether this, then, leads to 
perceptions of dominance (and gender) in misremembering—and to connect with 
other notions of remembering. In this context, I find Donna Haraway’s 
conception of situated knowledge relevant. The complexity inherent in situated 
knowledge seems to fit the arcane topic of remembering and what may be seen as    
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the gendered division of ‘important’, correct memory and ‘unimportant’, incorrect 
memory. It is, as Donna Haraway points out, that “... for the complex category 
and even more complex people called ‘women’, A and not-A are likely to be 
simultaneously true” (Haraway, 1991, 110-111). It is, therefore, justifiable that 
memory and remembering are included in the motif of situated knowledge; the 
perceived ‘exact’ objective memory in collision with the perceived ‘inexact’ 
subjective memory. Perhaps it is the ambiguity, the seeming inconsequential and 
quotidian minutiae of women’s rememberings that colour our memories and 
remembering, that make them imperfect to the obligatory exactness required by 
the dominant patriarchy. It is the ‘A and not-A that are simultaneously true’. In 
the broad historical sense these rememberings, women’s rememberings, are 
seldom the acceptable and accepted view or the codified account. The small 
rememberings are, of course, not confined to women. The scholar and author 
Madan Sarup, albeit reluctantly—or it would seem so—now and then includes a 
memory of his childhood and his family in his writing. His words when he writes 
about his father are touching, the self-abrogation as to the triviality of his words 
adds poignancy to his reflection and it is his mention of the supposed triviality 
that evokes his father, the substance of his father. Sarup writes: 
I remember very little about my father. A strong, well-built man, I 
know he enjoyed walking. I also remember him showing me an 
electric gadget for making hot drinks: a little element that fitted into a 
light socket, which heated the water in a cup. Why do I remember 
such trivial things and not anything important?’ (Sarup, 1996, 116-
117). 
 
I wonder that he considers this appealing memory ‘trivial’. Such memories are 
vivid fragments, inflections of brightness that give purpose/meaning to the whole 
and I believe they must be valued as such. I return to the allegory of mosaic    
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because this illustrates the importance of each detail to the overall image; 
inasmuch as each tessera may seem trivial when viewed individually, the final 
image depends on the inclusion of each detail. 
I remember the wedding … Half way between Colombo and Kegalle 
we recognised a car in the ditch and beside it was the Bishop of 
Colombo who everyone knew was a terrible driver. He was supposed 
to marry them so we had to give him a lift (Ondaatje, 1984, 36). 
 
So, what of the stories that are hidden in remembering, the memories/stories that 
become family legends? These are the myths that unite and bind the family and 
are all the more potent for being a subliminal connection; so that the ritual words, 
“remember when” draw us in, and return us to that (precarious) family/familiar 
nucleus with a pretence of constancy. But nuclei, memories, and family myths are 
frequently changeable/unstable; the shared and familiar history is often of small, 
inconsequential rememberings; small reminiscences that are positioned in vast, 
political, and world changing affairs, but these minutiae of ‘remember when’, 
these are the fragments that we hold and bequeath. Maybe we pass on these 
memories as stories told as family myths—not by writing them down—because 
we know we will remember them. It is the events that are deemed ‘important’ that 
get written down; histories of wars and treaties, and lists of kings and queens, but 
when we re-member or ask for memories from others—mothers, fathers, 
grandparents, strangers on the bus—the rememberings we hear are of incidents, 
(often) subjective vignettes, that make up the life of the story-teller. The wars 
may be there, but only as points of reference for the rememberer.  
‘Do you remember the outbreak of the Korean War?’ I asked. 
‘Yes,’ she said. ‘I was pregnant with May.’ … It seemed to me then 
that Poppy still spoke as if the whole world ran according to Mrs 
Dale’s Diary … (Modjeska, 1996,64). 
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Family myths, in common with the grander scale of religious and cultural myths 
discussed by Ashis Nandy, allow us “… access to the processes which constitute 
history at the level of the here-and-the-now … They allow one to remember in an 
anticipatory fashion and to concentrate on undoing aspects of the present rather 
than avenging the past” (Nandy, 1983, 59). The anticipation of forging 
myth/memory is, therefore, set to occur at the time of recollecting other 
memories. 
 
How do we know when to tell the memory? Often the time to recount a family 
memory/story (and to forge new memories) is linked to the calendar—birthdays, 
weddings and funerals, anniversaries, or the liturgical year. Perhaps this is 
because it is the time when families traditionally gather together—perhaps after 
being apart for a long time. Certainly, when I visited Zimbabwe in 1996/97 it was 
the first time my siblings and I were all together for a Christmas celebration since 
1974, the year my father died. This time we gathered at my aunt’s house for 
Christmas Eve and, in my research journal, there is a record of a story 
remembered and retold: 
Doris told us about when she and Uncle Pete got married (in 1940). 
They asked Mama and Papa (her new parents-in-law) for Christmas 
dinner. She said “I was very nervous and wanted everything to be just 
right”. She described how she carefully laid the table and lit candles. 
When Papa arrived he said, “Aren’t the lights working?” and flicked 
the [light] switch. When the lights came on he said, “Well, Good 
luck!” and blew out the candles. Doris said she was so mortified she 
did not have lit candles on the dinner table for the next twenty-five 
years. She told us, “Papa related candles with poverty” (Personal 
Journal). 
 
In pondering on this memory, I remember when Doris told us it seemed as clear 
to her as if it had happened the previous year. All of us at the table had heard the    
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story before but still we waited with anticipation for “Well, Good luck!” and then 
Doris’s analysis of why Papa said it, “Papa related candles with poverty.” This 
incident becomes part of my family remembering too although it happened before 
I was born. No doubt I will pass it on to my grandchildren when the time is right, 
probably at a Christmas dinner. Will it be the same story because now it has been 
written and the words are there for other eyes to read? Professor Daniel Schacter 
refers to a system called episodic memory, that is, memory “… which allows us 
explicitly to recall the personal incidents that uniquely shape our lives” (Schacter, 
1996, 17). When, therefore, did this Christmas story become ‘my’ memory, and 
when I relate it, what is it I re-member? I never knew my grandfather, he died the 
year I was born; nevertheless the memory is personal to me, too. The term ‘re-
membering’ is defined by Barbara Myerhof  as being “… purposive, significant 
unification … The focused unification provided by re-membering is requisite to 
sense and ordering. A life is given a shape that extends back in the past and 
forward into the future … Without re-membering we lose our histories and our 
selves” (Myerhof, 1992, 240). Therefore, her comment that, “A life, then, is not 
envisioned as belonging only to the individual who has lived it but it is regarded 
as belonging to the world, to the progeny who are heirs to the embodied traditions 
…” (Myerhof, 1992, 240) brings the lives (of my grandparents), as memories (or 
myths), into my personal re-membering and into the family lore. Therefore, the 
perceived importance and magnitude of the memory is not significant; life 
shaping incidents that enter our remembering may be as insignificant as Doris’s 
dinner party and, supposing that this is the way memory works, the memory of 
Doris’s dinner party is, for me (as her niece), a re-membering of someone else’s 
memory until it becomes my own. The evocative nature of remembering the    
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Christmas dinner party in 1996, and the conversations that took place around the 
table become part of my own memory-bank, and are intertwined with the original 
dinner party held before I was born and, in my refreshing and retelling the 
memory, I am able to bequeath it to my daughter and granddaughter. 
 
Therefore, to expand the primary discourse of this chapter, re-membering stories 
and myths allows me, indeed provokes me, as author, to use my ‘long drawer’. A 
colleague mentioned (in passing) ‘the long drawer’. He was speaking about 
Bakhtin’s custom of ‘drawing’ on material that he had written many years earlier. 
The play on the word ‘drawer’ (I imagine the material was kept in a bureau of 
some sort) and ‘drawing’ upon it, befits the way I work and research and 
remember. These things I keep: letters, essays, and notes; I write down dreams, 
conversations and memories of conversations; I keep journals, diaries, taped 
interviews, lists, and newspaper clippings—many of which I draw on at various 
stages in my work. In the paper written for presentation and later published in the 
electronic journal Outskirts I said this: 
My researcher persona seldom takes a holiday. Conversations I have, 
books I read, events I participate in or observe, becomes intrinsic to 
what? My life? My thesis? Whatever it is, it is stored away—
sometimes in memory, sometimes in writing, sometimes on tape or in 
pictures, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, but is 
there to be drawn on when I need it! Does not a feminist ethnographer 
have to work like this? And is it really a problem? (Venables, 1999). 
 
Where does it begin? I find in my ‘long drawer’ journals and diaries that go back 
forty years or more; scraps of paper with notes are even older. I remember the 
journals and letters I destroyed when I left Africa and regret that I was so 
imprudent and impulsive in burning them. The papers and letters I did keep take    
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on a meaningfulness that makes me realise I was an historian, an ethnographer, an 
anthropologist, before I knew what the words meant. Among the treasures that 
remain in the cache, my ‘long drawer’, are my father’s handwritten notes of the 
eulogy he gave at his mother’s funeral in 1967—the year my daughter was 
born—and just by seeing his handwriting I feel and savour the threads that link 
the generations: I remember the fountain pen he used, I remember my 
grandmother’s funeral, and most of all, I remember my father. The richness of the 
material gleaned from the women who participated in my research for this study 
are added to my long drawer. The correspondence and conversations with friends, 
relatives, Australians, Zimbabweans, and expatriate Rhodesians is evident and the 
anonymous others whose words and conversations, overheard, are stored for 
retrieval when I need them. In the long drawer, past impacts on the present and 
the present on the past and, once again, traces of autobiography are spoor to draw 
in the reader. 
 
To bring the focus onto the question of memories and nostalgia, I ask some of my 
protagonists about their remembering of Africa. First, I ask Sarah about her 
feelings for Africa. Her reply shows layers of remembering and a pentimento 
effect occurs as she scrapes through the memory/picture and brings other, older, 
pictures to the surface. So, the small question I asked her, lets her African 
memories lace together her more recent remembering in Western Australia, and 
even evoking the future:  
Eleanor: And when you think about Africa, the nostalgia that you feel, what sets it off?  
Sarah: I used to think I missed my friends, but now I don’t really think I do. But what I 
do miss, which sounds very strange with the upbringing we’ve had, I miss the Africans. I 
really, really enjoy the African humour and I’m obsessed with the bush and wildlife. [In 
Australia] I’m getting a four-wheel drive because the best beaches, in that little town I 
was in, Denmark, in spite of all the work, I used to endurance ride. I’ve ridden the forest    
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on motorbikes and horses. I have ridden in places that people don’t even know exist. I 
knew more of the Denmark district than people that had lived there always. I knew 
waterfalls and pools and I just love the bush. I’ll go round Australia in a few years time. 
I’ll get a campervan, even if I go alone. 
 
I ask Marlene, “Are you ever nostalgic for Rhodesia?” She replies. “Not now, not 
so much”. 
 
How do we remember our first days in Australia? Sarah said, when she arrived 
here in 1988, “When I first went to Albany, the first Saturday morning I went 
there, I was doubled up with mirth and people said to me, “What are you laughing 
at?” and I said “I’ve just had a time warp, I’ve just seen the clock set back thirty 
years!” and Betty said, “You know, I actually don't know how I survived that first 
year. When I look back on it and think, ‘how did you do it?’ I wonder now how 
did I even have the time to cope with what I was doing [and] I have no idea. 
 
I do not stand in time like a rock in a river; what is true of my duration must be 
true of me. If the moments of my duration can be separated it must also be true 
that I myself will cease to exist in the lack of an external cause (Lloyd, 1993, 49). 
 
It is necessary to bring into the discussion notions of ‘time’ as a factor in memory. 
In psychologist James Hillman’s work on aging, and elsewhere, I read about 
perceptions of time as mythical and that mythical time is cyclical (Eliade, 1954; 
Hillman, 1999). In other words, the argument that ‘history repeats itself’ and that, 
exponentially, the assumption is that memories will too. Our (Western) cultural 
perception is that our lives move not in mythical, cyclical time but in secular or 
linear time, that is, regular time. “We do not see that the new is the old come 
around again, and that to understand the new we must return to the old” (Hillman,    
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1999, 127). To situate the idea of memory in time, one solution is seeing it as 
“imagining qualified by time … [M]emory is always first of all imagination, 
secondarily qualified by time … [T]he sole difference between imagining and 
imagination on the one hand, and remembering and memory on the other is this 
added element of time” (emphasis in original) (Hillman, 1999, 89). Using this 
statement as a starting point, it would seem that the notions of time and memory 
are critically interlocked and I find that I cannot write about memory without 
writing about time. In the context of my hypothesis of rites de passage in 
immigration, the sacred and mythical component of time and memory are 
inextricably embedded. The word component is wrong, it is too hard edged for 
this soft and unstable topic. Nancey Murphy suggests that ‘Memories exist as 
dispositions, not as permanent states or files’ (Murphy, 1998, 15). I reflect on this 
and come to understand that, in their own context, there is probity in these 
ideas—even though I find in them a tendency to be glib and plebeian. The notion 
of a past that is contemporaneous with the present has been suggested by 
Deleuze; Genevieve Lloyd interprets this contemporaneousness as being “… not, 
as we are accustomed to think … two successive moments, but rather two 
elements which coexist …” (Lloyd, 1993, 107). This interpretation comes closer 
to my premises of the time factors in rites de passage, and, in fact, I would 
enhance the designated two coexisting elements into multiple coexisting 
elements. This leads me to the question already posited, that is, when do we stop 
remembering the event and start to remember the recollection of the event? I 
think of photographs, old and new, that capture faces that much later activates 
memories—memories that may belong to someone else.  
And this is my Mother and her brother Noel in fancy dress.    
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They are 7 and 8 years old, a hand-coloured photograph, 
it is the earliest picture I have. The one I love most (Ondaatje, 1989, 
4) 
 
Remembering people, significant people—mother, father, siblings and so forth in 
the country of origin can provoke more than nostalgia. In the (unfinished) book he 
was writing just before he died, Madan Sarup adds vulnerable observations, 
memories about himself and his family, at the end of some chapters. The power of 
his memories of his father are such that, toward the end of the quoted annotation 
he writes, “I am crying as I write this …” 
When, a few years ago, my eldest brother Rashid stayed at my house 
for a night, he said to me: ‘You are just like your father – your 
gestures, even your life-style’. I was astonished, and wondered how 
this could be, as I had not really known him. But I think he was right. 
I can feel my father’s influence all around me. I am crying as I write 
this …’ (Sarup, 1996, 117). 
 
This, to me, eloquently demonstrates the subjectivity of memory and the fact that 
time becomes meaningless in the face of pathos. This is the convergence of the 
minutiae of memory; what was it about Madan Sarup’s gestures and life-style that 
provoked the remark if not the delicateness, even preciseness, of Roshan’s 
remembering? However, I notice that it is only after the chapters that are not 
extensively engaged in theoretical discourse that Sarup adds his annotated 
comments, all of which are to do with his memories and some of which are 
unashamedly emotional and poignant and, indeed, reduced me to tears on 
occasion. 
 
This is a memory of an event that occurred before I was born, an event that I 
became aware of for the first time on my return to Zimbabwe in 1996/97 and that 
I have flagged in the historical background. The discovery that my paternal    
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grandparents (Mama and Papa) fully intended to return to Russia in 1919 was 
unexpected and startling. Why I had never heard this disconcerting news before I 
am unsure. When I ponder on this now it seems an anecdote of this nature would 
have—should have—entered family lore, embellished, maybe, and told to the 
children. I consider, is this an act of forgetting that makes space for another 
remembering; selective forgetting that “…is quite different from ignorance” 
(Douglas, 1985, 13)? I think about the reasons behind ‘forgetting’ about this 
dramatic (to me) change of plan and assume it was a political decision; that the 
commitment to leave the Russian/Bulgarian influence behind was paramount to 
their integration into colonial British society and is, I believe, closely linked with 
the decision to speak English ‘without an accent’. The story of the aborted return 
to Russia was revealed to me while I was talking with my Aunt Kay. Her 
memories of the early days in Rhodesia both from her own experience and from 
remembered family tales are extensive, rehearsed, and detailed. Aunt said to me, 
“And they always wanted to go back to Russia. The idea was that when they'd 
made some money they'd go back. When that happened, and they had enough 
money, they decided the children would have a better opportunity here [in 
Rhodesia]. So they stayed. That's when my father built that house in Parktown—
with the money they were going to spend on the tickets, he built that house”. My 
aunt had carried this memory from when she was five or six years old. She said, 
“It took a long time for them to amass some money”. 
The bit that really spun me out was that Mama and Papa fully 
intended returning to Russia when they had saved enough money.  
Where would I be now?  
Who would I be now?  
Would I BE? (Personal Journal). 
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Adding credibility to my assumption as to the reason for ‘forgetting’ is that it was 
the decision to remain in Rhodesia that compelled the determination to learn 
English as my Papa said, “without an accent”. But for me it was one of life’s 
defining moments to know how close it was, that my life history (if I had been 
born at all) would have been so completely and utterly different. That I was over 
fifty years old when I discovered this ‘secret’ is astonishing. That I had never 
considered that there might have been such a plan gives me cause to consider, 
again, my grandparent’s attachment to Africa, the dichotomy of living and loving 
one place and yet yearning to return ‘home’. Now I question my surprise at their 
desire to return to Russia when I think that I, too, often yearn to return home. 
And, as a family, at the end of 1991, supposedly to emigrate, we did go ‘home’—
only to come ‘home’ to Australia in 1992—auspiciously on 26 January, Australia 
Day. The action of return may be seen as an historical reflection of the desire of 
Mama and Papa to return to Russia. In retrospect, for me it was probably a 
craving to return to the past. Even after our abortive return to Africa in 1991 with 
the intention of resettling there, I find a note in my research journal written 
shortly before I left Australia on a field trip in 1996 which reads: 
I reflect that once again I find the desire for a return ‘home’. That is 
what I am doing too, coming home to Africa, and not for the first time 
(Personal Journal). 
 
And in Australia from 1992 to 1996, the dream remains. The continuing dream to 
go ‘home’, even when common sense tells me that the ‘home’ that I visualise is a 
fantasy, a memory, a myth. 
 
It’s right to love your home place, but first ask, “Where is that, really?” 
(Jelaluddin Rumi). 
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There is an enigmatic saying among many immigrants, not only to Australia, that 
there is the ‘expensive migrant sickness’ (also known as the ‘twenty thousand 
dollar cure’). I first heard about this sickness from my cousin Bistra who 
emigrated from Bulgaria to Canada some years ago. We talked about our 
experiences of immigration and she spoke about this ‘expensive migrant 
sickness’. At first I was unsure what she was talking about, but then she 
explained, and I soon recognised that we had also succumbed to it. The prognosis 
is this: after the initial euphoria of migrating, of being ‘allowed’ to immigrate—
be it to Australia, United States of America, Canada or to some other perceived 
Utopia; after taking the first steps in the adventurous ritual of rites de passage, 
there comes a period of dread and homesickness. This period of feeling a sense of 
loss, homesickness, displacement, with no behavioural guides, may appropriately 
be defined by the Durkheimian concept of anomie. Julia Kristeva, Madan Sarup, 
Ashis Nandy, and others address the issue often from a personal platform 
(Kristeva, 1991; Nandy, 1983; Sarup, 1996). Psychologists Grinberg and 
Grinberg, citing Menges, posit that homesickness is mainly evident in people who 
have “limited success in [their] mental development toward individuation” and 
“… unresolved childhood problems arising form a conflicting relationship with 
the mother” (1989, 20). Berger mentions “To the underprivileged, home is 
represented, not by a house, but by a practice or set of practices” (1894, 64). Be 
that as it may, many immigrants do suffer from anomie related to homesickness. 
There is a yearning to return to one’s home, to return to one’s matrix. 
 
Writing about aging, philosopher James Hillman tells us about the ‘myth of the 
Eternal Return’. The expression originates with Mircea Eliade, writing of ‘archaic    
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ontology … and the ancient cultures of Asia, Europe, and America” (Eliade, 
1954, 3). However, I contend that there is a connection from that archaic ontology 
to this thesis. It adds, perhaps, insight when I adapt the theory for my own 
purpose. I find there is an authenticity in this archaic ontology when I apply it to 
my own story and to that of the women in my project. According to Hillman, the 
route to this ‘mythological place’ be it Home, Paradise, Heaven, Eden or the 
Elysian Fields, [is] by death of reality “and by ending the flow of time” (Hillman, 
1999, 126). I would argue that the return home for the immigrant is also a myth 
and is situated in mythological, illusory time. The ‘old country’ is not the same 
country we left; time has passed there equally with time in the new country. The 
reality is that time has not stood still in the matrix, in the old country. It is not set 
in amber like an insect from the Palaeocene and there is no atavistic persona 
available. I seek to situate this experience of ‘desire to return to the past’ within 
the paradigm of the rites de passage and discover that because of its chimerical 
quality, it slips easily into the (multiple) passages between liminality and 
integration and thus serves multiple purposes of being situated in the meta-thesis 
of this writing; in the domain of time and memory, and in the rites de passage. 
The passages within passages of this section of the rites de passage are explored 
as they arise and more fully in the chapter on integration that follows.  
 
In conceiving the memory of ‘home’ as a myth, I consider the notion of selective 
forgetting in the context of immigration. Perhaps the quirk of selectively 
forgetting wretched and regretful circumstances and events in Rhodesia is a form 
of defence, or psychic survival in Australia. The good things come to mind 
unbidden, and, as with so much of memory, are often related to small and    
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seemingly insignificant events and occasions and sometimes it is like 
remembering a Utopia. No place is wholly Utopian as no place is wholly 
Dystopian—except in remembering, mis-remembering, and forgetting. Milan 
Kundera finds words in many languages that link homesickness, memory and 
nostalgia with the pain of not experiencing what is longed for (Kundera, 2002, 
passim). In the event, it seems the context of the remembering is crucial, and who 
it is that is doing the selective remembering (or selective forgetting). The 
knowledge that accompanies the remembering, mis-remembering and forgetting 
must, indeed, change. In the context of the integration/aggregation period in rites 
de passage the knowledge of the new and adopted ‘home’ will, using this 
hypothesis, be created from the elements of previous knowledge of ‘home’. 
Papastergiadis cites Mircea Eliade who defines the traditional home as the axis 
point, the Axis Mundi, that secures the unity between the domestic and the 
spiritual, “a link that connected the individual vertically in time to ancestry and 
horizontally in space to kin…”. He refers to this point in the axis as “the 
ontological reconciliation” (Papastergiadis, 1998, 5). The vertical/horizontal (or 
ontological reconciliation) identification of home as being where the spiritual and 
domestic spheres meet, is reiterated by John Berger. He places the space of home 
in the crosshairs, at the core of the world, when he defines home as “… being the 
center of the world because it was the place where a vertical line crossed with a 
horizontal one” (Berger, 1984, 56). And I reiterate my question from the previous 
chapter: Where is my Axis Mundi now; the new matrix that, as a liminal persona, 
a neophyte, and an immigrant I search for most of all? 
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Drawing on my research and writing experience, the myth of the Eternal Return 
relates also to the temporal paradigms that inhabit my work and how I am able to 
move between them like a time traveller—because I am the author and I have the 
power to do so—and because moments in time are contemporaneous, being 
“[Not] … two successive moments, but rather two elements which coexist …” 
(Lloyd, 1993, 107). Issues of time as a trope are appropriate in this chapter on 
memory because it is, often, memories that we are pursuing when we return to out 
place of origin; when we return ‘home’. Time reckoning systems are generally 
conventional, that is to say, socially constructed, “Despite our common tendency 
to reify them, they all represent unmistakably sociotemporal (rather than strictly 
physiotemporal or biotemporal) arrangements and are therefore by no means 
inevitable” (Zerubavel, 1997, 106). Schacter refers to remembering as being 
“mental time travel” and notes that it is “… truly remarkable [that] as 
rememberers, we can free ourselves from the immediate constraints of time and 
space, reexperiencing the past and projecting ourselves into the future at will” 
(Schacter, 1996, 17) and this is affirmed in the Deleuzean interpretation already 
posited. But the immigrant who suffers from ‘expensive migrant sickness’ takes 
the mental time travel into the physical and there are few who are not 
disappointed. 
 
Returning home for the immigrant is, of necessity, a return doomed to failure. In 
the rites de passage (which is the trope of immigration in my hypothesis), there is 
no return. Once the process of passage has begun, there is no return. While there 
may be a physical return, spiritually as the change continues, there is none—any 
more than an old woman can become a young girl again, or a dead person rise up.    
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“After the migrant leaves home, he never finds another place where the two life 
lines cross. The vertical line exists no more…” (Berger, 1984, 56). There is no 
more original Axis Mundi, the axis does not immigrate with the immigrant. Does 
there exist, in this hypothesis of immigration as rites de passage, a way to re-
cross the ‘two life lines’ and recreate an axis? Perhaps, in the complex auxiliary 
section of rites de passage between liminality and integration, a place where there 
is a “… temporal interruption […] This is the integration of the individual across 
the time span of the life cycle, so that a retrieval of a sense of personal integration 
is achieved” (Myerhof, 1992, 187). Thus, I reiterate, the myth of a return home 
fits well between the liminal sector and re-aggregation, a space that has been 
flagged earlier. There are other issues that arise during this period that need to be 
teased out. 
 
The use of the term matrix is [re]considered. While matrix is ordinarily a 
mathematical term it is a word that can be used in other ways. The dictionary 
definition conjures up ideas: the cavity in which anything is formed; that in which 
anything is embedded as ground mass; a mould etcetera (Chambers 20
th Century 
Dictionary). In the sense of the matrix as cited above, and possibly on a conscious 
level, this is a yearning to return to the ground mass. The geographical, the real, 
the physical ground mass. Look further and find it is not only the ground mass but 
the whole context of our origins, “… we are all pre-written to a great extent, born 
in a specific place, to specific parents, within a specific historical context, with 
particular physical characteristics. We have no control over these accidents, yet 
they pre-form our life trajectories…” (Bottomley, 1994, 64). The memories of the 
sights, smells, and sounds of the homeland are often felt viscerally, and these    
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memories are invoked at slight stimulus as has been eloquently recorded by the 
French novelist and critic, Marcel Proust. I have noticed that, even when I read 
stories set in Southern Africa, that it is as evocative as smelling the smells and 
hearing the sounds, and my emotional connections to my matrix re-surfaces. 
I can hear the men around the camp fire singing softly, taking it in 
turns to pick up a tune, the rhythm as strong as blood in a body … and 
there is the sweet smell of the African bush, wood smoke, dust, sweat. 
My bones are so sharp and thin against the sleeping bag that they hurt 
me and I must cover my hip bones with my hands. I make a vow 
never to leave Africa (Fuller, 2002, 184). 
 
We do leave, and then some of us pine to return. Alexandra Fuller lives in the 
United States now. For Marlene the urge to return came suddenly, when I asked 
her if she had every longed to return she replied, “I did, it suddenly hit me when 
the kids were little. I really had a longing to go back, I had a longing.” Marlene 
spoke about an “ache, probably about ten years after we had been here, there was 
this real ache to head back to Africa ... Not that I had anything to take me back, 
we had no family or anything there, there was just this ache for Africa. And yet I 
don’t have it now. But, you know, it was the smell of Africa, the animals. It’s the 
feeling, I don’t know. But you know it is where you’re born, it’s what you know, 
it’s the familiarity.” 
 
The emotional component—the subjectivity—of homesickness is undeniable. Of 
course the ‘expensive migrant sickness’ is homesickness. The expensive part 
comes when, the immigrant, or immigrants, in this case my husband and I, decide 
to return to the old country. How do we justify this to ourselves? In retrospect this 
is confused and I can only think we were befuddled with homesickness and vivid, 
albeit selective, memories of ‘home’. Amongst our arguments I can remember    
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how we discussed over and over again the fascination Africa held, memories of 
exotic events, continual change, and the danger that made life in Australia seem 
banal and dull. What were the reasons we left Australia? We found that life in 
Perth did not hold the excitement we remembered in Africa. There was none of 
the vivacity we knew from home—or if there was, we didn’t recognise it as such. 
Life was routine, get up, go to work, come home, cook, eat and watch TV, and 
then go to bed. Many of the things that attracted us back to Africa were, I can see 
now, reasons why we left in the first place. But, we chose to restructure our 
remembering because we wanted to return home to the time/period before we had 
left. On reflection, perhaps that is how some misremembering is evoked. Perhaps 
this acting on the fantastical remembering is trying to make the “mental time 
travel” manifest; in any event, our return to Africa was doomed to failure. 
 
Although we had, more than once, returned to Africa on holiday, the big move, 
which took place in 1991, was a disaster. As we landed at Harare we knew that 
we had made an extremely silly move. There was joy at being back in Africa but 
in my heart I knew we could not, would not, stay. This was not home, I had no 
memories of this new place, it was no longer my axis. I ponder, now, on what we 
were expecting, really expecting. Did we imagine that we would return to a time 
before we had left? That our house would be waiting with all our bits and pieces 
intact? Long dead pets waiting patiently at the gate? How naïve of us if that was 
the case. How fanciful and how solid the—how do I describe the qualities of 
memory?—imperceptible qualities of remembering had seemed. As I have 
previously suggested, home, especially in Africa, is not set in amber like an insect 
from the Palaeocene. In the event, we remained in Africa (Zimbabwe and South    
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Africa) for four months before returning home to Australia on Australia Day 
1992. The exercise did cost us upwards of $20,000 (thus fulfilling the ‘twenty 
thousand dollar cure’) that we could ill afford and, when we returned to Australia, 
we had to start again. That is the financial part of the expensive migration 
sickness. However, good things also came from the experience. I learned a lot, I 
changed my direction in life, and it is easier now to block the impulse to return to 
Africa. Usually I can anticipate the urge, I know the triggers (the weather, 
photographs, news of old friends) and use them to examine my process. I did 
return in 1996/97 to do field work for Honours; but I doubt that I will ever return 
to live in Africa. 
 
About the impossibility of returning home after emigrating the compelling words 
written by John Berger echo our experience. He writes, “Every migrant knows in 
his [sic] heart of hearts that it is impossible to return. Even if he is physically able 
to return, he does not truly return, because he himself has been so deeply changed 
by his emigration” (1984, 67). But, you do it all the same, even if it means 
scrimping and saving for the fare, selling your home for below its true value—
because it doesn’t matter what other people may tell you—the impossibility of 
returning home is something you have to find out for yourself. There is poetry in 
the yearning, and beauty too … 
We woke up in a friend’s house where there was a piano. We had 
slept on a mattress on the floor. The piano was in the room below. 
The two children of the house were playing an exercise before going 
to school. An exercise for four hands. Sometimes they stumbled and 
began the phrase again … Waking up to that music played lightly and 
dutifully by the children before going to school was the nearest we 
shall ever be, my heart, to waking up at home before we left (Berger, 
1984, 99). 
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Psychologists Grinberg and Grinberg comment that often the desire to return 
‘home’ is when the migrant discovers that his (sic) integration in the new country 
can never be one hundred percent. They say “It is at that juncture that he (sic) 
toys with the fantasy of going back to his country, in search of lost roots” (1989, 
176). It is this disequilibrium of identity where, as a migrant, one is neither part of 
the old country nor, yet, part of the new that this dilemma serves to instigate a 
persistent state of anomie for many migrants. I question where, in the rites de 
passage, this notion of anomie fits and find that is in this shadowy, auxiliary 
space that I have added, this is where the success or failure of integration may 
take place. For some immigrants, the state of anomie and depression (or is that a 
manifestation of the underlying anomie?) seems to take the place of continually 
and morbidly remembering Africa. For some, what appears to be a pathological 
loathing of Australia is evident. I ponder if this correlates to the comment that 
“Exiles look at non-exiles with resentment. They belong in their surroundings, 
you feel, whereas an exile is always out of place. What is it like to be born in a 
place, to stay and live there, to know that your are of it, more or less forever?” 
((Said, 2001, 180-181). In retrospect, I am reminded of how I was in Rhodesia. It 
was the place I where I was born and for most of my young life, it was the place I 
‘knew’ I would stay, live in, more or less forever.  
 
The preceding form of obsessive remembering (as anomie) is illustrated among 
the migrant community (such as it is) where there is a clique that continually 
remembers Rhodesia—to the utter boredom of everyone else. These people, as I 
have described them on page 111, are generally called ‘when-wes’, as in, “When 
we were in Rhodesia …”. It seems that the when-wes are not confined to    
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Australia for Sarah, who experienced Albany as being in a time warp, when 
speaking about a return trip to Harare said, “I went back to Harare for a Rotarian 
luncheon, and they’ve put the clock back thirty years. They have not progressed 
mentally, physically or in any way whatsoever. Those colonialists, the when-wes, 
are still there at Rotary”. So, the unattractive propensity to reminisce ad nauseam 
about the past is happening there as well!  
 
How do the women in my study feel about returning ‘home’ to Africa, to live, or 
to visit? I asked Sarah if she ever wanted to go back to Africa to live. She replied, 
“I never want to go back to Africa [to live]. That’s the difference, because the 
good in Australia outweighs the bad: 
Eleanor: But do you miss Africa? 
Sarah: Oh, terribly! I go back virtually every year. Well, for three-and-a-half years I 
never took a break when I worked on the farm, and then from the time they told me I was 
going to be in a wheelchair, I thought I’ve got to get away; I’ve got to get away from 
everything and clear my mind. It all starts with my mind. So, I went to the farm where I 
was born and brought up, my brother’s place in Zambia. And I stayed there for five 
weeks, I could only walk fifty metres when I got there, but I could walk five kilometres 
when I left. The doctors in Perth didn’t want to let me go but it was the very best thing I 
ever did. 
 
I asked Marlene if she had been back to visit Zimbabwe. She was animated in her 
response. She said, “I haven’t been back. I haven’t been back so I’ve no idea of 
what it is like now. I’ve visited the airport on that round-the-world trip and burst 
into tears when I landed there, just because of the smells and everything. But I’ve 
never been back to see what it’s like now. No, no.”  
Betty said, “When I go back to South Africa, I actually feel quite alien. I truly feel 
that I have moved on, I have gone in a completely different direction the things 
that are important to me in my life are not important to, even my brothers. I find    
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huge differences, huge, almost to the point where we have almost lost touch, 
which is really sad.”  
When I interviewed Amy, she asked me when last I had been in Zimbabwe. I told 
her, “I was there for Christmas of 1996 and I came back to Australia in January 
1997. I was there for about six weeks. It was really weird because I was by 
myself. All by myself! And back into my core family and just sort of being a 
sister again … going back as a single person you know. And everybody, all my 
family, tried immediately to categorise me as the person who left there so many 
years before. And I wasn’t that person at all. It was very difficult; I spent most of 
the time in tears.” 
 
Those individuals who make up parts of a diaspora, have been referred to as 
“passengers in a project” (Papastergiadis, 1998, 5). And I find that there is a 
similarity, being—or feeling like—a passenger and being a visitor, returning to 
one’s homeland. I recollect how I referred to myself during my solo return visit to 
Zimbabwe; each time I was offered a choice of activity or of destination, I would 
say, “I am a passenger here, the choice is not mine!” Of course, in this situation is 
the issue of returning ‘home’ to a place that is now strange to me and not ‘home’ 
at all. I did not have any memory of the new places, and new names for places I 
did remember. I did not know where I wanted to go. In the context of returning as 
a visitor, albeit to do field work, I find an echo of my fieldwork trip in 
anthropologist Zora Neale Hurston, who also returned ‘home’ to do research. 
Hurston’s return to her home town “... had such an impact on Hurston’s psyche 
that she could not simply transcribe the material uncovered there as though it 
were only scientific data. It was vividly connected in her mind to habits of being    
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and a way of life” (hooks, 1990, 141). In her words, I find a reflection of my 
pilgrimages into the past—into the mythological area of ‘the eternal return’. I 
ponder on this, and I find that more deeply felt is the realisation of the infinite 
complexity of the present—that can only be as it is because of the past.  
 
Eventually the return visits, the ‘expensive migrant sickness’, and the rest, 
become memories. Recollections we can remember, mis-remember, and forget. 
The yearning to return fades as we begin to share a history with the people around 
us. There is a place for us now we can remember events here—we can say to our 
neighbours, “Remember when!” and they know about the event; a shared history. 
The liminality of our position shrinks as we make the transition from immigrant 
to integrant. When it happens, we can successfully make the separation and can 
integrate into Australian life so this becomes home. For our children and 
grandchildren Australia is home, and for many of them it is the only one they 
know. Africa is no more their home than the places my parents knew before I was 
born are mine. I wonder what they will re-member of our memories of Africa? 
The stories and memories that are passed on to them, tales told at Christmas, 
weddings, births and deaths; “Remember when …”. It is only in the recounting 
that the memories are evoked, it is only what I’ve been told, and what I have 
chosen to imagine that I can tell.     
214
 
 
 
Chapter Eight 
 
 
 
 
Integration: A real Aussie [at last]  
 
 
To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the 
human soul (Simone Weil). 
 
He made it clear that though proud of his roots, his migration had been a mission 
accomplished (Obituary notice, West Australian newspaper, 17 January 2003). 
 
The final stage in the rites de passage is that of integration. Having persistently 
defined my hypothesis of the differences between assimilation and integration in 
earlier chapters, the notion of integration as the final step in rites de passage 
culminates/consummates the process. However, elements of assimilation remain 
and sometimes the final step into integration does not happen, leaving the liminal 
persona faltering on the threshold, in a locale—an Escher-like space—within the 
passage that I have referred to as assimilation in liminality.  
 
In this chapter, I examine rites of integration—of recognising self-integration and 
becoming an ‘Australian’. I determine the experiences the women in this study 
have had of the official processes involved in gaining Australian citizenship and    
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the validation bestowed by a public ceremony. I discuss whether the subsequent 
aggregation is an integration recognised by the Australian-born as well as by 
members of the immigrant community, and the polarities within this 
confirmation. To support the hypothesis of reciprocal recognition (or lack of 
reciprocal recognition), I draw on some parallel occasions that occurred during 
the white settlement of Southern Rhodesia. Among the parallels explored are 
issues of ‘ownership’ of being an Australian (as previously defined), or a 
‘Rhodesian’ in the colonial sense and I look at who is excluded from 
being/belonging, and why. The examination is general, and the material are drawn 
from sources that include the literature of white settlement in Rhodesia and my 
own perceptions of migrants in both Rhodesia and Australia. The topic of ‘not 
making the cut’ segues into this failure/reluctance to integrate—which may be 
self-imposed or ascribed by the host society. More overtly and in a general way, 
the reasons for exclusion of ‘ownership’ are likely to include language and 
obvious cultural differences.  
 
The topic of the myth of eternal return that I explored in the previous chapter, and 
reflexivity (in postmodern terms) is apparent, pentimento, in this chapter. The 
official/bureaucratic recognition of integration, that is, naturalisation, takes place 
after a number of years of residency. All the immigrant women in this study have 
completed the naturalisation process for various reasons and these become 
apparent as the chapter unfolds.  
 
The epigraph that leads into this chapter comes from an obituary in the West 
Australian newspaper (17 January 2003). The obituary is for Joseph Fenech, an    
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immigrant from Malta in 1954 when he was a teenager. One paragraph in the 
obituary is of particular interest to me and relevant to this chapter; “On trips back 
to Malta … and while hosting family visitors from the island, he made it clear that 
though proud of his roots, his migration had been a mission accomplished” 
(Cornish, 2003). 
 
The success of the transfer from the liminal stage of the rites de passage, to 
integrant, may not always be successful. Occasionally the longing for home and 
the idea that things were better in the old country persist. The grieving process 
mentioned by Bolivian immigrant Ms Espinosa and psychologists already cited 
(Ferrari, 1998; Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989) is, for some, pervasive and 
enduring. The acceptance of being in Australia for Ms Espinosa came only after 
she returned to Bolivia and realised the reasons for leaving in the first place (in 
Ferrari, 1998). There is, in her experience, an echo of my own. The initial stage of 
incorporation can, as I have indicated, be seen as a passage within a passage. 
Arnold van Gennep attempts to define these ambiguous spaces, and in his words, 
the metaphorical bricolage again appears. He writes of “ceremonial patterns 
where the transitional period is sufficiently elaborated to constitute an 
independent state, [and] the arrangement is reduplicated (van Gennep, 1960, 11). 
For immigrants, the negotiation of integration is continual, and the activities 
fluctuate spatially and in time and attitude. Many neophytes make complex and 
unpredictable arrangements in their attempt to cross the (multiple) boundaries 
from an ambiguous, transitional, “independent state” to a permanent 
inclusion/incorporation in the new society. For others, if the totality of becoming 
an Australian is, or appears to be, unattainable, and the severing from the country    
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of birth is palpable, the attachment to the matrix remains—in dreams, secret 
grieving, private thoughts—and if these do manifest it may be in the pathological 
diagnosis of depression.  
 
Immigrants may see the continual/persistent crossing and negotiation of 
boundaries as being imposed on them by the dominant group in the host society. 
Thus, the comment that, “… immigrants had to be made aware that they were 
crossing boundaries and that, indeed, they would never stop crossing boundaries 
all their lives” (emphasis in original) (Gunew, 1990, 111), is consistent with my 
hypothesis. However, I suggest that the inversion of this statement is also 
relevant. By this I mean that the pre-settled host (the dominant group in the host 
society) has also to negotiate boundaries vis-à-vis the immigrant. These 
negotiations are necessary to retain/maintain the status quo. I suggest that these 
(usually) covert and devious negotiations are a double-edged blade because the 
process of acculturation that occurs over time (using a linear model of time) shifts 
the boundaries, willy-nilly, until the previously well-defined boundary is 
obscured.  
 
One of the questions that arises from an immigrant’s continual negotiation of 
boundaries is this: what happens when immigrants want to integrate and are not 
allowed to by the attitude of the dominant group (in this case the Anglo-
Australian) and does this reflect the colonial experience? Looking at the literature 
on the settlement of Rhodesia, I reiterate the following comment by Frank 
Clements who found the Greek community in Southern Rhodesia to be 
“vulnerable in the white society” (Clements, 1969, 72). And to illustrate my    
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hypothesis that acceptability is something that is conferred and not claimed, I re-
examine Clements citation pertaining to the Greek war hero who was black balled 
from the Salisbury Club, with no reasons given but, by inference, “… because 
‘dagos’ and ‘yids’ were as unacceptable as ‘coolies’” (Clements, 1969, 73). The 
cited episode draws into my hypothesis evolving notions of acceptability, 
assimilation, and marginalisation, and this requires me to return to the structure of 
my study. The layering of the material in/on the panels of the triptych—and of the 
triptych itself—is discernible (as palimpsest) throughout the writing and shows 
the imbrication of ideas, histories, memories, and identities. In these passages, the 
past returns as another nexus for acceptability, assimilation, and marginalisation. I 
ask myself, what constitutes the certainty that a person has been accepted into the 
society, and does the perception of acceptance differ between individuals? Is 
acceptance when a person can be mistaken for a member of the dominant culture, 
and wants to be? Is it when a person has embraced enough of the dominant 
culture for it to matter and be hurtful when unequivocal acceptance into that 
culture is not forthcoming? This is clarified by Clements’ example, cited above 
and elsewhere in this work, of the man who was good enough to fight for the 
British but was unacceptable to join the snobbish Salisbury Club and who was 
therefore, unacceptable in Rhodesian colonial society—because of his ethnicity. 
The dissimulation inherent in this attitude is evident and Bhabha’s comment that 
“… the Other only becomes ‘one of us’ in death” (Bhabha, 1994, 174) suggests 
that, had the man been killed in action, he probably would have been accepted 
and honoured. That the war hero returned his medals and decorations to Queen 
Elizabeth II was only considered remarkable in that it was publicised (Clements, 
1969, 73). The paradox is, the dominant culture – whether in colonial Africa or    
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postcolonial Australia, always requires integration, but does not always confer 
acceptance. The notions of assimilation that I have previously indicated are, I 
believe, supported by this interpretation. In other words, if the immigrant can 
pretend to comply—a performance of compliance—the likelihood of being 
disappointed in integration is, thereby, reduced and the psychic identification 
mentioned by Bhabha—when the other only becomes ‘one’ of us’ in death—is 
not compromised.  
 
There is no ‘real’ Australia[n] waiting to be uncovered. A national identity is an 
invention (White, 1981, viii). 
 
It seems to me that the more the situation in Zimbabwe breaks down, the more 
Australian I feel. I meditate on this and consider; is this part of integration, this 
sense that the destruction of my matrix is discharging me to be someone or 
something else. During the years (since 1998) that I have been working on my 
doctorate, three of my siblings have immigrated (with their spouses) to Western 
Australia. During this time the rapid decline in living standards in Zimbabwe for 
both white and black Zimbabweans has been compounded by the denial of 
citizenship for white Zimbabweans: furthermore, personal danger, and the 
corruption of the government has accelerated. All these factors (and more) were 
the catalyst for their leaving Africa and moving to Australia. And, whilst I was 
never forcibly removed from my home, I recognise in their move many of the 
same reasons we left that country in 1977, and there is also the reflection upon the 
fact of my paternal grandparents leaving Bulgaria in 1907-8. However, the arrival 
of my siblings in Western Australia has allowed me to venture into exploring how 
much more Australian I am – have become – and how much less Rhodesian. In    
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exploring the discharge of my previous identity as connected to the deterioration 
of my remembered matrix, I asked my younger sister if she understood the feeling 
of becoming ‘more’ Australian as Zimbabwe deteriorated. I said to her, “The 
worse the situation gets in Zimbabwe, the more Australian I become” and she 
agreed with me, unreservedly. So, when I read the letter from my Australian 
friend Robin, who wrote to me after transcribing Betty’s taped interview, that “… 
[it] feels as though Betty is saying she has left the best part of her life in Africa”, I 
understand that the life that has been left behind belongs in the matrix, and it does 
seem, sometimes, to be ‘the best part’. But then I reread the words I wrote when 
reflecting on my undergraduate years at university in Australia, from 1993 to 
1995: “The three years I spent as an undergraduate were the happiest of my adult 
life. This was the beginning of a continuing journey in awareness and self-
knowledge’ (Venables; De Reuck and Ahjum, 2001, 239). So, for me, the 
memories of childhood remain in Rhodesia, and I know there is no return to that 
state. 
 
Robin’s letter continues: “There seems [sic] to be no personal positive feelings 
about being in Australia – the positives are focused on the boys, and the 
positiveness of the decision to leave. They have no roots in this country and one 
could say they are ‘rootless’ but it seems they are firmly ‘rooted’ in Africa, does 
this inhibit a person from settling or is it an unsolvable?” (Personal 
Correspondence). From my own interpretation of Betty’s interview I tend to 
disagree with Robin’s analysis, and in considering this I realise it is because she, 
Robin, has never left her matrix, she has never been transplanted. The roots we 
send down when we immigrate to Australia are of a different consistency than    
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those that sink into African earth. Therefore, whether Betty has ‘taken root’ in 
Australia is part of her own experience and, no doubt, the feeling of being 
Australian fluctuates. Nevertheless, it seems that the very ambiguity of being an 
immigrant is meaningful. There is no hard rule to say each day I feel like an 
‘Australian’ or I feel like an ‘outsider’: it is the constant negotiation with the 
society that confers the feelings of belonging, not belonging, or being an observer 
in the margin. The negotiation of borders, whether marginal or central is, as Sneja 
Gunew has posited, something that (as immigrants) we are required to do, and: 
“By definition, to be a new Australian [was] to be a boundary crosser, a 
transgressor, in the eyes of those who like to think that they had already been 
t/here (emphasis in original) (Gunew, 1990, 111). The transient and migratory 
nature of society appears in mimesis in quotidian experiences and I have come to 
believe that this daily negotiation is not exclusive to immigrants.  
 
What about the children and grandchildren that are born once the immigrants 
have settled here? Children and grandchildren serve, I believe, to encourage the 
blurring of boundaries between the pre-settled white Australians and the new 
Australians, the immigrants. Connecting to people in the new society through the 
immigrant’s children is illustrated in the Australian context by Anna-Maria 
Dell’oso who was born in Australia of Italian parents. I find in her words a treble 
image—Anna-Maria as a child assisting (albeit reluctantly) her mother to 
connect, in this case with other Italian women; Anna-Maria as author re-
membering the connection, and the third image is of Anna-Maria as an 
adult/author returning to school to re-learn the Italian language:     
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A “Sekon Langwidge”, as the middle aged ladies who chatted with 
Mamma outside Woolworths would say to me, was a Good Thing to 
have … I’d scuff my heels into the pavement and scowl as Mamma 
worriedly confided that, yes, Anna-Maria’s English was good now but 
the family had difficulty getting me to speak Italian these days 
(Dell'oso, 1987, 26). 
 
Anna-Maria Dell’oso’s critique of the enforced assimilation in Australia in the 
1950s is reminiscent of the [self]-enforced assimilation that happened in my own 
family where my grandfather commanded his children not to speak Russian 
anymore, but to speak English “without an accent”. I have cited this incident in 
chapter three: The beginning is not at Perth Airport. 
 
The pattern of acculturation through children is nicely portrayed by Marlene, who 
arrived in Australia in 1980 at the age of twenty-one, and unmarried. Marlene’s 
transformation into being an Australian began, it seems, after the birth of her two 
children in Australia. The epiphany/metanoia occurred when she took an ‘around 
the world’ holiday with her husband (who is also ex-Africa, from Kenya) and 
gave her cause to consider, if not her burgeoning Australian-ness, certainly her 
separation from her former Rhodesian-ness, which process had evolved stealthily 
as her memories of Africa faded into the immediacy of life in Australia. During 
our interview we spoke about Australian-ness and questioned how it felt to be 
‘Australian’, and if we were ‘real Australians’ based on our own experiences of 
Australians in Australia. 
Marlene: I rejected the Australian [identity] for quite a while, probably twelve or fifteen 
years. [I] really fought that. If people asked me, where are you from, I’d say I’m from 
Africa but I live in Australia. That’s really interesting. 
Eleanor: So it is only fairly recently that you … 
Marlene: Probably when I went overseas with John about three years ago [in 1997]. 
Eleanor: Was that your round-the-world trip? 
Marlene: Mmm. That sort of opened my eyes and I thought gee, we are so lucky living 
where we live, because I had the kids and I hadn’t been overseas for fifteen years 
probably. So, yeah I really still felt we had the cringe factor here, if you know what I    
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mean. And yet when I went and travelled the rest of the world, I thought, no, we were the 
ones who had got it right. We’ve got a fantastic lifestyle, and that was when I finally 
thought, yes, I’m proud to be Australian. 
 
There is a note of self-reflection in Marlene’s response when she remembers how 
she used to say “I’m from Africa but I live in Australia” and then she adds, as if 
surprised at her own words, “That’s really interesting.” This indicates to me that, 
although she had thought about this, she probably had not spoken about it before; 
and it was when I asked her if she felt ‘African’ or ‘Australian’ that she realised 
the significance of her transformation from immigrant to integrant. For myself 
and, seemingly, in this instance Marlene as well, the insight of having a self-
recognisable Australian identity effects a beginning of belonging and this is how I 
understand the text. The conceit of those people who claim ownership of 
Australians-ness to exclude others is, I believe, similar to the arrogance of white-
ness. By this I mean it is the unremarked self-assumed norm that names the other, 
it is the god trick that Donna Haraway describes as a claim of “… power to see 
and not be seen, to represent while escaping representation” (Haraway, 1988, 
581). So, when I research the literature surrounding Australian identity, I find 
multicultural writers writing of their experiences and defining Australian-ness, 
and self-proclaimed ‘Australians’ dismissing this as migrant writing (Gunew, 
1984; Gunew, 1994), and (Andreoni, 1984) with the insinuation that it is not 
‘Australian’. Where ‘Australians’ do take the opportunity to define themselves, 
there is a tendency to ridicule the idiosyncrasies of their identities: for example 
the recent 2002 and 2003 [docu]comedy Kath and Kim showing on ABC 
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation) television. Of course, this begs issues of 
class, and is beyond the scope of this hypothesis.    
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The acceptance of integration as an overt position is demonstrated, again, by 
Marlene further into the interview, and she signals that the advent of children 
born in Australia seems to ratify the integration. In her response she compares her 
own disposition and perspectives on life and living, with different attitudes she 
has observed among Australians:  
Marlene: There are Australians who have the same sort of attitude that I have. I will 
never become like some Australians but I will be like others. I actually would say that 
I’ve integrated now because my kids are Australians too. Yeah, we are Australians, and 
they are growing up the Australian way. 
Eleanor: And they were both born here, so they are Australian. 
Marlene’s observation acknowledges the multiple nature of Australian-ness, and 
this indicates further evidence of successful integration, because the necessity to 
imitate in order to assimilate has been resolved in the recognition of individual 
differences. Her impetuous, albeit superficial, comment that her children are 
“growing up the Australian way” is, I believe, an adoption/adaptation of what 
“the Australian way” means to her and her self-discovered identification with 
Australian-ness. Nevertheless, even in integration, there is a failure to claim 
ownership of Australian-ness, and I consider if this is because such claims are 
made on behalf of others—the real Aussies, from the bush? 
 
A child or children born in Africa and immigrating with their English-speaking 
parents (or parent) to Australia also encourages incorporation/integration into the 
society. From my own experience, the age of the child at the time of immigration 
is significant in this respect. Generally speaking, the younger the child the more 
likely the mother (in particular) will be to make contacts and friends within the 
community, usually through school and sporting activities.    
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Betty came to Australia in 1981, having left Zimbabwe very soon after Robert 
Mugabe came to power, motivated by her fear of becoming a refugee and her 
husband’s aversion to living in a communist country. I asked Betty about her 
children and if having school-aged children had assisted her in meeting 
Australians and integrating into the society: 
Eleanor: How many children have you got? 
Betty: Three boys. 
Eleanor: How old were they when you came to Australia? 
Betty: Jack was eleven and Benjamin was nine and Aaron was just six. 
Betty: And the women, I met quite a lot of women around, through school, through the 
clothing shop and I met quite a lot of women. And some of them had children in the same 
classes or something like that. And there were at least three or four from school who had 
been kind and I went round [to their homes] and they came to me and that type of thing. 
And there were the older
i (sic) women in Penguins [public speaking club] and they came 
and picked me up and I had some interesting trips you know, to listen to interesting 
speakers and things like that. The women were kind to me. 
Eleanor: And they were older (sic) women? 
Betty: Oh yes, absolutely! 
Not long after arriving in Australia she moved, with her husband and two of her 
children, to Kojonup, a small town in the Great Southern district of Western 
Australia. Betty told me it had taken her some time to make friends and she spoke 
about acceptance, integration, and belonging: 
Betty: But the people in Kojonup; we made lots of lovely friends there, although it took 
time. I felt like [Sara Dane]. I was watching Sara Dane on the TV at the time, she was 
having trouble with the women in Sydney who wouldn't accept her, and I felt I knew all 
about it. People were very friendly, greet you in the street. They’d say, “hello, how are 
you”, but that's where it stopped.  
 
The active pursuit to belong – with or without Australian-ness – is evident in 
Betty’s experiences. To help ease her way into the community Betty took up golf 
and, she said, “I got very involved in the [Anglican] church and in Rotary. So, we 
got well involved in everything. I had a very busy time but it took me time to get 
into the groups.” However, there is little respite from the continual negotiation of    
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borders and the neophyte may falter on the brink of integration; Betty said to me, 
“After six months that's when it suddenly hits you, this is the rest of my life, hey, 
I don't know if I can go on like this.” And I understand this sentiment—from a 
deep, deep part of me.  
 
I discussed with Betty the notion of immigrants from other lands coming into 
Australia and the impact on their children, the Australianisation of their children. 
She told me about an immigrant Italian family, neighbours at their first home in 
Perth, and the coincidences that surround their continuing friendship. Betty 
explained how the Italian family came to Australia with no English skills, “… 
they had huge trouble actually communicating in any form of English.” and few 
belongings, “…they had arrived with nothing, absolutely nothing [from Italy], a 
few things in a packing box. And their packing boxes were the basis of their 
furniture just about.” The coincidence of the Italian family purchasing a farm in 
Kojonup area meant that the friendship continued. Betty said, “We have actually 
kept contact with them, and then their grand-daughter was a student at Iona where 
I teach. And I mean the grand-daughter [is] absolutely Australian, totally—
although I knew she had Italian, very Italian, grandparents.” There is a reflection 
in Betty’s story of Anna-Maria Dell’oso—her experience of growing up, feeling 
herself as an Italian (or Italian-Australian) without her original language 
(Dell'oso, 1987), and my father’s family in Southern Rhodesia, bereft of their 
original language, and that is my loss too. 
 
My comment that the age of the child or children is significant in their assisting 
integration arises from the fact that my daughter was fifteen when we arrived in    
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Australia. In common with many teenagers, she wanted to be independent and to 
discover her new milieu on her own. So, apart from dropping her off at school in 
the morning, I had little contact with other parents and the parents of her friends. 
In addition, the necessity to work long hours precluded much in the way of 
socialising. My experiences are reflected in those of Sarah, who on arrival in 
Western Australia, moved immediately to the country. Two of Sarah’s three 
children had left school by the time they came to Australia. Sarah holds strong 
opinions about private schooling and the standard of education in Australia. She 
spoke of her reluctance to immigrate before she could afford to send her children 
to private schools in Australia.  
Sarah: I only wanted to immigrate when my second child had matriculated. So I got 
accepted in March 89 but we only immigrated in January 90 when Maureen had written 
matric. So I had two children out of matric. I didn’t like the [public] education system in 
Australia, [and] I couldn’t afford to have three children in private schools. [Before I 
immigrated] I managed to make a bit more money overseas and I could afford one in a 
private school. 
Eleanor: Three children? Three girls? 
Sarah: No, two girls and a boy. 
Eleanor: So when you came over in 1990 you went straight to Denmark? [in the Great 
Southern of Western Australia]  
Sarah: I went straight to Denmark. 
Eleanor: And both your children who had finished school came with you to Australia? 
Sarah: All three of my children came. It wasn’t easy for them. We had been here a week 
and I put the girls in an apartment that I’d bought in City Beach. I booked one into Carine 
[TAFE] to do hospitality, one into Edith Cowan University. And my son, I think we had 
been here two days and he went to boarding school, to Hale, and I went to the farm. I 
thought I’d see them more but 450 kilometres is a bit much. It had to be a long weekend. 
We didn’t see much of each other. Every single holiday they had to work on the farm, 
manual labour, with me. 
Eleanor: Because it was only you! So you had to do it! 
Sarah: Well, I’d never been without my kids. So they were left high and dry and I was 
left living alone for the first time in my entire life. 
 
I have already written of some of Sarah’s tribulations in Denmark and this excerpt 
from her interview articulates the isolation she felt as a new immigrant separated 
from home and family. I cite it here to reflect how the isolation sometimes present 
in the liminal stage impinges on the progress towards aggregation and the    
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consequent situating of self in the Australian context. And Sarah’s story is a 
reflection/remembrance of a non-English speaking farmer’s wife in colonial 
Rhodesia: I remember, again, my grandmother’s story about when she lived in the 
bush, when she had nobody to speak to—and nobody to listen to—apart from 
Papa and the children. Her isolation was not self-imposed, it was because she had 
no way of communicating either with the indigenous Africans—her white skin 
and language were an impenetrable barrier—or the white settlers because she did 
not ‘belong’, her language and cultural differences were strange and therefore 
unacceptable to the colonial Rhodesians. These examples portray the fact that the 
immigrant’s passage to belonging is beset with obstacles, and strewn with 
undefined boundaries that continuously require negotiation (Gunew, 1990). 
 
Vivian came to Australia in the early 1960s, via Canada and California. Seven of 
Vivian’s children were born overseas and two were born in Perth. Her husband 
left her when the youngest child was two-and-a-half and they had been in 
Western Australia for four-and-a-half years. She said, “I had a wonderful time 
being married to him and an even better time afterwards!” Her place while she 
was married to him, she said, was in the home. Vivian said that because she had 
children in school she was able to meet the other parents; she said she involved 
herself in things like “tuck-shop duty and the Parents Teachers Association” and 
this was part of her progress in integrating. Vivian says she enjoyed having a lot 
of children. As part of the integration process after her husband deserted her, 
Vivian revived her professional skills and established a consultancy with another 
architect. The irony is, as Vivian said, was that “I became a bigger and better 
architect than if he hadn’t left me”.    
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Amy and her family spent some time living in Melbourne in 1976 and in 
Canberra from 1979 until moving to Western Australia in 1982. Amy chose to 
situate herself in the home and in our conversation she said, “I’m the kind of 
person who quite enjoys being at home”. Being placed in the home, Amy found 
having children (two, both of whom were born when in Rhodesia) a means of 
making friends. She had established family in Australia: “I had family here, I had 
two sisters and a brother who had already immigrated. And [I also had] some 
cousins who had migrated here sometime before”. This is possibly why she says 
she did not feel lonely “in Australia”:  
Eleanor: And so when you arrived here [in Perth] Patrick would have been about eight?  
Amy: Yes he was. 
Eleanor: Did you find that, because of him being in school, that you could, that you made 
friends with the other mothers? Were you lonely? 
Amy: Yes. No I wasn’t [lonely] actually. I was, um, I was never very lonely in Australia, 
I think because the kids were just about going to school … I just got involved in school 
things. And, um, I’m the kind of person who quite enjoys being at home. You know, I 
don’t have to be out having a career all the time, I’m quite a ‘home-body’ so, um, so I 
was never really lonely. 
 
Clare said “I have lived in Oz since 1969 though, so consider myself Australian 
now”. And, how do we come to consider ourselves as Australians? There is the 
important factor of bureaucratic recognition, the right to vote, and the advantage 
of a ‘real’ passport. 
 
Therefore to cross the threshold is to unite oneself with a new world (van Gennep, 
1960, 20). 
 
The successful transfer into this, incorporation, the final stage of rites de passage 
is marked in the following example, by festive celebrations on 26 January, 
Australia Day. Each year, shortly before Australia Day, I receive in the mail an    
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invitation to view the Lotto Skyworks, held annually on the banks of the Swan 
River, with ex-Rhodesian friends. The ‘Butler Bash’ (a ‘corporate’ picnic) is held 
on the Perth foreshore and a large number of people are invited—not all ex-
Rhodesians and ex-Zimbabweans. Listed in the invitation for 2003, in ‘what to 
bring’, is “… as many friends as you wish, it is a great opportunity to share the 
wonderful feeling of being Australian with good friends” (my emphasis) (Personal 
Correspondence). 
 
Once the designated time of residency in Australia has been fulfilled, there are 
incentives for most immigrants to take up Australian citizenship. The question is, 
is it solely a pragmatic exercise that motivates us, as immigrants from Africa, to 
take Australian citizenship? The reason I pose this question becomes apparent in 
the experiences of the women in the study and is augmented by stories and 
anecdotes I have collected from my persistent scrutiny of immigrants from Africa. 
The topic of integration shows that the ceremony of naturalisation fits neatly into 
the aggregation/reaggregation stage, also called the ‘incorporation’ and 
‘emergence’, the final stage of rites de passage, elegantly noted as “[the] 
detachment of ritual subjects from their old places in society and return them, 
inwardly transformed and outwardly changed, to new places” (Turner, Victor, 
1977c, 36). It is the ceremony of naturalisation, the conferral of citizenship that 
marks the official recognition of integration but, as I have already indicated, the 
temporal parameters are fluid. Nowadays, the Department of Migration and 
Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) urges immigrants to take Australian citizenship. The 
banner on the government website urges “There’s never been a better time to 
become an Australian Citizen” (www.citizenship.gov.au) and the advertising    
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campaign appears on all television channels (2003). Linking this to the hypothesis 
previously mooted in this study that the satisfaction offered by compliance “… is 
due to the social effect of accepting influence” (emphasis in original) (Kelman, 
1958, 53), indicates that compliance allows the immigrant to belong in the 
society. In the context of taking Australian citizenship, I believe that the tacit 
coercion present in the government’s persuasion is the perceived social effect 
motivating the process of naturalisation, the effect presented being that the 
immigrant will then belong in the society. Therefore, the nexus between coercion 
and compliance is clear, and the view of which one it is (coercion or compliance) 
depends on the observer. There is hidden in this tacit coercion an indication that 
“… people are induced to want to do what they must do. In this sense ritual action 
is akin to a sublimation process, and one would not be stretching language unduly 
to say that its symbolic behaviour actually “creates” society for pragmatic 
purposes …” (Turner, 1974, 56). The perception of public rituals being tacit 
controlling factors in the creation of society is reiterated by Terence Turner and 
the notion of reflected image is apparent in this passage:  
[R]ituals are able to serve as mechanisms for exercising [such] control 
because they directly model, in their own structures, the hierarchical 
mechanism of control that forms an intrinsic part of the structure of 
the situations in question. The structure of ritual action, in other 
worlds (sic), directly embodies its own principle of effectiveness” 
(Turner, Terence S, 1977. 61-62). 
 
Official recognition bestowed on the neophyte with the oath swearing ceremony, 
certificate of citizenship, and the celebration that follows incorporates the 
attendant public acknowledgment of the change of status. Comparing the 
Australian naturalisation ceremony with the traditional ceremonies of rites de 
passage, it seems that not much has changed and even the sophistication with    
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which modern ceremonies are imbued is reflected and when scratching the 
surface of the modern ceremony, there appear, pentimento, shadows of past 
rituals of passage and incorporation. 
 
I consider my own experience of the naturalisation ceremony and, when I 
question the women in my sample about theirs, it is clear that many of the 
components concomitant to the completion of the rites of incorporation, are 
present. The recognition of integration that is granted to the neophyte in the 
ceremony of initiation/incorporation is as intrinsic in the traditional rites de 
passage as it is in the Australian naturalisation ceremony. The neophyte 
Australian must stand in front of authorised officials; the mayor; a member of 
parliament; civic councillors and other invited ‘witnesses’. The neophyte 
Australian must be seen by these witnesses to ceremonially make the move from 
immigrant to integrant by attending the ceremony in an authorised location; by 
swearing the oath of allegiance, and by receiving a gift that is a token of 
belonging. Besides Victor Turner and Arnold van Gennep, indications as to the 
relevance of ritual and ceremony in incorporation are noted, among others, in 
(Anderson, 1983; Connerton, 1989) and, obliquely, in (Douglas, 1983).  
 
I asked the women in my sample these questions: “Why did you take up 
Australian citizenship?” and “When did you take up Australian citizenship?” and 
I note that all of us have completed the naturalisation process. I asked other 
immigrants from Africa the same questions and on each occasion, when they have 
told me their experiences, there is an air of relief/achievement that they have 
accomplished this important ritual that recognises their integration. The reasons to    
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take Australian citizenship vary from case to case and for some the reasons seem, 
at first glance, to be altogether pragmatic, an exercise in expediency. But, even 
for these somewhat cynical ex-patriots, there is evidence of the desire to ‘belong’ 
in the new society. Among the points that are relevant to belonging, and being 
seen to belong, are the responsibilities inherent in being an Australian citizen, and 
these are set out in the ‘citizenship application package’ obtainable from DIMIA, 
and for which the immigrant applies, prior to an interview with an official from 
DIMIA. I flag the interview procedure here and will elaborate on this in due 
course. 
 
Primarily, however, there is in the privilege of becoming an Australian citizen the 
international recognition of being a citizen of a ‘real’ country and, for an ex-
Rhodesian, the knowledge that one is no longer one of the world’s pariahs. 
Associated with this affiliation is, of course, the convenience of having a passport 
that is recognised internationally. I found this aspect of taking Australian 
citizenship crucial in my own experience. I arrived here as a citizen of 
Rhodesia—a country which no longer existed—on an out-of-date Rhodesian 
passport (which, even if it hadn’t expired, was invalid almost everywhere in the 
world at that time with the exceptions of South Africa, Greece and Switzerland). 
The Australian Resident visa attached to the passport allowed me (and my 
daughter who was included on my passport) entry into Australia as immigrants. 
When we arrived here at the beginning of 1982 the regulatory period of residency, 
before applying for citizenship, was three years, thus making us eligible for 
citizenship early in 1985. In retrospect, I tend to think we assumed that the 
obligatory time of residency before naturalisation was the same as in South    
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Africa, that is, five years. However, early in 1985 the required time of residency 
in Australia (before naturalisation) was changed to two years and when this 
adjustment was brought to our notice (in the newspaper) we applied for 
citizenship forthwith. Once completed, this step would give us the right to vote, 
hold an Australian passport and be, to all intents and purposes, ‘Australians’ with 
all the privileges and attendant responsibilities.  
 
The process after submitting the application for citizenship takes some time and, 
as a family unit, we were summoned to attend an official interview with a 
representative of (what is now called) DIMIA and which, I presume, was to 
ensure we were who we said we were, and that our residency credentials were 
bona fide. Prior to the interview we had been sent brochures that listed our rights 
as Australians and also the responsibilities that being an Australian citizen 
entailed and we understood that we would be questioned on these topics; this part 
of the interview felt like an examination and we hoped we had passed.
ii  
 
In researching this section of the chapter, I was struck by the scope implied in the 
name ‘Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs’. My 
interest was sparked by a passage in an essay on multicultural writing where the 
author comments: “In part the ambiguities surrounding the use of the term 
‘multiculturalism’ centre around who is considered to be included … the term is 
restricted to those from non-English-speaking backgrounds so that Anglo-Celts 
are not included … By the same token Aboriginal writers using English (instead 
of being represented in translation) are also considered ‘ethnics’” (Gunew, 1990, 
111). The incongruity of Aboriginal Australians being included with, perhaps as,    
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immigrants foregrounds the arrogance of assumed ‘real’ Australian-ness by the 
dominant Anglo-Celt and Anglo-Saxon group, and this presumption is legitimised 
in the pompous public nomenclature. The outsided-ness of Aboriginal Australians 
is an extensive topic and one which falls outside of the paradigms of this thesis, 
but the significance is noted.  
 
I return now to the processes of ritual in the attainment of Australian citizenship. 
Once we had ‘passed’ the interview and permission to take Australian citizenship 
was approved, we waited for the City of Melville, our local council, to send us an 
invitation to attend a citizenship ceremony in the Civic Centre. Relating this 
process to the traditional final stage in rites de passage is not difficult. In Ndembu 
tradition, for example, a sacred space for ritual may be indicated by a circle of 
branches, “… to create a sacred space that rapidly achieves structure … in this 
way a small realm of order is created the formless milieu of the bush” (Turner, 
Victor, 1977b, 23). The Main Hall is clearly an ‘authorised location’ or a ‘sacred 
space’ and the order is implied in that it is situated in the local seat of power—
that of the local government. We were allowed to invite three or four people as 
guests: ‘witnesses’ to our transformation. There were many ‘new’ Australians at 
the ceremony, from all parts of the world—a multicultural gathering. The 
ceremony took place as planned and as our names we called, we stood and moved 
to the front of the hall where we swore the oath of allegiance—in those days to 
“the Queen of Australia”—on the Bible. If memory serves, the Muslims who 
were present swore on the Koran, and those of other faiths, or no faith, on any 
book or object of symbolic authority for them. The image of this “touching a 
sacred object” to seal the oath is reflected in van Gennep’s comment “through    
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touching simultaneously or one after the other a sacred object” (1960, 29). After 
swearing the oath of allegiance, we received a gift from the Council; a corsage for 
the women and a pen for the men, and each couple received a bound Bible as did 
each individual. At the conclusion of the ceremony we were invited to partake of 
refreshments with the Councillors. Jokes about Vegemite sandwiches and pies 
were made as the participants stood, self-consciously, around the room.  
 
This sequence of events seems to be the normal procedure at most of the 
naturalisation ceremonies I have attended in Australia—the ceremony, the gifts, 
the refreshments and the (weak) jokes. The informal ritual that takes place after 
the ceremony is relevant to the public acknowledgment of transformation from 
one state to another, and van Gennep’s words (already cited) illustrate this: “the 
rite of eating and drinking together … is clearly a rite of incorporation, of 
physical union, and has been called a sacrament of communion” (van Gennep, 
1960, 29), and Sneja Gunew’s rendition of ‘assimilation’ as a visceral event 
imparts a droll spin to the occasion (Gunew, 1999, 146). However, because the 
participants are unknown to each other – most have never met before the 
ceremonial event, and while there is a faintly embarrassed air of conviviality, 
there is no indication of any comradeship; there is no cohort, and this is a 
departure from the traditional rites. However, on another level, this reflects the 
notion of the ritual [re]constituting the social structure and I reiterate (part of) the 
quotation previously cited: “The structure of ritual action, in other worlds (sic), 
directly embodies its own principle of effectiveness” (Turner, Terence S, 1977. 
61-62). And, I posit that this part of the naturalisation ceremony is, in microcosm, 
an accurate reflection of the structure of Australian society.    
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The staff at my place of work at the bookshop, many of whom were by this stage 
my friends, planned a surprise party for me on 13 September, the day after our 
naturalisation ceremony. A huge cake decorated to look like the Australian flag 
was brought in to work, and I found the occasion to be highly emotional. Whether 
this was because of becoming an Australian or the fact that these people thought 
enough of me to plan such a treat is debatable, but when I look at photographs of 
that experience today, I find it difficult to relate to the woman in the picture that is 
me. Part of my memory of this event is a large lump of sponge cake with cobalt 
blue icing (that had stained the yellow sponge) that remained in the freezer for 
months afterwards, too emotionally valuable to throw away, but totally inedible. 
Perhaps it stood as a symbol of ‘belonging’ (at last) so how could I throw it out? I 
ponder, now, on the importance I invested in this mouldy piece of doughy cake, 
taking it as a symbol of being an Australian. Perhaps the official ceremony was 
not the final step into incorporation, perhaps the negotiation of boundaries was/is 
set to continue, indefinitely. 
 
Did the official recognition of becoming Australian change me? The question is 
layered. In my own perceptions of my Australian-ness there was ambivalence, I 
didn’t know (and sometimes I still don’t know). Was my Australian-ness apparent 
to people who had known me ‘before’ – when I was, amongst other identities, 
‘Rhodesian’? After taking up citizenship we registered to vote and applied for 
passports. The following year (1986) we visited Zimbabwe for my mother’s 
eightieth birthday. This was the first time I had returned to Zimbabwe since 1981 
when I had gone home to say goodbye to my family before leaving Africa for    
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Australia. The remarkable thing I discovered on this first return visit to Zimbabwe 
after becoming an Australian citizen, was the curious way the people in 
Zimbabwe treated me. My accent was declared to be strongly Australian—after 
four years in this country.
iii Many of the Australian stereotypes were applied to 
my husband, my daughter, and myself, and that was bewildering—after all, we 
were still doing that to real Australians ourselves. In retrospect, I consider that is 
part of becoming an Australian; the beginning of the ending of belonging in my 
country of birth; the end of the sense of belonging among my friends and family. 
So, now I can look back and see that at this stage I was never a Zimbabwean, no 
longer a Rhodesian, but not yet an Australian. At the beginning of this chapter I 
wrote about discharging my previous identity as if it were connected to the 
deterioration of my remembered matrix. I spoke about the feeling I had of 
becoming ‘more’ Australian as the situation in Zimbabwe disintegrated. I said 
“The worse the situation gets in Zimbabwe, the more Australian I become”. I 
understand now that this trip to Zimbabwe in 1986 was the beginning of the 
discharging of Rhodesian identity. Not arriving in Australia, not the citizenship 
ceremony, not living here, in Australia, for decades—but returning home and 
discovering that ‘I’ was no longer there.  
 
To continue using the metaphor of the transplanted tree, in this case myself—
myself as the tree—I had been placed in a new location but had not yet started to 
take root and flourish. I remember that, at the beginning of 1986 whilst we were 
in Africa, a general election was taking place in Australia and as citizens we were 
obliged to vote. At this stage, not having followed the politics in any informed 
way and having little knowledge of the voting system in Australia, I filled in my    
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postal ballot arbitrarily—not an intentional ‘donkey vote’ (or, as I would have 
called it then, ‘a spoiled paper’) but, nevertheless, a complete mish-mash. So this 
was how it felt, being a liminal persona in Zimbabwe; being officially recognised 
as an Australian by having the vote—having to vote—but, within myself, not 
quite accepting my newly bestowed Australian-ness there in Africa, nor, it must 
be said, when we returned, in Australia. Clearly, the stage of integration overlaps 
the liminal and the liminal stage overlaps the separation and the imbrication 
covers the entirety. These are the passages within passages, doorways within 
doorways, and these are the spaces that become areas and intervals of 
significance. Once again, it is the ambiguity of being an immigrant, and while 
being labelled ‘Australian’ by friends and family, knowing I wasn’t that, any 
more than I was a Zimbabwean. It is the constant negotiation with the society, 
wherever situated, that confers the feelings of belonging, not belonging, or being 
an observer in the margin.  
 
I return to the questions I asked the women in my sample: “Why did you take up 
Australian citizenship?” and “When did you take up Australian citizenship?” 
Their answers are varied but the underlying structure is similar; sometimes the 
answer to the first question is embedded in the answer to the second. For 
example, Marlene told me about her Australian naturalisation ceremony in 1983. 
She said:  
It was a fantastic ceremony, held in Melbourne. I received a wattle at the ceremony 
which we planted [when we lived] in Melbourne. The people at work all stopped work 
and the MD came and presented me with a folder they had made up about Aussie things, 
[and] a pie and a beer! I was so touched! After the ceremony, all our friends went out for 
dinner. They were so thrilled that some foreigner had taken out Australian citizenship – 
and I thought it was just for the passport! It was really very lovely. 
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There is an element of cynical amusement in Marlene’s words. The notion of 
becoming an Australian for the sake of getting a valid passport seems humorous 
to her now but, at the time, after struggling with Rhodesian, Zimbabwe/Rhodesian 
and other interim passports, the luxury of having a passport that was recognised 
internationally was most decidedly a prize. Taking Marlene’s experience (and my 
own) of the Australian celebration of immigrants taking citizenship I asked 
Robin, my Australian-born friend, her thoughts on the importance of taking 
Australian citizenship and the naturalisation ceremony. She told me:  
I think many Australian born people have a greater respect for those that take out 
citizenship and this public ceremony makes the immigrant more visible to the community 
as now being ‘one of them’ albeit a ‘new’ one of them! Swearing allegiance to another 
country you have no history with is strange – bet they don’t stop cheering for SA or Zim 
in the cricket! Why would they? Their hearts and history [are] not Australian (Personal 
Correspondence). 
 
Robin’s response and my own experience at the bookshop where my Australian-
born colleagues were enthusiastic enough (about my naturalisation) to prepare a 
surprise party for me, leads me to believe that, by making this public commitment 
to Australia, the endorsement of fellow citizens is akin to the congratulations 
offered to the parents at the birth of a baby. In traditional rites de passage, once 
the final rituals are completed, the acceptance as a full member into the 
community is unremarkable. According to van Gennep, the final act in an 
initiation (which in his example includes a “special mutilation”) “… makes the 
novice forever identical with the [adult] members” (van Gennep, 1960, 75). 
Theoretically, that is the intention of the naturalisation ceremony, to make the 
new Australians “forever identical” with other Australians and, tacitly, in the 
subtext already discussed, the mimesis inherent in the relation between the society 
and the ceremony reinforces this hypothesis. 
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Sarah, from Zambia, had a number of reasons that motivated her to take 
Australian citizenship, and she told me about them in a recent letter:  
I took up my Australian citizenship as soon as I qualified (i.e. two years to the day and 
the time it took to process!) It was an amazing relief to get it as I had been on probation 
with business migrant status for two years and now nobody could reserve the right to 
kick me out, and at last I belonged somewhere that I could vote for the first time in my 
life! Sadly, I then discovered that I did not want to vote for any of them, watching them 
performing like rude seals in parliament (Personal Correspondence). 
 
In this letter, Sarah is clear about the feeling of security citizenship has given her. 
Her sense of belonging is stated openly in her desire to fulfill the responsibilities 
of an Australian citizen, particularly in being enfranchised to vote. The 
disillusionment she feels in the standards of political representation is worth 
commenting on: I believe that it is the image of an egalitarian Australia that is 
projected in the oath of allegiance, made by immigrants at the citizenship 
ceremony, that leads new Australians, such as Sarah, to envisioning/anticipating 
an idealised model of political representation. I flag here that the oath (or pledge) 
that is used now does not refer to the ‘Queen of Australia’, but to ‘Australia and 
its people’. I will elaborate on this in the following chapter: the final reprise.  
 
Betty arrived in Australia in January 1981, and took up her citizenship in July 
1984 when she was living in Kojonup. She said “we took the oath at the Shire 
Office”. The ceremony was held in the afternoon after the monthly Shire Council 
meeting and the participants had tea with the Councillors after the ‘swearing the 
oath of allegiance’ ceremony. Betty said she was not expecting there to be any 
other people taking the ceremony; she thought that they were the only immigrants 
in the area. However, there was a family from Katanning: the man worked as a 
meat worker in the abattoir there. Betty said she felt they had nothing in common 
with this family and she said “I actually felt quite uncomfortable about it, I had a    
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problem with this, to do with equality”. When I reflect on Betty’s words, I find 
the notion of belonging, and wanting to belong, returns. I question whether she 
wanted the Australia she now belonged to, to be a reflection of Anglo-Australia 
and the Islander family from Katanning were, clearly, not Anglo-Australian. 
Overall, in discussing the procedure, Betty said, “Although I was happy to be 
made Australian, the oath swearing was just a formality to legalise how I’d been 
living [as an Australian] and to get the passport.” The gift she received from the 
council was a bunch of flowers and she told me she remembers feeling 
embarrassed walking home afterwards, through the main street in Kojonup, 
carrying this huge bunch of flowers “like a bride”. 
 
Vivian, who travelled on a British passport, kept it for some years after 
immigrating, until circumstances warranted her taking Australian citizenship. 
Unfortunately, Vivian was reluctant for the circumstances to be examined in this 
research. Her refusal allows me to reiterate that, in my interpretation of feminist 
ethnographic research, the respect I have for the women in my sample is 
sacrosanct and this is expressed in the following form, signed by my protagonists 
at the very beginning of the process: 
If I require certain parts of my history to remain confidential, I will 
indicate this to the Researcher (Eleanor) and she will act accordingly 
and discuss with me the means by which the information can be used 
without personal implication, and she will abide by my final decision 
(Form of Consent).  
 
However, in a recent telephone conversation Vivian told me, again, how proud 
she is to be an Australian citizen and how much she appreciates being able to live 
here. It seems that the responsibilities of being a citizen in Australia are taken    
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seriously, not only by Vivian, but by all the protagonists in my sample as well as 
many of the ex-Zimbabwean immigrants I know in Western Australia. 
 
In a letter, Robin (my Australian-born colleague) writes that she sees the 
naturalisation as a “Ceremony of acknowledgment/acceptance and one that 
provides the device through which the participant can be incorporated into 
Australian society.” The publicly witnessed recognition of the ‘transformation’ is 
positive according Robin; she continues, “[It] is Public—in front of family, 
friends, community and public officials.” I confirm that this public 
acknowledgment of citizenship follows that part of the reaggregation ritual in 
rites de passage, when the novitiate is seen to be accepted in their new identity—
by a public proclamation and admission. This is the “… symbolic birth or 
reincorporation into society” (Turner, 1974, 53). In a more esoteric locus, this is 
the state of ‘Emergence’ that I have mentioned in the feminist psychological 
model of rites of passage that corresponds, in a tenuous way, with that of the 
more traditional (male-oriented) rites de passage. The three stages in the feminist 
psychological model are Containment, Transformation and Emergence, and the 
neophyte ends her “ordeal” when “…she has enfolded her experience within, and 
the veil is lifted. [And] finally she develops an affinity with other people who 
have been analyzed or initiated, an affinity based on a shared experience of depth 
or meaning that leads to a more conscious worldview” (Rutter, 1994, 172). I 
understand this to be the self-recognition of completion of the third stage of the 
rites of passage and I extend my understanding of this notion of ‘shared 
experience of depth or meaning’ in the conclusion of this chapter. 
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From her point of view as Australian-born, Robin tells me that she is, in some 
ways, envious of “these people” [immigrants] because “… they participate in a 
ritual that I can never participate in [in Australia] and, in some ways, are able to 
express a level of Australian-ness that I cannot”. She adds, “I think we born-and-
bred Australians don’t have/make the opportunity to reflect on what it means to 
belong to Australia – we take our citizenship for granted” (Personal Email). In a 
recent citizenship ceremony I attended, the Mayor expressed a similar wish in her 
speech, and in fact, included in the ceremony an Affirmation of Australian 
Citizenship: “Affirmation by an Australian Citizen”. It is, however, the approval 
of the Australians present at the ceremony that validates the integration of the 
immigrant into the society. Nevertheless, both the Mayor’s and Robin’s desire to 
publicly acknowledge their Australian-ness are not unique, and are also apparent 
in Marlene’s story of the party that was given on her behalf when she took her 
Australian citizenship, and the celebratory Australian flag decorated cake given to 
me on 13 September 1985 the day after I took up my citizenship. Both 
celebrations were organised by Australian-born people. The popularity of 
Australia Day on 26 January gives many Australian people the chance to show 
their appreciation of being Australian. Is there, therefore, irony in the invitation to 
celebrate ‘our’ (ex-Rhodesian) Australian-ness at the Australia Day fireworks on 
the Perth foreshore? We each come to view this conspicuous display of patriotism 
with our own ideas of what it means to be Australian, and possibly for reasons 
that have nothing to do with Australian-ness at all. The issues that surround 
Australian-born people affirming their Australian-ness with ceremonial rites are 
addressed further in the following chapter: Reprise, and I will compare recent, 
smaller ceremonies with the major celebrations of the Bicentennial in 1988.    
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Robin asked me, “Have all the participants in your research been naturalized?” 
She mentions that she knows of people who have come to live in Australia who 
have chosen not to become citizens but does not elaborate. However, her 
reflection on immigrants refusing to take citizenship, or not taking citizenship for 
whatever reasons, segues into the part of my thesis where I suggest the presence, 
or rather, the vacancy of failed integration, or the denial of integration, or the 
unsuccessful passage from migration to integration for reasons that I have 
examined in the course of this study. The question of acceptance and belonging is 
not far removed in Robin’s reasoning and she asks the rhetorical question, “Is the 
need for acceptance greater in people fleeing from their country … I wonder what 
the reasoning is for not becoming an Australian citizen?” and she relates this ‘not 
becoming an Australian “… to those – e.g. Poms – who emigrate because they 
can and whose system of government and governance is still intact?” She 
concludes with the remark that echoes my question at the start of this chapter, 
“What I am asking is, what drives them [the women in this research] to take 
citizenship, are the reasons purely practical?” (Personal Correspondence), and I 
reflect on a naturalisation ceremony I attended earlier this year (2003) for my 
brother and his wife. When I compare their ceremony to ours, I am aware of how 
much more – grateful is the word that comes to mind – they were, when officially 
‘initiated’. During the swearing of the oath of allegiance, both of them were 
moved to tears. I can’t remember feeling anything like that, I remember being 
concerned in case I had raised the ‘wrong’ hand.  
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The final conclusion is not one of conviction. The new Australian faces a 
continual negotiation of identity; the continual negotiation of boundaries, and the 
fluctuations between feeling integrated and belonging, against those of feeling 
forgotten, foreign/alien, and not belonging. There is also the privileged place of 
being an observer in the margin—a locus that I, personally, have learned to covet 
and relinquish only under duress—and all of these are present at some time, in 
some way throughout the rites of passage that we, as immigrants, undertake. But 
it is in the final stage, the integration/aggregation stage, the Emergence as ‘adept’ 
stage, that these elements become, albeit fleetingly, dramatic. The drama of 
fireworks on Australia Day, cakes decorated with flags, ceremonies and 
celebrations, gifts of Bibles and flowers, and then the mundanity of existence 
returns, I have likened the process of transformation, from immigrant to integrant, 
to that of ‘enlightenment’, and I return to that simile here. There is a poem written 
a millenium ago by an unknown Chinese Zen master, and this is what he wrote: 
Chopping wood, 
carrying water 
Magical power, 
marvelous action! 
Chopping wood, 
carrying water
iv 
 
That is the discovery, that is the conclusion. As Rhodesians, before the 
immigration begins, metaphorically we chop wood and carry water, signifying the 
quotidian chores of existence—a metaphor within a metaphor—and after the 
celebrations – “Magical power, marvelous action” – that mark the final stage of 
initiation we resume the quotidian chores of existence: chopping wood and 
carrying water. As part of the process we begin to learn, to understand who we 
are; some of us may move ahead blindly, taking for granted the privileges and    
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benefits of life in Australia: but for others there is a metanoia, “a fundamental 
change in character, way of life … a spiritual conversion” (Chambers 20
th 
Century Dictionary). The changes that occur in our understanding of the society 
and the community to which we belong may well be part of the 
integration/aggregation process, but could also be how we live our lives anyway.  
 
In the following and final chapter, I resume the debate surrounding Australian 
identity and seek some form of closure within the paradigms of this dissertation. 
Thus, working from the flawed base of perpetual change and incomplete-ness, I 
seek to draw the many and complex threads together—from the method and 
preparation of this dissertation, the review of the literature, and the historical 
background that support and project into the first panel of the triptych. I revisit 
the central panel of the triptych—where the liminal personae tread and re-tread 
their own passages of transformation—and then re-member the memories that 
trigger the desire to return ‘home’. And, finally, I offer the reprise of integration 
to complete the mosaic (collage, bricolage) so that there is some conclusion, 
however elusive it may be. 
 
                                                 
i This is the first mis-transcription of ‘Aussie’ as ‘older’ that I have referred to in Chapter Six: 
‘Limen: the ambivalent neophyte’, hereafter signalled thus (sic). 
 
ii There was a subcontext to this interview that I was aware of but that, even now, I am unable to 
translate. It seems that I am not the only immigrant who ‘tapped in’ to this meta-interview; 
apocryphal understanding amongst ex-patriot Rhodesians and South Africans has it, that, it is at 
this interview that the DIMIA official checks your ‘whiteness’ and ability to speak English, and I 
suggest that these beliefs are the projection of residual memories of colour monitoring during 
Apartheid in South Africa; or bureaucracy in colonial Africa; or, possibly, hearsay about the 
postwar White Australia Policy. 
 
iii I have previously suggested that accents were (and are) an obsession in Rhodesia (and also in 
South Africa) and are seen as crucial in indicating the social status and antecedents of the 
protagonist. 
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iv From Zen Forest, translated by Soiku Sigematsu.    
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Chapter Nine  
 
 
 
 
Reprise 
 
 
Australian citizenship – A sense of belonging  
(Logo on Australian citizenship pledge card: Affirmation by an Australian 
Citizen). 
 
In this final chapter, I continue to explore the debate surrounding celebrations of 
Australian identity that I flagged in the previous chapter, and look at some 
contemporary commentary on the ‘ownership’ and the contested space of 
Australian identity. I establish some understanding, albeit speculative, of the 
issues. Following this final exploration of identity, I revisit the naturalisation 
ceremony from the vantage point of a research student and an Australian. I then 
return to the dissertation as a completed entity—with a beginning, a middle and 
an end—and I reprise from the beginning; moving from, and between, the method 
and preparation, the review of the literature, and the historical background. The 
separation stage of rites de passage begins in the first panel of the triptych and in 
this reprise I touch briefly on some of the points that were discussed. The 
supporting chapters for the central panel, Identity I and Identity II, expanded the    
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tropes of identity, assimilation and integration and these were further rehearsed in 
the principal image of the central panel, the liminal. Further analysis and 
interpretation occurred in the supporting chapter of the third panel where re-
membering the memories triggered the desire to return ‘home’. And, finally, I 
revisit the trope of integration to complete the mosaic (collage, bricolage) so that 
there is some conclusion, however transitory and elusive it may be. 
 
David Armstrong, [the original] Director of the Australian Bicentennial 
Authority, sees the aim of the 1988 celebrations as being ‘to find a national 
identity’ (White, 1981, 171). 
 
Seeking the real Australian has been a recurring theme throughout this 
dissertation. As I research the literature, I find that I am not alone in this quest, 
although my reasons appear to differ from those that predominate. However, it is 
significant to my purpose to understand the predominant investigation, and to this 
end I observe and strive to remember the 1988 Bicentennial that marked the 
arrival of white Australians in Sydney, New South Wales in 1788. In my personal 
memory, living in Western Australia, the Bicentennial did not seem an important 
occasion. Indeed, many West Australians were sceptical, as David Hollinsworth 
has remarked, of “… the equating of the founding of the nation with the landing 
at Sydney [and saw the event] as arrogant as well as incorrect” (Hollinsworth, 
1998, 193). The contested space of Australian national identity and, as I have 
indicated, Australian national history, was thrown into the public arena. The 
literature shows some magnificent discrepancies of who, and what, a real 
Australian is considered to be, and this leads me to the understanding that Richard 
White was correct when he stated, “A national identity is an invention” (White,    
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1981, viii). The politicians claimed then, and still claim now, an homogenised 
identity for Australians that I find is usually a transparent ploy to separate 
‘Australians’ from the ‘others’. Paradoxically, when some people claim 
ownership of Australian-ness—specifically Aboriginal Australian-ness, they are 
held under the microscope, both by the media and their peers, and their 
antecedents rigourously examined. During the Bicentennial year, and 
subsequently, controversies surrounding identity were more noticeable than usual. 
This was particularly conspicuous in the Indigenous and academic literary spheres 
where, for example, the Aboriginal author, academic and critic, Mudrooroo 
criticised academic and author Sally Morgan for claiming Aboriginal heritage in 
her book My Place (1987) having clearly claimed his own ‘ownership’ of 
Aboriginal identity, for example when he wrote in response to a journal article on 
Aboriginality, “I stress here that I have been among many Aboriginal groups 
throughout Australia, not as a scholar, but as a member of the community” 
(Nyoongah, 1992, 156). Mudrooroo was, according to Maureen Clark in the 
journal, Kunapipi, “Acknowledged for over two decades as the arbitrator in 
matters of authentic Aboriginal writing, [his] was the voice of Indigenous 
Australia” (2001, 48). The subsequent events lead me to re-visit notions of the 
tricky situations inherent in taking a position on the moral high ground, and 
advance the idea that it is, more-than-likely, a hill of decomposing manure. The 
repercussions of this debate were still echoing in 2001 and the literature shows 
there was some stringent criticism when Mudrooroo was ‘unmasked’ in 1996, 
particularly pertaining to the emerging story that he had knowingly constructed 
his false Aboriginal identity (Clark, 2001, 48). This dialogue leads me to consider 
that, perhaps, claiming Australian identity and attributing Australian identity are    
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more closely related than first meets the eye. By this I mean when somebody says 
“He’s a real Australian, from the bush” they are attributing Australian-ness to an 
imaginary person; and when they claim (as I do) “I am an Australian” this is also 
an imaginary destination, because I really do not know if I am an Australian, or 
just pretending to be one. I can identify with Eva Cox when she says “So I am 
Australian because my lapsed passport says I am …” (Cox, 1992, 65). Thus, I 
believe that claiming Australian-ness in an offhand, casual, or humorous way 
signals no ownership of the identity, deflects criticism, and adds to the 
multiplicity of Australian-ness that has a disregard for political coercion that 
pushes for national identity. 
 
The celebratory aspect of the 1988 Bicentennial was, I believe, a politically 
driven exercise for reasons of fabricating and consolidating an ‘Australian’ 
nationality. This is borne out in the literature surrounding celebrations and the 
manufacture of nationality; for instance, Benedict Anderson (1983) Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, and Paul 
Connerton (1989) in his How Societies Remember, in particular the chapter 
relating to commemorative ceremonies—where he evokes the commemorative 
rites of the National Socialist Party of the Third Reich in Germany (Connerton, 
1989, 41-71). There is a reflection in this of my argument in the previous chapter, 
that the naturalisation ceremony is a way of coercing immigrants to comply and 
thus to join the society: I wrote, compliance allows the immigrant to belong in the 
society. I have already cited Victor Turner commenting that, “… people are 
induced to want to do what they must do [and this] symbolic behaviour actually 
“creates” society for pragmatic purposes …” (Turner, 1974, 56). The pragmatic    
253
 
purposes of celebration to create society link, again, to my argument regarding the 
political agenda inherent in the nature of national celebration and, more 
particularly, individual naturalisation ceremonies.  
 
There’s never been a better time to become an Australian Citizen 
(www.citizenship.gov.au) (Television advertisement, all channels) (2003). 
 
I have determined, in my thesis, ways in which the transformation from 
immigrant to integrant may be achieved. I have situated the process by which the 
women in my study (and myself) have located ourselves in Australia, as 
Australians, within the paradigm of the rites de passage. Therefore, in this, the 
conclusion of my thesis, I, as an ‘Australian’, revisit the naturalisation ceremony 
that immigrants are required to participate in to become citizens. The validation 
bestowed by a public ceremony is incisive to the sense of becoming a citizen. The 
relinquishment of previous citizenship is a public affirmation of severance of 
previous allegiance and national identity. However, I flag here that this statement 
needs to be qualified, and the reasons behind this qualification are that, in the 
recent past (April 2002) the government of Australia has permitted citizens to 
hold dual nationality. This duality is effective only where other governments also 
approve, such as Britain and New Zealand. The extent of the evolution of the 
naturalisation ceremony became apparent to me recently, once again at the 
Melville Civic Centre, the same public venue where my family and I attended 
‘our’ ceremony in 1985 and where we swore allegiance, received Australian 
citizenship and the certificates that are the proof of our Australian-ness. My 
attendance at the more recent ceremony was in the interests of this research and 
not as an invited guest or participant. My plan was to be positioned in the    
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wondrous place of non-participant ‘observer’; even, perhaps, the ‘god’s-eye’ 
place that I have previously denied/denigrated. In the event, I discovered that, for 
me, participation in one form or another, seems to be mandatory.  
 
This is the scenario: I telephoned Melville council to find out when the next 
ceremony was due to be held and spoke to the Civic Functions Officer.
i I 
explained my request and my reasons for wanting to attend and he invited me to 
the [monthly] ceremony to be held the following week. We arranged to meet prior 
to the commencement of the proceedings in the conference room where the 
ceremony is now held. From the outset I begin to doubt my memory that our 
initiation was in the Main Hall. The conference room looks familiar although it 
does seem smaller. The room is decorated with symbols representing outback 
Australia – to reflect that 2003 is the ‘year of the outback’. The Australian flag is 
prominently displayed and an unpretentious portrait of Queen Elizabeth II is 
attached to the lectern. There are five or six rows of chairs, set in a semi-circle, to 
seat the 58 candidates and their guests – approximately 200 chairs altogether, On 
one side of the room there is a table and chairs for children; on it are colouring-in 
books “with an Australian theme”. On another table are the gifts for the 
participants. I asked the officer about the gifts and he explains that Bibles are no 
longer given, “because” he says “some participants have been offended at 
receiving a Christian Bible”. This requires me to reframe my conjecture in the 
previous chapter ‘Integration’ where I presumed that those of Islamic faith 
received a copy of the Koran as a gift – although this may have been the case in 
1985. Nowadays, in the City of Melville, the gift presented to the ‘new’ 
Australians is the certificate of naturalisation, framed. After the ceremony when I    
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talk to some of the recipients, I discover that this gift is not necessarily 
appreciated because the current certificate includes the citizen’s date of birth. One 
woman explained to me, “Even my children don’t know how old I am, so I won’t 
be able to hang this up anywhere!”  
 
I asked the Functions Officer about swearing the oath of allegiance, and what 
happens if the participant does not wish to use the Bible; he tells me that if people 
require another book (or object) on which to swear, they can be accommodated 
and the appropriate Bible or book will be provided, but usually there is no need 
and a symbolic object is not used at all. Therefore, I believe that there is a 
civility/consideration apparent in this desire not to offend any one of a number of 
ethnicities and that this has resulted in a more egalitarian ceremony less directed 
at the Anglo-Saxon Christian and serves to incorporate members of under-
represented groups in the Melville City district.  
 
At the appointed time the doors were opened and the participants and their guests 
filed into the conference room. I was able to speak to the representatives from the 
Australian Electoral Office who had set up a table directly outside the door (to 
enrol the ‘new’ Australians as voters as soon as they come out after the 
ceremony). I also spoke to the Mayor for a few minutes before we went into the 
room and she inquired as to my interest and presence at the ceremony. During the 
ceremony she introduced me to the audience as a research student from Murdoch 
University, which revelation destroyed my ‘gods-eye’ observer position but 
allowed me to approach some of the participants after the ceremony—and most of 
them were willing to talk to me about their experience.     
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In her introductory speech, the Mayor stressed the importance of the decision to 
take Australian citizenship and signalled the separation from the home country by 
saying: “You will be declaring allegiance to Australia by becoming a citizen and 
leaving the country of your birth behind” (Transcript of Mayoral Address). The 
most significant addition to the speech and symbolic of the evolution of the 
ceremony were these words, “We recognise the living culture of the Nyoongar 
People and the unique contribution they make to the life of the Melville region” 
(Transcript of Mayoral Address). Finally, the Mayor spoke of the reciprocal rights 
and the obligations of citizenship, “uniting all Australians while respecting their 
diversity” (Mayoral Address). 
 
I have indicated that at the conclusion of the ceremony I was able to speak to 
some of the participants: I asked an English couple why they had decided to take 
Australian citizenship after living in this country for four or five years, and in 
their reply they mentioned dual citizenship. This, they said had been a deciding 
factor, as neither of them were willing to relinquish their British Passports. As I 
moved around the room, I found that, by permitting dual citizenship, a number of 
British and New Zealand citizens made the decision to take up Australian 
citizenship. Most of the comments I heard, however, were to do with the splendid 
singing from the a cappella male-voice choir and the delicious food supplied by 
the Melville Council. There was a general sense of relief that the formalities of 
the affair were now over, and we could go home and resume our lives as we had 
lived them before: “Chopping wood/carrying water …” and, on an esoteric level, 
resume the continual crossing of the boundaries between assimilation and    
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integration—negotiations that most likely depend on where we are and who we 
are with. 
 
Sometimes I say I had to write that whole book to find out what I wrote on that 
last day. Discovery and invention can lie very close to each other (Modjeska, 
2002, 94). 
 
reprise (Spens. reprize) ri-prîz’, v.t. to gain anew (obs.): to recapture (obs.): to 
renew, repeat, reissue (Chambers 20
th Century Dictionary). 
 
The structure of this thesis reflects the tripartite panels of rites de passage (as 
suggested by Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner), and in exploring these 
passages I have found auxiliary/additional locations within them: passages within 
passages; meta-passages, and parallel paths. I have taken the minutiae of 
experiences from the narrative of the immigrant women in my study, and situated 
them in the passages and on the paths. In the introduction, I used the metaphor of 
a physical map because I believe that the flexible and enigmatic configurations 
are easily associated with rites de passage in immigration. This over-arching view 
of the process as a physical map, in this reprise of the thesis, allows me to 
reiterate that my own conformation is mapped too, for the stories of my life are 
also made visible. In this metaphor I am not presuming to inscribe the landscape 
of Australia, merely finding my own conformation within and upon it; although 
the thoughts that prompted this meditation had their genesis in the history of the 
original white settlers who reinscribed the Australian landscape as an “… 
unfettered exercise of mastery …” (Hollinsworth, 1998, 187). However, in my 
study as the allegorical map is ‘read’ there is a sequence—a continuity—that 
traces the transformation from immigrant to integrant to this point where, at last,    
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there is capacity to locate ourselves in Australia, and the potential to see ourselves 
as ‘Australians’ and it is likely that no ‘masterful’ inscription is made at all.  
 
At this late stage of writing, the thought occurs to me that the triptych could be 
moved around: so the first panel becomes the central panel and the central panel 
replaces the third—which, in turn becomes first—or, indeed, some other 
permutation. But then I realise that in the written thesis that I have created the 
order is perfunctory/contrived and it is there for the practical purposes of having 
the conventional, standardised entity/structure of beginning, middle, and end. In 
the composite of the triptych I have created I have endeavoured to stack the 
panels atop one another and, even if read in no particular order, images and 
shadows of each panel are visible through the others.  
 
In the first chapter I introduced the women in my sample and, as I am part of my 
own sample, I stated the autobiographical content of the narrative and this 
candour has been evident throughout the thesis. Further, throughout the work I 
have reminded, prompted, and reiterated information about the women and I have 
observed the goals of feminist social research, already cited and recapitulated here 
as: “(1) to document the lives and activities of women, (2) to understand the 
experience of women from their own point of view, and (3) to conceptualize 
women’s behaviour as an expression of social context” (Reinharz and Davidman, 
1992, 51). I expressed my dilemma of being situated as the author[ity] of the 
research, as well as being a participant in the research; and clarified how I chose 
to deal with the predicament. In the introduction I explained the methodology and 
methods I use and the paradigms in/by which I work, and I indicated that these    
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boundaries are fluid. I defined my usage of names when referring to ‘Rhodesia’ 
and ‘Zimbabwe’, and the context in which they are used. Because of my desire 
for transparency in the writing of this thesis, I was frank in revealing some of the 
problems I faced during the research and used excerpts from my personal journal 
to illustrate these difficulties. The notion of transparency of writing and the 
layering of the sections was elucidated in the introduction and I signalled that the 
methods and the structure of the triptych are apparent throughout the work.  
 
The literature review, although written and presented as a separate chapter, has 
not been restricted to that chapter, for I have expanded on it and, as an 
exploration, allowed it to unfold throughout the thesis. Therefore, using the 
inspiration of transparency in structure, in the review of the literature I indicated 
by use of the metaphor of a physical map, the outline of the ground that the thesis 
covers, and this has echoes in this reprise, notably where I discussed my own 
conformation within the landscape/map of Australia. The thought of a physical 
map as a suitable metaphor for the thesis and the literature review and the images 
of the curves and contours of the earth suggested notions of ‘matrix’ and Axis 
Mundi. Within the literature review I explored aspects of autobiography to 
exonerate the use of autobiography in this work. As a prelude to the following 
chapters I referred to (and quoted from) some of the poetic works that I see as 
inherent in the processes of memory and history.  
 
Narrative in chapter three: The beginning is not at Perth Airport forms part of the 
background supporting the central panels. The chapter embraced stories and 
biography from my own family whose history as early settlers in Southern    
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Rhodesia reflects personal, present experience in Australia. Two significant 
themes in my thesis originated in this chapter: that of Australian identity, and that 
which contrasts the meanings attributed to assimilation and integration. The 
balance between personal and historical insights established the position from 
which the first stage of the rites de passage, that of separation, could commence. 
Thus, the separation from the matrix begins. The development and exploration of 
the events of this first stage of immigration are situated in, and are seen as being 
relevant to, the theory of rites de passage. In the disconnection and severance 
from the matrix that comprises separation, the tropes of homesickness and desire 
to return, arose.  
 
The immigrants’ arrival in Australia prompted further questions of identity and 
the dilemma of being mistaken for Australian women added to the confusion. 
Ambiguity of identity was explored and connected to theories of compliance. 
Notions of compliance as a method of social survival were unravelled and I 
extended these to questions of and reflections upon multiple identity such as self-
determined identity, assumed identity, and attributed identity. In this chapter I 
looked at the positionality of the subject and the privileged place of observing the 
centre from the margin. The topic of assimilation, seen through the prisms of 
coercion, compliance, and the necessity of ‘appearing’ to belong became a 
strategy of assumed assimilation that I presented as a form of camouflage and 
anarchy. The consequent process of sublimation is, I have posited, embedded in 
the liminal stage of the rites de passage. This assumed assimilation, I have 
argued, is symbolic behaviour and gives validity to the hypothesis that 
immigrants are agents-of-change, my premise being based in Victor Turner’s    
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argument that “symbolic behaviour actually ‘creates’ society for pragmatic 
purposes—including in society both structure and communitas” (Turner, 1974, 
56); and I flagged the Bourdieuian concepts of doxa, orthodoxy, heterodoxy, 
crisis and change.  
 
The discussion of identity continued with the metaphor of mirrors and non-
reflecting mirrors to reflect difference. The theory I advanced to elucidate that 
minimal difference is less acceptable than radical distortion employed the 
metaphor of True Mirrors® that is, non-reflecting mirrors, and evoked Lacan’s 
essay:  The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in 
psychoanalytic experience (1977). To support this, I drew on Bourdieu’s theories 
of doxa, orthodoxy, heterodoxy, crisis and change and developed the argument to 
include habitus, understood here as embodied history. I argued that it is the minor 
distortions we recognise in others that often reflect the traits we fail to see in 
ourselves, and that this denial of asymmetry in ourselves encourages us to 
disparage those who closely resemble us. Within this paradigm I further 
developed the theme of identity.  
 
In this thesis, the central panel of the triptych, introduced the immigrant as a 
liminal persona, and engaged with the subtle differences that separated her (as 
neophyte) from Anglo-Australians. The margin that is the liminal became the 
metaphorical province of the arcane procedures that shape the transformations in 
the  rites de passage. In this central stage I uncovered aspects of feminine 
interpretations of rites of passage (Rutter, 1994) and discovered that there are 
additional aspects of assimilation and integration to be understood and    
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interpreted. The quest for a secure placement in Australia revealed the struggle to 
separate from previous identity thus allowing me, as author, a junction to reflect 
on life in colonial Rhodesia. Notions of time/space, and the understanding that 
“liminal time is not controlled by the clock” (Turner, Victor, 1977a, 33) reminded 
me of the similarity of the liminal space to the time/space in Escher’s etchings. In 
the liminal stage, I reminded the reader that, in my hypothesis, issues of time 
reflect the metaphor of mosaic and this simile is reflected in this panel of the 
triptych. The fragmentation that reflects the tesserae of mosaic, is inherent in the 
liminal period and, I argued, provokes the disintegration of identity so that it may 
be re-formed. I linked this disintegration of identity with the ambiguity of time 
attributed to the liminal/transformation period.  
 
At the beginning, in the first stage of the rites de passage (Migration and 
Separation) I flagged the trope of homesickness and indicated that it was 
pervasive and continuing. One of the manifestations of homesickness, I have 
argued, results in the desire to ‘return home’ and this is the experience of many 
immigrants. The costly return to the home country invokes notions of time in 
memory and the significance of re-membering and forgetting. I have postulated 
that the belief that we can return ‘home’ creates a passage filled with confusion. I 
have situated the passage (filled with confusion) that I have conjured, parallel to, 
and circling, the passage from the liminal stage to the aggregation stage—the 
final panel of the triptych and of the rites de passage, and have, thus, connected 
the hypothesis to the overall theme of liminality and located it in the meta-thesis. 
I have explained that, while there the suspicion remains that things were not as 
bad as we remembered them to be, the return to the matrix is seldom permanent    
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and therefore, it is likely that there is no successful return. I addressed the 
possibility that not all liminal personae are successfully integrated and this led 
into the final stage of the tripartite image—that of integration and incorporation. 
It is at this junction that I am able to signal the conclusion of my thesis. In the 
penultimate chapter I have drawn on some historical occasions in the white 
settlement of Southern Rhodesia where the conferring of integration was 
problematic. I have connected these issues to those of ‘ownership’ of being 
‘Australian’ (or ‘Rhodesian’) and who is excluded and why. I have addressed the 
integration of the migrants into their adopted society and looked at their 
experiences of the rituals and ceremonies that are a part of becoming an 
Australian citizen. I have argued that elements of assimilation, as I have defined 
it, remain and that negotiation of positionality and identity continues. I have 
endeavoured to examine the rites of integration that include being recognised by 
others as an Australian and the recognition of ones own ‘Australian-ness’. The 
immigrants’ family, and especially the presence of children, has been flagged as 
significant in moving through the liminal and the postliminal to integration. The 
chapter concluded with my reflections on quotidian life pre-integration and post-
integration. 
 
In this, the final chapter, I have resumed the discussion surrounding Australian 
identity and drawn the tentative conclusion that claiming Australian-ness in an 
offhand, casual, or humorous way signals no ownership of the identity and 
because of that it deflects criticism and, moreover, adds to the multiplicity of 
Australian-ness that has a disregard for the political coercion that pushes for 
national identity. I discover, here, that this notion segues into the image that many    
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Australians have of themselves—be they native-born or immigrant—that of 
‘larrikin’ disdainful of authority. 
 
Finally, I consider how to conclude this dissertation in a way that is satisfactory to 
my audience, to myself, and ultimately to the women in my study. I have come to 
understand that, from my position now, my identities of self-proclaimed 
Australian, academic, and more personally, spiritual aspirant, an ending is, really, 
just another beginning. The negotiation of boundaries and the persistent doubts of 
self-identity, “who am I?” and positioning in Australia – not “where am I?” but, 
rather, “what am I doing?” remain – and are likely to do so within the delicate 
framework of Australian identity as it is presently conformed and contested.  
                                                 
i I would like to acknowledge the courtesy and assistance I have received from the Mayor of 
Melville, Katherine Jackson, and the Functions Officer, Warren Thornton, both of whom have 
been unstinting in providing material from the ceremony and answering my queries at the 
ceremony and afterwards.    
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